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The Essays
This collection of essays analyzes optimal capital requirement regulation
and its effects on the incentives of stakeholders.
The first essay, written together with my supervisor Roland Kirstein was
recently published in the Journal of Money Credit and Banking. It analyzes
under which conditions a binding capital requirement reduces the incentives
of banks to undercut in prices. Based on the strategic capacity commitment
model of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) we show that if the immediate recap-
italization insufficiently costly, capital requirement regulation induces banks
that compete in Bertrand competition to behave like Cournot competitors.
Formally, the binding capital regulation changes the strategic price setting
Bertrand game into a two stage game, where banks first have to commit to
a loan supply capacity before they compete for loan interest rates. This de-
creases the loan supply and increases loan interest rates, resulting in higher
profits for banks compared to the unregulated case. In this thesis, I add the
online appendix to the published version that provides all the proofs of the
propositions. This appendix was not part of the publication due to capacity
limits within the journal.
The second essay builds on the results of the first essay and analyzes
the impact of reduced competition on the efficiency of capital requirement
regulation in establishing financial stability. It is shown that if the markets
are concentrated, i.e., there are only few banks, the possibility to commit
for capacities and the resulting gain of price setting power can increase the
efficiency of capital regulation compared to the efficiency under perfect com-
petition.
The third essay is an equally shared work with Florian Buck from the
LMU Mu¨nchen, which is accepted for publication in the Journal of Banking
and Finance. In this paper we analyze the efficient mix of capital regulation
and banking supervision. We show that both instruments are substitutes
within a feasible set. If we allow for regulatory competition our model shows
that the implementation of the optimal policy is not feasible. An agreement
on international minimum capital standards may reduce the inefficiencies of
international competition among regulators. However, a harmonized capital
regulation may reduce the average supervisory effort.
The fourth essay concentrates on the regulator’s incentives to implement
optimal risk weighted capital requirements for risky and safe assets, i.e.,
government bonds. I show that a regulator that simultaneously regulates
the banking sector while also borrowing from the sector is confronted with a
conflict of interest. As a result a regulator with fiscal interest may set the risk
weight for risky assets to high compared to the weight for government bonds.
By doing so the banks’ demand for government bonds is increased. This eases
government spending. Therefore, the government regulator can indirectly
influence his refunding conditions and increase government spending.
Essay I
Strategic Effects of Regulatory Capital
Requirements in Imperfect Banking
Competition
EVA SCHLIEPHAKE
ROLAND KIRSTEIN
Strategic Effects of Regulatory Capital
Requirements in Imperfect Banking Competition
This paper analyzes the competitive effects of regulatory minimum capital
requirements on an oligopolistic loan market. Before competing in loan rates
banks choose their capital structure, thereby making an imperfect commit-
ment to a loan capacity. It is shown that due to this imperfect commitment,
regulatory requirements not only increase the marginal cost of loan supply,
but can also have a collusive effect resulting in increased profits. This pa-
per derives the threshold value from which capital requirements can turn
one round Bertrand competition into a two-stage interaction with capacity
commitment, leading to Cournot outcomes. Therefore, it provides theoret-
ical support for the applicability of the Cournot approach when modeling
imperfect loan competition.
JEL codes: G21, K23, L13
Keywords: capital regulation, oligopoly, capacity constraint.
WE EXAMINE THE LIKELY anticompetitive effect of capital re-
quirement regulation, as introduced by the international banking regulation under the
Basel accords, which has not been examined in the previous literature. A sound bank-
ing system is essential for ensuring economic wealth and stability. Since the banking
sector is particularly vulnerable to inefficient bank runs and contagion resulting in
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bank panics, the overall aim of banking regulation is to secure financial stability
by minimizing the likelihood of bank runs ex ante, and reducing ex post contagion
when banks fail. To achieve this goal, most countries have introduced a governmental
safety net, which includes deposit insurances, and lender of the last resort practice as
well as bailout policies. The undesirable secondary effect of such a safety net is the
destruction of market discipline, thereby providing strong moral-hazard incentives
to exploit the option value of the safety net. Greenbaum and Thakor summarize this
idea as follows:
The moral hazard engendered by one form of regulation, namely deposit insurance,
creates the need for other forms of regulation such as capital requirements. (Greenbaum
and Thakor 1995, p. 103)
The intuition is that well-capitalized banks have fewer incentives to increase asset
risks. A bank endowed with more capital is less likely to exploit the option value of
the deposit insurance, thereby reducing the probability of banking default. However,
if a binding equity regulation is introduced (or tightened), then banks have to either
reduce their assets or increase their capital. In the short run, an immediate increase
in capital in order to match the regulatory requirement may prove costly or even
impossible. Therefore, the immediate effect of increasing the capital requirements is
likely to cause a reduction in the total supply of loans and, accordingly, an increase
in the loan interest rate.
Our paper demonstrates that a binding regulatory capital requirement may alter
the sequence in which strategic decisions are made since it constrains a bank’s
lending activities in the short run. This is in line with Brander and Lewis (1986),
who analyzed the strategic impact of leverage decisions on output decisions. They
argued that increases in a firm’s leverage enhance the output level of the firm in a
Cournot oligopoly with random demand. In contrast, we concentrate on the effects
of a strategic capital choice in a deterministic Bertrand competition and examine
the impact of a capital commitment on the fierceness of the loan rate competition.
In the first stage, the capital regulated banks decide on their refunding structure,
which consists of equity and deposits. In the second stage, loan rate competition
takes place while the bank’s ability to satisfy the demand resulting from the loan rate
decision is conditioned by the amount of capital raised and the capital requirement
regulation. If recapitalization is costly, then the capital decision in the first stage is an
imperfect commitment to capacity for bank loans. Applying the model developed by
Maggi (1996) to a bank loan market, we analyze the effects of a capital requirement
regulation on the strategic behavior of oligopolistic banks. We show that if the cost
of recapitalization is above an identified threshold, banks would no longer have an
incentive to undercut each other in the second-stage loan rate competition. Due to the
binding precommitment to a loan capacity, the Bertrand loan rate competition results
in Cournot–Nash equilibrium outcomes. Our comparative static analysis shows that
an increase in the regulatory capital requirement decreases the threshold that makes
a first-stage capacity decision binding. In other words, if the capital requirement is
higher, the commitment to a loan capacity is more binding.
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Just as this collusive effect,1 the increase in banks’ marginal cost caused by capital
regulation would reduce total lending. However, in contrast to such a cost effect, the
collusive effect is likely to enhance bank profits.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 gives a short overview of the existing
theoretical literature, which analyzes the impact of capital regulation and the strand
of literature in industrial organization that is concerned with strategic commitment
to a certain capacity in oligopolies. Section 2 introduces the basic model setup and
discusses the conventional model of Cournot quantity competition that is often used
in the IO banking literature to analyze imperfect competition among banks. Section
3 introduces our adaptation of the two-stage capacity loan rate competition for the
banking market, and also shows how we derive the main results. In Section 4, we
discuss the implications of our results and show that the main results of our analysis
remain valid in a dynamic context where we allow for entry into the banking market.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
The actual impact of a regulatory capital requirement on the individual behavior
of banks and the individual incentives to take excessive risk is not undisputed in the
banking literature. Berger, Herring, and Szego¨ (1995), Santos (2001), and Van Hoose
(2007) provide comprehensive reviews of the theoretical literature regarding the
impact of capital requirement regulation. Irrespective of the ambiguous theoretical
predictions, there is a general consensus in the literature that higher capital has a
positive direct effect on the balance sheet structure, as discussed by Van Hoose (2008).
This bank default reducing effect is most often analyzed in a perfect competitive
environment, but is also valid in a Bertrand oligopoly. Carletti (2008) points out
that the majority of papers on banking regulation merely compare the equilibria of
the two extreme market structures: a monopoly case and perfect competition. These
models therefore lack the consideration of strategic interaction between financial
intermediaries.
However, the empirical evidence suggests that imperfect competition is an impor-
tant feature of most banking sectors: Berger et al. (2000) find empirical evidence that
banks in the United States made consistent profits between 1970 and 1997. Barajas
et al. (2010) apply the Rosse–Panzar (1987) H-test to the data of the holding com-
panies of large banks and reject the two extreme hypotheses of competitive and
monopolistic behavior in the banking industry.
A few theoretical papers that actually consider strategic interaction among banks
model imperfect competition as oligopolistic, quantity-setting models in the Cournot
fashion. VanHoose (1985) analyzes the effects of increased bank competition on
the ability of a central bank to pursue monetary policy. Pecchenino (1983) models
1. We call this effect “collusive” in the sense of spontaneous tacit collusion that results from a nonco-
operative Nash equilibrium and that does not expressive any actual coordination among the competitors.
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heterogenous banks that differ in risk tolerance and make decisions concerning both
the size and risk level of their portfolios, while their individual actions have spillover
effects on the actions of other banks. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) model imperfect
competition for loans a` la Cournot in order to analyze the impact of competition on
the risk that a bank takes when borrowers are able to influence the risk level of the
bank’s assets. Rime (2005) models Cournot loan market competition to analyze the
coexistence of the very risk-sensitive capital regulation under the internal ratings-
based approach in Basel II and the more risk-insensitive requirements under the
standard approach. He shows that sophisticated banks will specialize in low-risk
customers, whereas unsophisticated banks specialize in high-risk loan customers.
The application of oligopolistic quantity competition to loan supply in which banks
offer a certain amount of loans to the market and then demand for loans determines
the equilibrium loan rates, appears counterintuitive. In fact, one expects banks to
offer loan contracts that specify the loan rates, while prospective borrowers look for
the best loan contract conditions and demand the loan from the bank with the best
conditions (lowest interest rates).
We argue that modeling competition between banks a` la Cournot might be justified
because of a two-stage game, where banks first commit to loan capacities and then
compete in loan interest rates brings about the Cournot competition results. The
basic idea goes back to Edgeworth (1925), who emphasizes that due to exogenous
capacity constraints, Bertrand oligopolists may not be able to serve the whole market
demand and therefore would not undercut each other in prices until a competitive
equilibrium is reached. Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) generalize this idea for an
endogenous capacity choice. In their two-stage model, the oligopolists first compete
in capacities, followed by a competition in prices, which is strictly constrained by the
prior capacity decision. Kreps and Scheinkman conclude that when firms commit to a
certain capacity of production before price competition takes place, the capacity and
prices chosen in equilibrium are identical to the Cournot equilibrium. The question
that arises is whether such a rigid capacity constraint can be applied in the case
of lending competition among banks. Freixas and Rochet (1997) even state that a
capacity constraint may not be feasible as a starting point for a theoretical analysis
in the context of banking.
However, Freixas and Rochet (1997) may have overlooked that binding regulatory
capital requirements can indeed affect the nature of strategic competition among
banks. Following Berger, Herring, and Szego¨ (1995), we define capital requirements
to be binding if the capital ratio in the presence of regulatory capital requirements
is greater than the bank’s market capital requirement. In particular, as mentioned
by Gehrig (1995), if short-term recapitalization is costly, then capital requirements
temporarily limit a bank’s lending activities and thereby soften loan interest rate
competition.
Empirical observations suggest that many banks do hold a capital ratio that is above
the minimum capital requirement. For example, Berger, Herring, and Szego¨ (1995)
show that the observed capital to asset ratios varied considerably over time. Flannery
and Rangan (2008) report that banks’ capital-to-asset ratios increased significantly
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during the 1990s. Bolton and Freixas (2006), as well as Chami and Cosimano (2010),
offer a theoretical explanation based on dynamic considerations for the excess capital.
It is optimal for banks to hold a certain buffer above the regulatory minimum capital
requirement in order to avoid violating the regulatory constraint. Taking this into
account, a binding capital constraint can also be interpreted as a bank-specific optimal
capital ratio, which is the sum of the regulatory capital requirement and the optimal
buffer. For a detailed comparison of regulatory and actual capital ratio, see Elizalde
and Repullo (2007).
Empirical support of such a view on optimal capital ratios is provided by Barajas
et al. (2010). Analyzing bank lending behavior during the 2007–09 financial crisis,
they find strong evidence that banks optimally choose their capital structure in the
anticipation of future loan demand. Further, they find support that the lending deci-
sions during the crisis were constrained by capital rather than liquidity. Moreover,
the recent quantitative impact study (QIS) by the Basel Committee (2010) concludes
that banks are usually endowed with too little capital to fulfill the regulatory cap-
ital requirement, which suggests that the regulatory capital requirement is indeed
binding.
In our static model, we focus on the endogenous choice of capital that, with binding
capital constraints, may limit the lending capacity. We analyze the assumptions that
contribute to a strategic choice of capital through which the Bertrand competition
results in a sequential game with Cournot outcome. With regard to our main result,
which is the potentially anticompetitive effect of capital regulation, it does not matter
whether banks comply with the actual regulatory capital requirement or consider it
optimal to add a constant buffer.
We deviate from the model of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and allow the
oligopolistic banks in our framework to extend their capacities through urgent re-
capitalization measures, but this can only be done at higher cost. This assumption
reflects the idea that a sudden need to increase capital may turn out to be costly.
Empirical evidence for this idea can be found in the recent financial crisis: it was
observed that some banks faced difficulties in replacing lost capital in a timely fash-
ion. Calomiris and Herring (2012) discuss the problems that Citigroup and other
financial institutions faced in 2008 when they had to raise additional capital in order
to comply with capital requirements. Despite the urgent need to replace lost capital in
2008, institutions preferred to wait. They mention that stock prices were so low that
issuing significant amounts of stocks in order to cover the large losses incurred would
have implied substantial dilution of stockholders including existing management.
These observations support our assumption that bank managers try to avoid an im-
mediate increase of capital in order to satisfy market demand and rather prefer to
reduce the demand for loans by increasing the loan rate.
The distinction between short run and long run, or as more specifically shown in
our model, between the strategic long-term decisions made in the first stage and the
short-term decisions in the second stage reflects exactly the cost of raising capital. On
the one hand, the first-stage decision regarding the refunding structure is a strategic
decision, which is made over a long-term horizon; that is, raising capital is not
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costly. On the other hand, it can be rather costly if there is an urgent need to raise
additional equity as illustrated by the Citigroup example. The time horizon in which
management tries to avoid modifications of the refunding structure is defined in our
paper as “short term.”
In the industrial organization literature, the impact of a flexible capacity constraint
on Bertrand competition has been discussed by Gueth (1995) and Maggi (1996) for
differentiated product markets. Both studies argue that capacity constrained Bertrand
competition yields a Cournot outcome for sufficiently high additional costs of the
capacity extension in the second stage. In the case of capital regulated banks, the
decision-making process of banks cannot be reduced to the buildup and extension of
production capacities. Rather, we have to derive the banks’ optimal financial structure.
We show that the best response functions of capital regulated banks are far more
complex in our model than those of capacity constrained firms in the context of Gueth
(1995), Maggi (1996), and Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). However, our analysis
shows that the response functions in the neighborhood of a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium are functionally similar to the capacity constraint response functions
derived by Gueth and Maggi. We thereby show that a constraint on the financial
structure of loans in Bertrand competition can lead to the Cournot outcomes in a way
that is similar to a classical production capacity constraint.
By allowing for product differentiation, our model avoids one of the main short-
comings for which the Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) model has been criticized.
In their model, they assume that firms compete in a homogeneous product market,
which makes it inevitable to define a rationing rule that determines the specific de-
mand addressed to each supplier. The shortcoming is that the derived results are not
robust with regard to changes in the specific rationing rule as proven by Davidson
and Deneckere (1986). Assuming product differentiation is not only reasonable in the
relationship bank lending context, but also provides the means for accurately defining
the demand of each bank in the second stage for any loan rate pair, the results do
not depend on a specific rationing rule. Yet, in order to generalize our results, we
allow the degree of heterogeneity between banks to be close to zero and show that
our results still hold.
The theoretical setup closest to our research was modeled by Chami and Cosi-
mano (2010). They use a dynamic model to analyze the impact of monetary policy
on imperfect loan rate competition under capital regulation. The impact of capital
regulation on the strategic interaction among banks setting loan rates is captured in
a cooperative supergame of oligopolistic behavior in the fashion of Abreu, Pearce,
and Stacchetti (1990). The authors conclude that the threat of a constraint on lending
capacity also restricts the achievable profit from reneging on the coordinated loan rate
policy. Hence, capital requirements reinforce the existing collusive behavior among
banks in the dynamic cooperative supergame. Since the analysis carried out by Chami
and Cosimano concentrates on the impact of the monetary policy on loan rate com-
petition, the existence of collusive behavior is simply assumed but not endogenously
derived. In contrast, our paper provides an argument of how collusive behavior may
occur in the first place, that is, as a result of the capital requirement regulation.
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2. MODEL SETUP
2.1 Basic Definitions
Consider a loan market with two identical banks. These banks try to maximize
their profits by investing in loans that they refund with insured deposits and own
resources, that is, capital. We assume that all parties are risk neutral and the bank
management is acting in the best interest of the owner(s). Banks can only invest in
loans (L) demanded by the representative borrowers of one risk class. The investment
in assets is financed by deposits (D) and equity capital (e). This implies the balance
sheet constraint:
L ≤ e + D. (1)
The constraint is binding if banks maximize profits and cash yields no returns.
We assume that banks compete in imperfect loan rate competition. For simplicity,
we concentrate on the case of two banks that are labeled with the indices i, j =
1, 2; i #= j , even though the results could be generalized to the case where there is
an arbitrary number of banks. Boccard and Wauthy (2000), for instance, develop a
generalization of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) with regard to the oligopoly case
with n ≥ 2 competitors.
Like in the Maggi (1996) model, we use a standard linear representative consumer
model with product differentiation to describe the borrowers’ demand for loans.
Adapting the model developed by Matutes and Vives (2000), we assume that there
is a continuum of borrowers of the same type whose utility can be described by
a representative utility function.2 The following lemma summarizes the demand
structure.
LEMMA 1. If there exists a continuum of homogenous borrowers whose utility can be
described with a representative utility function of the form U (L1, L2) = m + a(L1 +
L2)− b2 (L21 + L22)− d L1L2, one can derive a generalized inverse demand function:
ri (Li , L j ) = a − bLi − d L j , (2)
provided that both banks do not ration their customers and make nonnegative profits,
the direct demand function is defined as
Li (ri , r j ) = a(b + d) −
bri
(b2 − d2) +
dr j
(b2 − d2) . (3)
2. To keep our results tractable, we abstract from different risk types of borrowers. In this respect, our
model describes the rather risk insensitive capital requirement regulation under Basel I and the Standard
Approach in Basel II (III); for example, our model describes a commercial bank lending to small- and
medium-sized enterprises. An explicit modeling of different risk classes as in the IRB Approach of Basel
II and III is beyond the scope of this paper.
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PROOF. An appendix containing the derivation of the linear differentiation model
from a representative consumer’s utility function is provided online and by the
authors upon request.3 !
In (2), ri represents the loan interest rate of bank i, and Li represents the total
lending of bank i to borrowers. It is assumed that a > b > d ≥ 1.4 If d were nega-
tive, the loans offered by the competing banks would be complements and if d = 0,
the two loans would be independent in demand. If d → b, the loans become perfect
substitutes. In our analysis, we concentrate on the more general case of a hetero-
geneous market; therefore, we do not have to invoke a specific customer rationing
rule. The heterogeneity could emerge from the reputation of the bank, the specific
service offered to the borrower or relationship banking combined with a switching
cost for borrowers. Yet, one can argue that bank loans are rather homogeneous goods.
Therefore, we will also consider the particular case d → b in our analysis.
It is further assumed that banks only choose loan rates that result in nonnegative
profits. This assumption is taken into account by introducing nonnegativity constraints
into the profit maximization problem: bri − dr j ≤ a(b − d) and d L j ≤ a − bLi .
Provided that these constraints are not violated, the inverse demand function can be
inverted5 to obtain the direct demand function.
Like Dixit and Norman (1985), we assume in our analysis that a firm is willing to
meet any level of demand beyond its installed capacity provided that the loan rate is
above the additional cost of extending the capacity. Thus, rationing is excluded from
our analysis.
2.2 The Cournot Duopoly
Later, we want to show the conditions under which the equilibrium of the two-
stage Bertrand game with capacity choice (presented in Section 3) is identical to the
outcome of a Cournot game. In order to be able to compare the results of the two-stage
game, we derive the general Cournot equilibrium outcome in the following. If banks
compete in quantities and the marginal cost of providing loans is x , bank i’s profit
function is
!i = (ri (Li , L j )− x)Li . (4)
Inserting (2) into (4) leads to the first-order condition
2bLi + d L j = a − x . (5)
3. The stable url is: http://rolandkirstein.de/jmcb/appendix.pdf.
4. Under the assumption of symmetric marginal cost and linear demand, the symmetry of second
derivatives (Young’s theorem) requires that the parameter d is equal for both banks. This can only be true
if parameters a and b are also equal for both banks.
5. The inversion is allowed under the assumption that both firms always satisfy their demand, otherwise
the quantity demanded of one firm is a function of the residual demand left by the rationing opponent. See
Boccard and Wauthy (2000) for an analysis of the robustness of the Gueth Maggi results when firms are
allowed to ration their customers. Furthermore, these equations are only valid for b #= d.
EVA SCHLIEPHAKE AND ROLAND KIRSTEIN : 683
!!!!Beforegame starts Stage 1                            Stage 2
Regulator introduces
a minimum capital
requirement δ.
Banks chose e. Banks compete in interest rates
for loans L required by borrowers.
In order to fund loans banks
take up deposits D. If necessary
to obey δ, banks recapitalize E
at higher cost.
FIG. 1. The Timeline of the Decisions Taken.
This gives the best response function in quantities
RCi (L j ) =
(a − x)− d L j
2b
, (6)
which results in the symmetric Cournot equilibrium outputs
LC (x) = (a − x)(2b − d)(2b)2 − d2 =
a − x
2b + d . (7)
The corresponding symmetric Cournot equilibrium interest rates are
rC (x) = ab + (b + d)(x)
2b + d = x +
b(a − x)
2b + d . (8)
The resulting Cournot equilibrium payoff for each bank is
!c(x) = b(a − x)
2
(2b + d)2 . (9)
3. THE TWO-STAGE MODEL
In order to analyze which parameter constellations of the minimum capital re-
quirement regulation allow for Cournot equilibrium outcomes under loan rate com-
petition, we model the loan rate competition as a two-stage game in which banks
raise capital in the first stage and compete by setting loan rates in the second
stage.
The timeline of our model is illustrated in Figure 1. In stage 0, the regulator sets
up a certain minimum capital requirement rate. Knowing this rate, the banks raise
capital in stage 1 in order to take part in the loan rate competition in stage 2. Based on
the minimum capital requirement regulation, the amount of capital then determines
a capacity for providing loans to borrowers of a certain risk class.6 In the second
6. To keep the model simple, we neglect the default probabilities of assets. However, the basic results
derived from our model will hold as long as banks invest in a fixed loan portfolio composition.
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stage, the banks compete in rates that turn into loan quantities demanded by the
borrowers.
As Tirole (1988) mentions, the Bertrand and Cournot model should not be seen as
two different models, which predict contradictory outcomes of imperfect competition.
The models rather describe the same markets with different cost structures. A change
in the cost structure can transform a Bertrand competition into a two-stage game
with Cournot outcomes. In order to understand how capital requirement regulation
influences loan rate competition among banks, we now focus on the cost structure that
results from a minimum capital requirement regulation under the basic assumptions
of our model.
3.1 Equity Regulation and Capacity
The investment in assets in our two-stage model is financed by deposits raised in
the second stage (D), as well as capital raised in the first stage (e) and capital raised
in the second stage (E) at a higher cost. This implies the extended balance sheet
constraint:
L ≤ e + E + D. (10)
We assume that depositors are fully insured against default at a premium normalized
to zero. This assumption, which is often made in the literature (e.g., Boot and Marinc
2006, Wagner 2010) allows us to neglect competition on the deposits market because
insured depositors are insensitive to the bank’s exposure to risk and are ready to
supply any amount of deposits at a deposit rate rD . We assume that the expected
rate of return on capital is higher than the return on insured deposits. This is a
common assumption in the literature (e.g., Holmstro¨m and Tirole 1993, Diamond
and Rajan 2000, Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz 2000, Repullo 2004, Hakenes and
Schnabel 2007). However, this assumption is not undisputed. We take a closer look
at the discussion regarding the cost of capital, since the assumptions we make on the
refunding cost structure of bank loans are essential for the outcome of our model.
In our model, the cost of capital represents the average return per unit of capital that
the bank has to credibly promise to capital holders so as to induce them to provide
equity. This average payment has to exceed the riskless rate on deposit funding.
Admati et al. (2010) refute the assumption that bank capital is costly to society.
They examine the macroeconomic perspective of capital cost, whereas we take a
business economics view in assuming that capital financing is more costly than
deposit funding to a specific bank. From the perspective of a single bank, factors like
tax disadvantages, agency conflicts, and the incentive effects of the banking safety
net implicate that the Modigliani–Miller theorem may not hold, which means that
capital financing is more expensive than debt financing per unit, irrespective of the
time horizon. Empirical evidence that the cost of capital is indeed above the cost of
debt financing can be found in Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson (2010) and Cosimano
and Hakura (2011).
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If capital financing were not expensive, banks would be indifferent with respect
to whether they fund their loan investments with deposits or capital. They would
therefore be willing to finance loans even with 100% capital, and there would be no
need for a minimum capital requirement regulation. By assuming the marginal cost
of capital to be re = rD + c, where c > 0 reflects the expected premium of capital
investors, we exclude this case.
Moreover, we assume that it is more costly to acquire additional capital in stage
2. As Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson (2010) point out, raising capital might create flow
costs. This cost may consist of the rate difference of urgently issued shares, as argued
by Berger, Herring, and Szego¨ (1995), or the cost of organizing an additional general
assembly. The cost can also be interpreted as a time constraint, highlighting the fact
that an immediate increase of capital would be impossible, while loan rates could be
adapted immediately.
In contrast to gradually accumulating capital by retaining earnings, an immediate
issue of new public capital may create significant costs because it might be interpreted
as a negative signal. This was first pointed out by Myers and Majluf (1984). We adopt
this assumption in our framework by defining rE = re + θ with θ > 0. If short-
run recapitalization is impossible, then θ →∞. However, to secure strictly positive
profits, we assume that the reservation loan interest rate is higher than the cost of
equity: a > rE .
We consider two stages of decision making. These stages are defined by the nature
of the cost of capital. The first-stage decision-making process captures the long-term
planning horizon of a bank.7 In this stage, decisions on retained earnings can be made.
Hence, the flow cost of capital is low and the bank faces only the cost of holding
capital on the balance sheet. After these long-term decisions have been irrevocably
made, we consider a second stage in which increasing capital requires additional cost.
This assumption is justified if banks can raise additional capital during the second
stage only by issuing new equity, which creates higher flow costs.
Under capital regulation, banks are forced to refund a percentage of their assets with
capital. We denote this percentage as the minimum capital requirement δ ∈ [0, 1].
Hence, regulation requires in the second stage e + E ≥ δL . At the beginning of the
second stage, holding capital e results in a capacity commitment to the maximum
amount of loans the bank is allowed to invest in loans L = e
δ
. This capacity com-
mitment defines a constraint above which additional recapitalization costs have to be
paid. If a bank plans to give out loans L > e
δ
, the bank has to raise additional capital
E at an expected rate rE . However, the bank is forced to cover only a share δ of the
additional loans (L − e
δ
) with capital and the remainder with deposits. Hence, E is
determined by
E = δ max
{
L − e
δ
; 0
}
= max{δL − e; 0}. (11)
7. Like in standard macroeconomic theory we refer to “long term” not in a temporal meaning, but
in the sense that all factors of production can be freely chosen, while the “short term” is defined as the
planning horizon where at least one factor of production is fixed.
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Note that with infinite recapitalization cost θ the bank is unable to raise additional
capital in the second stage. Such a setting reflects a rigid capacity constraint as
presented in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). In our model, we generalize the idea to
an imperfect capacity constraint with finite recapitalization cost θ > 0. In the next
section, we solve the two-stage game by backward induction.
3.2 The Second-Stage Bertrand Competition
Marginal cost of a bank under equity regulation. In the second stage, the capacity
e
δ
, defined by the first-stage capital decision, is an exogenous condition of the loan
rate decision. We first determine the cost and marginal cost function of a bank that
provides loans L .
LEMMA 2. A capital regulated bank that has raised capital in the first stage faces the
following piecewise-defined cost function at the beginning of the second stage:
C(L) =

ree if L ≤ e
rD L + ce if e < L ≤ e
δ
(rD + cδ)L + θ (δL − e) if L > e
δ
.
(12)
PROOF. For brievity, the proof is included in an appendix that is available online.8 !
From Lemma 2, we can easily derive the marginal cost by differentiation (note that
C(L) is not differentiable at L = e and L = e
δ
).
COROLLARY 1. In the second stage, the bank faces the following piecewise-defined
marginal cost function
MC(L) =

0 for L < e
rD for e < L <
e
δ
rD + (c + θ )δ for L > e
δ
.
(13)
If the loan demand is low (L ≤ e), no marginal cost arises since the cost of capital
is sunk in the second stage. If e < L ≤ e
δ
, the marginal cost equal the cost of deposits.
Lending above the loan capacity requires banks to increase their capital. Thus, the
marginal cost of providing additional loans is a combination of the marginal cost of
additional capital (c + θ ) plus the deposit interest rate.
Denoted as reii (r j ) and rei/δi (r j ), the loan rate of bank i is implicitly defined
by Li (reii (r j ), r j ) = ei and Li (rei/δi (r j ), r j ) = ei/δ. At these critical loan rates, the
residual loan demand for bank i for a given loan rate of the opponent r j equals the
8. The stable url is: http://rolandkirstein.de/jmcb/appendix.pdf.
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fixed capital ei and the loan capacity ei/δ, respectively. The closed-form expressions
for the critical loan rates are:
r
ei
i (r j ) :=
(b − d)a − (b2 − d2)ei + dr j
b
(14)
r
ei/δ
i (r j ) :=
(b − d)a − (b2 − d2) ei
δ
+ dr j
b
. (15)
Note that for a given r j and ei , it must hold that reii (r j ) > rei/δi (r j ) for any δ ∈ [0, 1].
These capital and capacity clearing rates are increasing in the opponent’s rate, as well
as in the exogenous parameter a that captures the potential loan demand. If the
opponent’s loan rate r j and/or the potential market demand is higher, the residual
demand addressed to bank i is also higher. In order to clear the given capacity,
the clearing rates must increase. Choosing a loan rate ri ≥ reii (r j ) will result in a
residual demand that is lower or equal to the capital the bank has raised in the first
stage. Hence, the marginal cost for providing loans in the second stage is zero. A
loan rate reii (r j ) > ri ≥ rei/δi (r j ) results in a residual demand that is greater than
the first-stage capital, but lower or equal to the loan capacity. The marginal cost of
supplying loans at such a rate would therefore be given by the second piece of (13).
A loan rate chosen below the capacity clearing rate rei/δi (r j ) > ri results in residual
demand above the loan capacity of the capital requirement regulation. In order to
satisfy the demand above capacity, bank i needs to raise additional capital in stage 2
and marginal cost of providing loans at such a low loan rate are defined by the third
piece of (13).
Best response functions. Assuming that banks will try to maximize their overall
profits, we can state the objective function of bank i in the second stage as
!i (ri , r j ) =

ri Li − reei if ri ≥ reii (r j )
(ri − rD)Li − cei if reii (r j ) > ri ≥ rei/δi (r j )
(ri − rD − δ(c + θ ))Li + θei if rei/δi (r j ) > ri .
(16)
The positive last term in the third piece of the profit function reflects the saved cost
from raising capital in the first stage. Note that the profit function is not differentiable
at the points Li = ei and Li = eiδ . Choosing moderate levels of capital in the first
stage will result in binding capacity constraints of the second-stage loan rate compe-
tition. These imperfect constraints result in the discussed discontinuities of the profit
function (i.e., cost function). To ascertain the best response regarding the loan rate
choice of bank i to any loan rate chosen by bank j , we, therefore, have to distinguish
the different cases that can arise, depending on the capital levels raised by both banks
in the first stage and the parameters of the model. A loan rate pair (ri , r j ) results in a
certain quantity demanded from each bank. For a given level of ei , we determine the
best response loan rate choice, depending on the relation of the realized demand to the
loan capacity of bank i . We call bank i’s best loan rate response function “consistent”
if, for a specified value of r j and the given ei , this bank’s demand Li is indeed
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included in the specified interval for which the chosen loan rate is the best response
in terms of the profit maximization program. Lemma 3 derives the consistent best
response function of bank i for each possible case.
LEMMA 3.
(a) For given values of ei , e j , δ under the assumed demand system, a best response
function Ri (r j ) is represented as
Ri (r j ) =

(b − d)a + dr j
2b
=: RI
(b − d)a − (b2 − d2)ei + dr j
b
=: RI I
(b − d)a + dr j + brD
2b
=: RI I I
(b − d)a − (b2 − d2)ei
δ
+ dr j
b
=: RI V
(b − d)a + dr j + b(rD + δ(c + θ ))
2b
=: RV
br j − (b − d)a
d
=: RV I
1
2
(a + rd + δ(c + θ )) =: RV I I
,
which is consistent if the following holds
RI ⇐⇒ [0 ≤ Li (Ri (r j ), r j ) < ei and r j < rlj (ei )]
RI I ⇐⇒ [Li (Ri (r j ), r j ) = ei and rlj (ei ) ≤ r j ≤ rhj (ei )]
RI I I ⇐⇒ [ei < Li (Ri (r j ), r j ) < ei/δ and rhj (ei ) < r j < r Lj (ei )]
RI V ⇐⇒ [Li (Ri (r j )i , r j ) = ei/δ and r Lj (ei ) ≤ r j ≤ r Hj (ei )]
RV ⇐⇒ [ei/δ < Li (Ri (r j ), r j ) and r Hj (ei ) < r j ≤ r L=0j (ei )]
RV I ⇐⇒ [L j (Ri (r j ), r j ) = 0 and r L=0j < r j < r L
M
j ]
RV I I ⇐⇒ [Li (Ri (r j )i , r j ) ≥ L Mi and r L
M
j ≤ r j ].
(b) Depending on the parameters of the model and the chosen capital in the first
stage, a maximum of seven cases can occur, which are indicated above.
PROOF. An appendix containing the detailed proof as well as the derivation of the
critical values of r j is available online.9 !
RI to RVII capture the possible branches that can be a part of the best response func-
tion of the capital regulated bank, where the superscripts I to VII refer to the specific
function. L Mi denotes the loan amount demanded at the monopoly loan rate. The right
9. The stable url is: http://rolandkirstein.de/jmcb/appendix.pdf.
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column defines intervals for the opponent’s loan rate. Together with the capital choice
of the first stage, each interval defines a residual demand, which then determines the
best reaction of the bank. The interval rlj (ei ) ≤ r j ≤ rhj (ei ) corresponds to a fairly low
loan interest choice of the opponent (superscripts l and h correspond to moderately
low and moderately high) such that the resulting residual demand for bank i can be
financed with the capital raised in the first stage. The interval r Lj (ei ) ≤ r j ≤ r Hj (ei )
(superscripts L and H correspond to the lower and upper bound of an opponent’s
fairly high loan interest rate) corresponds to a fairly high loan interest rate chosen by
the opponent, which results in a residual demand that can be satisfied with first-stage
capital and deposits, but without raising additional capital. The superscript L = 0
corresponds to a loan interest rate of the opponent that results in zero demand for the
opponent (where the Kuhn Tucker condition on nonnegative loan demand becomes
binding) and r L Mj refers to an interest rate of the opponent that results in a residual
demand that is greater or equal to the monopoly demand.
The intuition of Lemma 3 is that bank i chooses the optimal loan rate ri according
to its residual demand function for a given r j . As r j increases, the optimal loan rate
reaction is thereby given by the identified response functions. The intersections of
the respective response functions determine the individual threshold values for r j .
For a very low loan rate of bank j , the residual demand for bank i is very low and
smaller than the capacity. Therefore, the optimal response r∗i is the Bertrand loan
rate for producing below the capacity constraint. The branches of the best response
function then follow the logic that as bank j increases its loan rate, the residual
demand for bank i also increases. If the opponent chooses a loan rate, such that the
residual demand for loans from bank i increases above the capacity due to the jump
in marginal cost, the capacity clearing loan rate is still below the Bertrand loan rate
of expanding capacity. Hence, the optimal response is not to expand capacity, but to
ask for the capacity clearing loan rate until the residual demand is so high that the
best response Bertrand loan rate that takes the recapitalization cost θ into account
is above the capacity clearing loan rate. If the opponent increases the loan rate even
more until it reaches L j (Ri (r j ), r j ) = 0, then bank i’s best response is to increase
its loan rate further until the best reaction loan rate equals the monopoly loan rate.
However, bank i would only increase its loan rate up to the monopoly loan rate. It
would not be optimal to further increase the loan rate as a response to increases in
the opponent’s loan rate. The best response function becomes horizontal.
Figure 2 illustrates the findings of Lemma 3. For a given parameter constellation,
the chosen capital levels of the first stage specify how many branches the best response
function consists of. The actual best response function is given by the bold line, while
the narrow lines are the respective branches. The labels I to VII capture the branches
RI to RVII that are part of the best response function.
For relatively low levels of capital (ei → 0), the best response function consists
solely of branches RV,RVI, and RVII. Without any capital raised in the first stage,
bank i has to raise capital in the second stage to be able to supply loans. This case is
illustrated in Figure 3. !
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FIG. 2. The Best Response Function with Seven Branches.
FIG. 3. The Best Response Function with No Capital Raised in the First Stage.
Subgame perfect loan rates. If the capital amount in the first stage translates into a
capacity that allows the entire market to be served (monopoly supply), bank i will
never need to raise additional capital in the second stage. Hence, branch RV is not a
part of the best response function as illustrated in Figure 4.
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FIG. 4. The Best Response Function with High Capital.
FIG. 5. The Best Response Function Very High Capital.
If bank i has raised very high levels of capital such that it can refund the
whole market demand for loans by its capital raised in the first stage, the best
response function only consists of branches RI,RVI, and RVII as illustrated in
Figure 5.
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There are other cases in addition to these extreme cases; however, an analysis of
them would be redundant. In the interest of brevity, we only discuss the extreme
cases here, since a detailed discussion of the different cases is unnecessary for the
derivation of a subgame perfect equilibrium as Lemma 4 shows.
LEMMA 4. The branches RI,RII,RVI, and RVII of the best response function cannot
be part of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
PROOF. Branches RVI and RVII cannot form a Nash equilibrium since firm j faces
zero demand and earns zero profits. Lowering r j could strictly increase profits; thus,
bank j would be strictly better off by deviating from the high loan rate decision.
Branches RI and RII can also be excluded from the set of candidates for a subgame
perfect equilibrium. If bank i anticipates limiting its loan supply to Li ≤ ei in the
second stage, it would save cost (i.e., profit maximizing) to choose a lower level of
capital in the first stage. !
PROPOSITION 1. For any pair of capital levels ei , e j chosen in the first stage, the
subgame perfect equilibrium choice of loan rates in the second stage is unique if
d #= b.
PROOF. From Lemma 4 we know that only branches RIII, RIV, and RV are feasible
candidates for a subgame perfect equilibrium. The best reaction function is kinked;
however, it is continuous and monotone increasing. From Lemma 3 we can derive
the slopes of branches RIII and RV that equal d2b , respectively, and the slope of branch
RIV that is equal to db . With b > d > 0, all branches have a slope between 0 and 1.
Hence, the intersect between the two banks’ best response function is unique.10 !
3.3 The First-Stage Capital Choice
Knowing the feasible intersects of the best response functions in the second stage, it
is possible to determine the first-stage payoffs as a function of the respective capacity
choices. Anticipating the best response equilibria of the second stage, bank i chooses
an optimal level of capital that results in a capacity equal to the equilibrium demand
of the second stage. It would not be profit enhancing to deviate from a capacity choice
that equals demand in the second stage since capital is expensive in our model. A
profit-maximizing bank therefore takes no more capital than is required by regulation
to satisfy the loans demanded in the second stage. Reducing the capital to the required
level for satisfying loan demand in the second stage would not affect the demand and
loan rates; however, it saves cost. Similarly, a capacity below the anticipated equilib-
rium demand would not be optimal because raising additional capital in the first stage
10. The proposition holds for the slightest degree of differentiation. Yet, the particular case of perfectly
homogeneous loans is not covered in our model. In this case, where b = d, the slope of branch RIV
equals ∂Ri (r j )
∂r j
= 1, such that an intersection of the reaction functions at these branches give a continuum of
equilibria and a unique pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist. However, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)
show that in a perfectly homogeneous loan rate competition with efficient rationing, a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium can also exist.
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would save on the costs associated with recapitalization in the second stage without
influencing the equilibrium loan rates or demand in the second stage. Hence, in the
first-stage equilibrium, a profit-maximizing bank will raise the exact amount of capital
required for satisfying the equilibrium demand in the second stage ei = δLi (r∗).
Applying this argument to both agents, it becomes clear that only the intersect of
RIV of the best reaction function qualifies for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
of the whole game. This intersect defines a capacity clearing equilibrium where the
loan rates chosen in the second stage guarantee a demand that just clears the capacity
defined by the capital raised in the first stage.
In general, the optimal loan rate choice is implicitly defined at the point where the
marginal benefit from loan rate cutting, reflected by an increased demand resulting
from lowering the loan rate, equals the marginal cost of expanding the supply of
loans. In an unconstrained Bertrand competition, the Cournot loan rates can never
be sustained in equilibrium, since the marginal benefit from loan rate undercutting
outweighs the marginal costs of supply until the loan rate equals the marginal costs.
Now suppose the banks raise the exact capital required for supplying the Cournot
loan quantities in the second stage. The capacity clearing loan rate of the second
stage would then be the Cournot loan rates. Undercutting this loan rate would only be
beneficial if the marginal benefit of increased demand outweighs the marginal costs
of expanding the loan capacity. Let θ H denote the critical level of the recapitalization
cost during the second stage, that is, the level that exactly outweighs the marginal
benefits of expanding capacity.
LEMMA 5. The critical recapitalization cost value θ H is unique and given by θ H =
d2(a−rD−cδ)
(2b−d)bδ .
PROOF. Let rB(θ ) := ((b−d)a+b(rD+(c+θ)δ))(2b−d) denote the symmetric Bertrand loan rate
with costly recapitalization in the second stage (L(rB(θ )) ≥ e/δ), that is, the in-
tersection of the branches RV of both banks.11 From (8) we have rC (rD − cδ) :=
ab+(b+d)(rD−cδ)
2b+d as the Cournot loan rate for the marginal cost of supplying the
Cournot quantity without recapitalization, which is represented as (L(rC (rD − cδ)) =
LC = a−rD−cδ)2b+d ). Without loss of generality, we assume that both banks raised e =
δL(rC (rD − cδ)) in stage 1. Note that even with a differentiated, but linear demand,
the Bertrand equilibrium loan rate is always below the Cournot equilibrium loan rate
for the equal marginal cost, that is, rB(x) < rC (x). Vives (1985) shows that with linear
demand, the Cournot loan rate is always greater than the Bertrand loan rate in differen-
tiated duopolies. Hence, at least for an arbitrarily small recapitalization cost (θ → 0)
it must hold that rB(θ ) < rC (rD − cδ). In this case, both banks announce rB(θ ), under-
cut Cournot loan rates, recapitalize and supply L(rB(θ )) > L(rC (rD − cδ); therefore,
11. Formally, r Bi (θ ) = argmax(ri − rD − δ(c + θ ))Li − θei gives the first-order condition Ri (r j ) =
(b−d)a+dr j+b(rD+d(c+j))
2b . A symmetric equilibrium requires
dr+(b−d)a+b(rD+d(c+j))
2b = 2br+(b−d)a+b(rD+d(c+j))d . Solving
for r gives ((b−d)a+b(rD+(c+θ )δ))(2b−d) .
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the Cournot equilibrium does not sustain loan rate competition; that is, the the first-
stage capacity choice is not binding. Increasing the recapitalization cost θ increases
rB(θ ), but leaves rC (rD − cδ) unchanged. Therefore, there must be a positive value of
θ H such that rB(θ ) > rC (rD − cδ) ∀θ > θ H . This critical value is implicitly defined
by rB(θ ) = rC (rD − cδ) or ((b−d)a+b(rD+(c+θ)δ))(2b−d) = ab+(b+d)(rD−cδ)2b+d . Solving for θ gives
θ H = d2(a−rD−cδ)(2b−d)bδ . !
PROPOSITION 2. The symmetric two-stage game has a unique subgame perfect equi-
librium consisting of
e∗ =
{
δL(rB(θ ))
δLC (rD − cδ)
iff θ < θ H
iff θ ≥ θ H
r∗ =
{
rB(θ )
rC (rD − cδ)
iff θ < θ H
iff θ ≥ θ H .
PROOF. In the deterministic environment of our model, each bank anticipates the
second stage-loan rate equilibrium. Therefore, optimal capacity choice is the cap-
ital that satisfies ei (e j ) = δL(ri (ei ), r j (e j ), where ri (ei ), r j (e j ) is the second-stage
loan rate pair that satisfies max(ri − rD + cδ)D(ri , r j ) subject to r j = R j (ri , eiδ ) and
r I I Ii ≤ r∗i ≤ r Vi . From Lemma 5, we know that for θ < θ H the second-stage sym-
metric loan rate choice is the Bertrand loan rate with the marginal cost of expending
capacity (i.e., recapitalization in the second stage) rB(θ ). Since rB(θ ) < rC (rD − cδ)
for θ < θ H , the Cournot loan rates do not sustain the loan rate competition. Anticipat-
ing L(rB(θ )rB(θ )) as the demand resulting from the second-stage loan rate choices,
the optimal capital amount raised by each bank is e∗ = δL(rB(θ ), rB(θ )).
Now consider the case where the recapitalization costs are θ ≥ θ H and hence,
rB(θ ) ≥ rC (rD − cδ). For high recapitalization costs, the banks anticipate that once
Cournot capacities are installed, undercutting in loan rates is not beneficial. Hence,
the symmetric Cournot loan rate pair is included in the subset characterized by the
two constraints of the maximization problem. The optimal capacity (capital) choice
is therefore equal to the optimal quantity choice. Formally, the optimal capacity
decision has to equal the anticipated demand. Hence, firms know that the optimal
loan rate in the second stage will be the intersect of branch RIVof both agents. The
first-stage optimal capacity choice can therefore also be written as
ri (ei , e j ) = a − b ei
δ
− d e j
δ
. (17)
Both banks maximize the objective function with respect to the constraint of the
optimal capital level simultaneously, which is represented as
max
ei
!i = (ri (ei , e j )− rD)ei
δ
− cei . (18)
EVA SCHLIEPHAKE AND ROLAND KIRSTEIN : 695
The first-order condition is
(a − rD − δc)− 2b ei
δ
− d e j
δ
= 0. (19)
A symmetric capital choice can then be derived, which is represented as
e∗ = δ a − (rD + δc)(2b + d) . (20)
The following symmetric loan rate choice in the second stage is then
r∗ = (ab + (b + d)(rD + δc))
2b + d . (21)
We characterized the general Cournot equilibrium outcomes as functions of a
marginal cost x in (7), (8), and (9).
Substituting the first-stage cost of supplying loans x = rD + δc, we obtain
LC (rD + δc) = a − (rD + δc)2b + d = e
∗/δ
and
rC (rD + δc) = ab + (b + d)((rD + δc))2b + d = r
∗. !
The optimal symmetric capacity and the loan rates associated with it result in the
following symmetric profits:
!c(rD + δc) = b(a − (rD + δc))
2
(2b + d)2 = !
∗. (22)
If short-term recapitalization is costly, the unique symmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium of the two-stage capital loan rate choice competition is to issue capital
in the first stage that supports the Cournot equilibrium quantities. As a consequence,
the symmetric banks are able to realize Cournot profits. The intuition is that if short-
term capitalization is sufficiently costly, the imperfect precommitment to capacities
becomes perfect. If the extension of the capacity in the second stage is (marginally)
too costly, the bank has an incentive to undercut its opponent in loan rates since the
marginal cost of serving the demand above capacity exceeds the marginal benefit of
attracting additional loans. That is why banks only want to meet the demand up to
their capacity. Anticipating the credible precommitment, the Cournot capacity choice
is the unique equilibrium of the first stage. Note that in the symmetric equilibrium,
the optimal loan rates chosen generate a demand that exactly clears the capacity.
Without excess demand above capacity, the bank does not incur any recapitalization
costs. Thus, for imperfect capacity commitment (θ < θ H ), banks in the symmetric
equilibrium also set loan rates higher than the Bertrand loan rate for the actual
marginal costs incurred by the bank rB(θ ) > rB(rD + δc). Thus, even an imperfect
commitment to capital raised in the first stage enhances profits.
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3.4 The Impact of Capital Regulation
The analysis has shown that a binding regulatory capital requirement may reduce
the incentives of banks to undercut each other in loan rates. This collusive effect results
from the strategic complementarity of loan rates. Anticipating the best response
function in the second stage, the banks have an incentive to strategically underinvest
into capital during the first stage, thereby reducing the incentives to undercut in loan
interest rates in the second stage. For any cost equal to or above the critical threshold,
it would be optimal to precommit in the first stage to a financial structure that exactly
allows for Cournot capacities and resulting in Cournot loan rates in the second stage,
which maximizes the noncooperative equilibrium profits. From Lemma 5, we know
that the critical recapitalization cost value is a function of the capital requirement rate
δ. Capital regulation, therefore, influences the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
that was characterized in Proposition 2. The impact of capital regulation on the
equilibrium is summarized in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3.
(a) The critical recapitalization cost value is decreasing in the capital requirement
rate δ.
(b) A critical value of the minimum capital requirement δH exists where whenever
the regulator sets a minimum capital requirement above this threshold, ceteris paribus,
the Cournot outcomes define the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
PROOF.
(a) Partial differentiation yields ∂θH
∂δ
= − d2(a−rD )(2b−d)bδ2 . Since by assumption a > rD and
b > d it is clear that ∂θH
∂δ
< 0.As d approaches b (the loans are nearly homogeneous),
this value approaches
(− (a−rD )
δ2
)
, which is clearly negative. The critical value of
recapitalization cost that allows a Cournot equilibrium to be sustained in Bertrand
competition is decreasing in the minimum capital requirement rate.
(b) Because the recapitalization cost threshold is decreasing in the capital require-
ment, there must exist a capital requirement δH (θ ) for which it must hold that the
critical recapitalization cost threshold is below the actual cost θ ≥ θ H (δH ). This crit-
ical capital requirement is implicitly defined by Lemma 5 and its explicit expression
is δH = d2(a−rD )
θ(2b−d)b+cd2 . From Proposition 2, we know that a recapitalization cost above
the critical threshold results in the Cournot outcomes as a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium. !
COROLLARY 2. For δ < δH , ceteris paribus, the symmetric equilibrium loan supply
resulting from r∗i = rB(θ ) is L∗i = L(rB(θ )), which is greater than the Cournot quan-
tity LC , since rB(θ ) < rC . However, with 0 < θ < θ H the equilibrium loan supply
is greater than the one-stage Bertrand equilibrium L∗i < L(rB(rD + δc)) because
rB(θ ) > rB(rD + δc).
Corollary 2 demonstrates that if δ < δH , the loan rate competition under capital
regulation does not entail Cournot outcomes; however, the equilibrium loan rates are
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still higher than in the unregulated loan rate competition. Similarly, the equilibrium
quantities are also lower and the profits are higher with regulation.
4. DISCUSSION
4.1 Dynamic Context, Potential Entry
The analysis presented in the previous sections is based on a static perspective
of the market. The main result is that banks in Bertrand competition can use equity
regulation to generate higher profits. However, these positive profits could attract
new entrants if barriers to entry are low. Additional competitors would thereby
erode the Cournot profits. In modern banking, the barriers to market entry seem to
be low, which would challenge the practical relevance of our results in a dynamic
setting. However, Rhoades (1997) points out that despite the growing importance of
electronic banking and improvements in information processing, the lack of customer
information, switching costs, and sunk costs create significant barriers to entry in
modern banking. Furthermore, several empirical studies provide strong evidence
on the existence of significant entry barriers in banking. In a data set of Italian
banks before and after deregulation, Gobbi and Lotti (2004) find that credit market
incumbents in credit markets have an informational advantage over new entrants.
More recently, Berger and Dick (2007) identify an early mover entry advantage in the
data of 10,000 U.S. banks in local retail markets. Similarly, Adams and Amel (2007)
find that moderate changes in market conditions do not increase the likelihood of entry
in retail banking. Despite these barriers to entry, the banking sector in many countries
is strictly regulated, and often obtaining a license is prerequisite for operating as
a bank. If licenses are restricted and scarce, new competitors are not allowed to
enter the banking sector, which creates a significant barrier to entry for outside
competitors.
When discussing repeated interaction and potential entry, it therefore seems to be
justified to assume that entry costs in modern banking are nonnegligible. Let F > 0
denote the fixed cost of entry. Further, let !(N ) denote the individual profit of each
bank in a symmetric Cournot Nash equilibrium with N competitors that is strictly
decreasing in N . Observing the profit level !(n) > F > 0 in a loan market with n
incumbents, a potential entrant will enter if, and only if !(n + 1) ≥ F . If F is low,
potential entrants will enter the loan market and decrease future profits. However,
as long as F > 0, a number m of incumbent banks exists, such that !(m) > F but
!(m + 1) < F , implying that a potential entrant would face negative profits and will
therefore abstain from entry. Since F > 0, it must hold that !(m) > 0. Hence, with a
certain fixed cost of entry, banks competing in Cournot fashion make strictly positive
profits even in a dynamic framework where we allow for free entry.
We therefore conclude that as long as positive fixed cost of entry exists, capital
requirements can reduce competitive forces and therefore be an explanation for
strictly positive profits in the banking industry.
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4.2 Conclusion
We have shown that banks that are competing in Bertrand competition can use
minimum capital requirements to credibly commit to Cournot capacities and, thereby,
achieve Cournot profits. By showing that binding capital requirement regulation can
establish collusive behavior among banks we come to similar conclusions as Chami
and Cosimano (2010) in a collusive setting, even though our starting point is the
noncooperative strategic behavior of banks.
The main prerequisite for our results is that the recapitalization cost in the second
stage are high, that is, above the threshold described in Lemma 5. The intuition is
that banks, which are facing a binding capital requirement, prefer to cut back lending
opposed to raising additional equity capital. This appears to be in line with recent
empirical observations we discussed in the literature review.
Contrary to that part of the banking literature that argues that regulatory capital
requirements reduce the profits of banks because they increase the cost of offering
loans, this paper shows that regulation can also enhance the bank’s profits, and thus
the charter value of the bank in excess of the increased cost of capital. Therefore, our
theoretical results help to explain the occurrence of substantial profits in Bertrand
banking markets. Furthermore, they provide a justification for the usage of the Cournot
model in theoretical banking models of imperfect competition even if banks actually
compete in loan interest rates.
The potential welfare effects remain ambiguous. On the one hand, increased profits
may stabilize the banking sector by reducing risk-taking incentives of banks due
to an increase in the banks’ charter value. On the other hand, the reduction in
competition reduces borrower rents and may lead to inefficiencies in the loan market.
Assuming that the regulator aims at an optimal trade-off between incentives for the
competitiveness of bank services and stability in the banking sector, the collusive
effect should be considered in the design of prudential regulation, especially in the
discussion of an increase in capital requirements.
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Appendix
Lemma 1. If there exists a continuum of homogenous borrowers whose utility can be
described with a representative utility function of the form U(L1, L2) = m+ a(L1+L2)−
b
2 (L
2
1 + L
2
2)− dL1L2 , one can derive a generalized inverse demand function:
ri(Li, Lj) = a− bLi − dLj . (1)
Provided that both both banks do not ration their customers and make non-negative
profits, the direct demand function is defined as:
Li(ri, rj) =
a
(b+ d)
− bri
(b2 − d2) +
drj
(b2 − d2) . (2)
Proof. We adopt the model of Matutes and Vives (2000) by assuming there is a continuum
of borrowers of the same type with the following representative utility function, which is
represented as:
U(L1, L2) = m+ a(L1 + L2)− b
2
(L21 + L
2
2)− dL1L2
Where m represents all other goods and pm = 1 is the normalized loan rate for all
other goods. The representative borrower tries to maximize his utility subject to the
budget constraint Y ≥ m + r1L1 + r2L2 where Y is the income of the borrower. The
Lagrangian function to describe the optimization problem is as follows:
maxL(L1, L2) =
m+ a(L1 + L2)− b2 (L21 + L22)− dL1L2 + λ(Y −m− r1L1 − r2L2)
The Kuhn–Tucker conditions are:
a− bL1 − dL2 − λr1 ≤ 0 L1 ≥ 0 L1(a− bL1 − dL2 − λr1) = 0 (3)
2
a− bL2 − dL1 − λr2 ≤ 0 L2 ≥ 0 L2(a− bL2 − dL1 − λr2) = 0 (4)
1− λ ≤ 0 m ≥ 0 m(1− λ) = 0 (5)
Y −m− r1L1 − r2L2 ≤ 0 λ ≥ 0 λ(Y −m− r1L1 − r2L2) = 0 (6)
If the borrower’s income Y is sufficiently large, such that m > 0 , from 5 we obtain
that:
λ = 1 (7)
which implies the equation below with (6):
Y = m+ r1L1 + r2L2 (8)
Substituting (7) in (3) and (4), we obtain the following:
a− bL1 − dL2 − r1 ≤ 0 L1 ≥ 0 L1(a− bL1 − dL2 − r1) = 0 (9)
a− bL2 − dL1 − r2 ≤ 0 L2 ≥ 0 L2(a− bL2 − dL1 − r2) = 0 (10)
With positive demand for loans from both banks L1 > 0 and L2 > 0 we obtain the
inverse demand curves below:
r1(L1, L2) = a− bL1 − dL2 (11)
r2(L1, L2) = a− bL2 − dL1 (12)
3
Since demand for loans of both banks is positive, we can invert the inverse demand
curves in order to obtain the direct demand curves (note that a(b−d)(b2−d2) =
a
(b+d) ), as follows:
L1(r1, r2) =
a
(b+ d)
− br1
(b2 − d2) +
dr2
(b2 − d2) (13)
L2(r1, r2) =
a
(b+ d)
− br2
(b2 − d2) +
dr1
(b2 − d2) (14)
If the demand for one bank is zero (i.e., Lj = 0) while the demand for the competitor
is positive (i.e., Li > 0), (9) and(10) imply that the inverse demand for loans from bank
i is:
ri(Li) = a− bLi
and the direct demand function that bank i faces is:
Li(ri) =
a− ri
b
At the same time, the Kuhn–Tucker conditions for the demand for loans j with the
binding constraint Lj = 0 imply that:
rj > a− dLi.
Lemma 2. A capital regulated bank that has raised capital in the first stage faces the
following piecewise–defined cost function at the beginning of the second stage:
C(L) =

ree if L ≤ e
rDL+ ce if e < L ≤ e/δ
(rD + cδ)L+ θ(δL− e) if L > e/δ
(15)
4
Proof. Since the balance sheet constraint is binding, we can write D as a function of loans
and capital D = L − E − e. If the bank invests in loans L ≤ e, it can refund its assets
solely out of the capital raised in the first stage at cost re. Hence, D = 0 and E = 0.
Intending to provide loans L > e, the bank needs to raise additional funds. Since
refunding with deposits is cheaper (by assumption) than raising additional capital, the
bank will refund the assets with deposits. No additional capital is required by regulation,
in which E = 0 in the second stage. The cost of providing a loan amount e < L < e/δ is
given by ree + rD(L − e). Since re − rD = c, the cost of funding consists of the deposit
rate times the total loan amount plus the risk premium for the capital raised in the first
stage.
If the asset investment exceeds the first–stage loan capacity L > e/δ, the bank is forced
to raise additional capital in the second stage in order to comply with the minimum
capital requirement. The additional capital is expressed as E = δL − e. Refunding cost
can therefore be summarized as rDD+ ree+ rEE. Using the balance constraint leads to
rD(L − δL) + (rD + c) e + (rD + c + θ) δ (L − e/δ), which can be simplified to the third
piece of the cost function.
Lemma 3. a) For given values of ei, ej , δ under the assumed demand system, a best
response function Ri(rj) is represented as:
Ri(rj) =

(b−d)a+drj
2b =: R
I
(b−d)a−(b2−d2)ei+drj
b =: R
II
(b−d)a+drj+brD
2b =: R
III
(b−d)a−(b2−d2) eiδ +drj
b =: R
IV
(b−d)a+drj+b(rD+δ(c+θ))
2b =: R
V
brj−(b−d)a
d =: R
V I
1
2 (a+ rd + δ(c+ θ)) =: R
V II
,
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which is consistent if the following holds:
RI ⇐⇒ [0 ≤ Li(Ri(rj), rj) < ei ∧ rj < rlj(ei)]
RII ⇐⇒ [Li(Ri(rj), rj) = ei ∧ rlj(ei) ≤ rj ≤ rhj (ei)]
RIII ⇐⇒ [ei < Li(Ri(rj), rj) < ei/δ ∧ rhj (ei) < rj < rLj (ei)]
RIV ⇐⇒ [Li(Ri(rj)i, rj) = ei/δ ∧ rLj (ei) ≤ rj ≤ rHj (ei)]
RV ⇐⇒ [ei/δ < Li(Ri(rj), rj) ∧ rHj (ei) < rj ≤ rL=0j (ei)]
RV I ⇐⇒ [Lj(Ri(rj), rj) = 0 ∧ rL=0j < rj < rL
M
j ]
RV II ⇐⇒ [Li(Ri(rj)i, rj) ≥ LMi ∧ rL
M
j ≤ rj ].
b) Depending on the parameters of the model and the chosen capital in the first stage,
a maximum of seven cases can occur, which are indicated above.
Proof. To prove part a) of Lemma 3, we proceed as follows. We first derive the first order
condition for each piece of the profit function that implicitly defines the best loan rate
response (i.e., RI , RIII , RV ) for each of the cases discussed. Then we consider the points
of discontinuity (RII , : RIV ). We then discuss the remaining possible cases (RV I , RV II).
Finally, we show that part b) of Lemma 3 must hold.
From Lemma 2 we obtain bank i’s piecewise–defined objective functionmaxriΠi(ri, rj).
A best response function Ri(rj) is implicitly defined by Π′i(Ri(rj), rj) = 0. The first or-
der conditions for the three pieces of bank i’s objective function can be summarized as
(ri −MC(L))L′i + Li = 0 with L′i = − bb2−d2 . Substituting L′i and solving for ri gives:
ri =
(b− d)a+ drj + b(MC)
2b
(16)
Inserting the pieewise defined marginal cost into the best response function givesRI , RIII , RV :
RI: If the best response to rj results in a residual demand 0 ≤ L(Ri(rj), rj) < ei, the
marginal costs in the second stage are MC(L(p)) = 0. Substituting and solving for ri
gives Ri(rj) =
(b−d)a+drj
2b . We now have to show that Li(Ri(rj), rj) < ei ∀ rj < rlj(ei) :=
2(b2−d2)ei−(b−d)a
d . In closed form this can be rewritten as ei >
a
(b+d) − b(b2−d2) (b−d)a+drj2b +
6
drj
(b2−d2) . This can be simplified to 2ei(b
2− d2) > a(b− d) + drj , or 2(b
2−d2)ei−(b−d)a
d > rj
, which holds ∀ rj < rlj(ei).
RIII: If the best response to rj results in a residual demand ei < Li(Ri(rj), rj) < eiδ ,
the second–stage marginal cost are MC(L(p)) = rD, which results in the best reac-
tion Ri(rj) =
(b−d)a+drj+brD
2b . We first show that ei < Li(Ri(rj), rj) holds ∀ rhj (ei) :=
2(b2−d2)ei−(b−d)a+brD
d < rj < r
L
j (ei) :=
2(b2−d2)ei/δ−(b−d)a
d . The closed form is ei <
a
(b+d) − b(b2−d2) (b−d)a+drj+brD2b + drj(b2−d2) , which can be simplified to 2ei(b2 − d2) < a(b −
d)− brD + drj , or 2(b
2−d2)ei−(b−d)a+brD
d < rj , which holds ∀ rj > rhj (ei).
Similarly, it can be shown that Li(Ri(rj), rj) < ei/δ, with a(b+d)− b(b2−d2) (b−d)a+drj+brD2b +
drj
(b2−d2) < ei/δ is true for ∀rj < rLj (ei)
RV: If the best response to rj results in a residual demand, represented as
Li(Ri(rj), rj) >
ei
δ , the optimal loan rate response is Ri(rj) =
(b−d)a+drj+b(rD+δ(c+θ))
2b .
This is the best loan rate response if a(b+d) − b(b2−d2) (b−d)a+drj+b(rD+δ(c+θ))2b + drj(b2−d2) > eiδ
or
2(b2−d2)ei−(b−d)a+b(rD+δ(c+θ)
d < rj which is obviously true for all
rj > r
H
j (ei) :=
2(b2−d2)ei/δ−(b−d)a+b(rD+δ(c+θ)
d as long as the non–negativity con-
straints of the maximization program are not binding.
RII and RIV result from the discontinuous jumps in the marginal cost function at
the points where Li(Ri(rj), rj) = ei and Li(Ri(rj), rj) = eiδ . These equalities define
the capital and capacity clearing loan rate pairs (ri, rj). Since ∀ rj < rlj(ei), the best
loan rate response is Li(Ri(rj), rj) < ei and ∀ rhj (ei) < rj < rLj (ei) the best loan rate
respond is ei < Li(Ri(rj), rj) for rlj(ei) ≤ rj ≤ rhj (ei). Therefore, it must hold that
Li(Ri(rj), rj) = ei similar, for rLj (ei) ≤ rj ≤ rHj (ei) it must hold that Li(Ri(rj), rj) = eiδ .
RVI: This branch of the best response function results from the assumptions of our
model, i.e., the non–negativity constraints on demand in the optimization problem: 0 ≤
Lj =
a
b+d+
brj
b2−d2+
dri
b2−d2 . A loan rate pair (Ri(rj), rj) that result in a negative demand for
7
the opponent j makes the non–negativity constraint binding. Solving the constraint for ri
yields Ri(rj) =
brj−(b−d)a
d . Inserting Lj(Ri(rj), rj) =
a
(b+d)− b(b2−d2)rj+ d(b2−d2) brj−(b−d)ad
gives Lj(Ri(rj), rj) = 0.
RVII : If rj > rL=0j , bank i’s best response loan rate is only increasing in rj as long as
the “residual demand” (note that bank i covers the entire market since Lj(Ri(rL=0j ), rL=0j ) =
0) is smaller than the monopoly output Li(Ri(rj), rj) < LMi . Hence, it is only optimal to
respond to a further increase of bank rj with increasing ri as long as Ri(rj) > rMi with
rMi being the monopoly loan rate that solves the maximization problem:
rMi = argmax(ri−rD−δ(c+θ))Liri+θei implicitly defined by the first order condition.
Solving for the loan rate gives rMi =
1
2 (a+ rd + δ(c+ θ)).
Since rMi is unique and independent of rj (depending solely on the exogenous model
parameters), the best response loan rate function becomes vertical. It would never be
beneficial to deviate from the monopoly loan rate for Li(Ri(rj), rj) < LMi . Hence, no
further best response branches can exist, which means that part b) must hold.
The critical values of the opponent’s loan rate are implicitly defined by the intercept
of the different best response branches. Equating the different branches and solving for
rj we derive the critical values:
rlj(ei) : (R
I = RII) solving (b−d)a+drj2b =
(b−d)a−(b2−d2)ei+drj
b for rj yields
rlj(ei) :=
2(b2 − d2)ei − (b− d)a
d
rhj (ei) : (R
II = RIII) solving (b−d)a−(b
2−d2)ei+drj
b =
(b−d)a+drj+brD
2b for rj yields
rhj (ei) :=
2(b2 − d2)ei − (b− d)a+ brD
d
rLj (ei) : (R
III = RIV ) solving : (b−d)a+drj+brD2b =
(b−d)a−(b2−d2) eiδ +drj
b for rj yields
rLj (ei) :=
2(b2 − d2)ei/δ − (b− d)a+ brD
d
8
rHj (ei) : (R
IV = RV ) solving (b−d)a−(b
2−d2)ei+drj
b =
(b−d)a+drj+b(rD+δ(c+θ))
2b for rj
yields
rHj (ei) :=
2(b2 − d2)ei/δ − (b− d)a+ b(rD + δ(c+ θ))
d
rL=0j (ei) : (R
V = RV I) solving (b−d)a+drj+b(rD+δ(c+θ))2b =
brj−(b−d)a
d for rj yields
rL=0j (ei) := a−
bd(a− (rD + δ(c+ θ)))
2b2 − d2
rL
M
j (ei) : (R
V = RV I) solving brj−(b−d)ad =
1
2 (a+ rd + δ(c+ θ)) for rj yields
rL
M
j (ei) :=
a(2b− d) + d(rD + δ(c+ θ))
2b
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Abstract
Minimum capital requirement regulation forces banks to refund a substantial amount
of their investments with equity. This creates a buffer against losses, but also in-
creases the cost of funding. If higher refunding costs translate into higher loan
interest rates, then borrowers are likely to become more risky, which may destabilize
the lending bank. This paper argues that, in addition to the buffer and cost effect
of capital regulation, there is a strategic effect. A binding capital requirement regu-
lation restricts the lending capacity of banks, and therefore reduces the intensity of
loan interest rate competition and increases the banks’ price setting power as shown
in Schliephake and Kirstein (2013). This paper discusses the impact of this indirect
effect from capital regulation on the stability of the banking sector. It is shown that
the enhanced price setting power can reverse the net effect that capital requirements
have under perfect competition.
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1. Introduction
This paper analyses the effect of capital requirement regulation on the stability of
banks in a loan market where few oligopolistic banks compete in loan interest rates
and decide on optimal loan capacities by their refunding structure.
Because bank loans are likely to be homogenous, the unregulated loan interest
rate competition is fierce, and banks undercut each other in loan rates until the
interest payments equal the marginal refunding cost of the asset investment - the
classical Bertrand result.
However, regulating the capital structure also changes the competitive behavior
of the banks, i.e., the timing of strategic decisions. Due to higher costs, banks may
prefer to adapt lending rather than the capital structure when they are confronted
with a binding capital requirement. In this case the introduction of a capital require-
ment regulation can change Bertrand competition into a two stage game. In the first
stage banks choose optimal loan capacities, and then, in the second stage, the banks
choose loan interest rates to clear capacities. This idea that capital regulation creates
a credible precommitment to loan interest rates, and thereby reduces the intensity
of interest rate competition, was first discussed in Schliephake and Kirstein (2013).1
They develop a detailed analysis of the conditions under which capital requirement
regulation changes the strategic interaction among oligopolistic banks from strategic
complementarity in price setting to strategic substitutes in capacity choices. They
show that higher capital requirements reduce the incentives of banks to undercut in
1For technical reasons Schliephake and Kirstein (2013) assume that borrowers have preferences
for a specific banks. This assumption allows the transformation from indirect to direct demand
without the explicit definition of a certain rationing rule. However, they show that their results
also hold when borrowers become close to indifference between loans such that loans are perfect
substitutes.
2
interest rates but their model neglects any uncertainty and risk effects.
In contrast, this paper focuses on the impact of increased price setting power on
the stability of the banking sector. In this paper I will call the effect of enhanced
price setting power “Cournotization” effect. It creates an indirect effect of capital
requirement regulation on the stability of the banking sector. In particular, it influ-
ences the ability of banks to consider the risk shifting behavior of their borrowers,
and thus the effect changes the optimal reaction of banks when they face increased
capital requirements. This effect adds to various direct and indirect effects of capital
requirement regulation and competition on the stability of the banking system that
are discussed in the literature overview and summarized in Figure 1 and Table 1.
This paper shows that the cost of recapitalization and the resulting Cournotiza-
tion effect may play a role in determining the net effect of capital requirement on
banking stability. In particular, the results indicate that the number of oligopolistic
competitors, the correlation of loan defaults, and the intensity of borrower risk shift-
ing simultaneously determine whether capital requirement regulation of oligopolistic
bank markets enhances or erodes the stability of the sector.
In order to analyze the effect of Cournotization on bank stability, it is necessary
to establish the "missing link" between the literature on competition and stability on
one hand, and the literature on capital regulation and stability, on the other hand.
This is done in section 2. In section 3, the basic model of oligopolistic loan interest
rate competition and capital regulation is set up. A simplified version of the model
in Schliephake and Kirstein (2013) is introduced and the results derived to illustrate
the Cournotization effect. In section 4, the effect of the increased price setting
power on the optimal decisions and resulting effects on stability are analyzed under
perfect correlation. In section 5, the results are generalized for imperfectly correlated
borrower defaults. Section 6 discusses the policy implications and concludes.
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2. Literature Review
The literature on competition and stability and the literature on capital regulation
and stability respectively is extensive. However, only few theoretical papers exist that
analyze the simultaneous effects. Figure 1 provides an overview of the main effects
that capital regulation and competition have on the stability of banks. The term
banking stability thereby means the probability of an individual bank to default. In
particular, consider a bank that invests its equity and deposits in risky loans. The
term stability then reflects the probability that the return of non-defaulting loan
assets is greater or equal the bank’s liabilities to its depositors. A lower probability
of an individual bank default thereby reflects higher banking stability.2
The literature on the relationship between competition and stability can be
roughly divided in two streams. Representatives of the competition-instability hy-
pothesis argue that more competition erodes stability because it reduces the charter
value of the bank and, therefore, increases the incentives to take more risk. This
charter value effect is the effect numbered (I) in Figure 1 and has been discussed, for
example, by Matutes and Vives (2000), Hellmann et al. (2000), Repullo (2004) and
Allen and Gale (2000). Moreover, Allen and Gale (2004) argue that a reduction in
the charter value of banks also decreases incentives to spend effort on monitoring,
thereby further increasing the riskiness of the bank. In general, the models on the
stability enhancing charter value effect of competition focus on competition on the
liability side of the bank and take the investment risk of banks as exogenous. In other
words the charter value effect argues that if banks fully control their riskiness, they
2This idiosyncratic definition of banking stability does not reflect systemic risk. An analysis of
the impact of competition on the systemic risk of the banking sector is beyond the scope of this
paper and left for future research.
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Figure 1: The Effects of Capital Regulation and Competition on Banking Stability
The charter value effect (I) enhances stability by reducing the deposit rates to be paid
on liabilities. The risk shifting effect (II) reflects the aggregate probability of asset
default that is influenced by the loan interest rate. The margin effect (III) occurs
when defaults are imperfectly correlated (ρ < 1) and enhances stability through
higher returns on non-defaulting assets. The buffer effect (IV) reflects lower liabilities
to depositors if assets are financed with more equity. Higher equity funding increases
the marginal cost (V) and thereby the loan interest rate, which reinforces borrower
risk shifting. The Cournotization effect (VI) may introduce price setting power of
banks if recapitalization is sufficiently costly and, therefore, influences the bank’s
reavtion to higher regulation.
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have more incentives to decrease their risk of default the more profits they expect to
make in future. If higher regulation constraints the ability of banks to invest in as-
sets, banks demand less deposits resulting in lower deposit rates and higher marginal
profits. Since this effect is straightforward and unambiguous, it will be neglected in
the below analysis.
Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) challenge the charter value hypothesis by allowing not
only banks but also borrowers to control the riskiness of the bank and its investments.
In their model they consider the competition for loan assets and allow borrowers to
react to higher loan interest rates. Building on the seminal work of Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981), they argue that it is not only the limited liability of banks, which
gives rise to risk shifting, but also that the risk of loan assets increases in the loan
interest rate. Assuming perfect correlation of loan defaults, this extension actually
the “conventional wisdom” that higher competition leading to instability. If risk
shifting takes place in the loan asset market, increased competition can actually
reduce the probability of bank failure, since lower loan rates reduce loan asset risk.
This borrower risk shifting effect is labeled effect (II) in Figure 1.
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) extend the Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) model
and allow for imperfect correlation among the investment projects. They argue, that
higher loan interest rates from lower competition increase borrower risk shifting on
the one hand but also increase the margin on non-defaulting loans, labeled effect (III).
The higher margins on non-defaulting loans can outweigh the borrower risk shifting.
The relative strength of the margin effect thereby depends on the correlation of
defaults in the bank’s asset portfolio. Their findings indicate that if all loans do
not default at the same time then the impact of competition on banking stability is
generally non-monotonous.
Similar to the theoretical predictions of the literature on the impact of compe-
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tition on stability, the literature on the net effect of minimum capital regulation
on stability is contradictory, as well. Higher equity funding of investment, ceteris
paribus, increases the stability of banks, since equity provides a buffer against un-
expected losses and reduces the moral hazard of banks similar to the charter value
effect of low competition. In other words, forcing banks to refund a fixed amount
of assets with higher equity decreases leverage and makes banks more stable, which
is labeled effect (IV). If banks internalize all costs and benefits of bank equity, the
private optimal capital structure would coincide with the socially optimal capital
structure as discussed by Gale (2003). However, banks do not fully internalize the
benefits of equity since they are shielded at least partly against the downside risk of
their investments by the banking safety net. Setting minimum capital requirements
is a regulatory instrument that shifts the risks borne by the depositors, or insured by
the safety net, back to the shareholders. Hence, moral hazard and the incentive of
excessive risk taking is reduced as shown by Hellmann et al. (2000), Repullo (2004),
and Allen et al. (2011). Furthermore, higher capital requirements reduce the risk of
contagion among banks as pointed out by Allen and Carletti (2011).
However, regulating the refunding structure of banks also changes their opti-
mal investment decisions. Generally, when equity funding is costly to the bank,
an increase in capital requirement regulation has multiple effects that stabilize and
destabilize the banking sector.
Firstly, higher equity funding decreases the amount of deposit funding and, there-
fore, reduces the states of nature in which a bank can fail, which is the above discussed
buffer effect (IV).
Secondly, it increases the marginal cost of financing investments. The higher cost
of funding decreases the banks profitability, which decreases the banks charter value,
and thereby gives rise to higher risk taking, which destabilizes the bank. At the same
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time, the higher cost of funding decreases the activity of the banks. Less activity
means less lending, which results in increased loan interest rates. Higher loan interest
rates lead to higher earnings on non-defaulting loans, which can offset losses from
defaulting loans (II), on the one hand. On the other hand, higher loan rates reduce
the earnings of borrowers, which induces risk shifting of borrowers (III). The net
effect of capital requirement regulation on banking stability depends on which of the
described effects prevails.
Empirical evidence on the relationship of capital requirements, competition, and
financial stability is equally ambiguous. Carletti and Hartmann (2003) provide a
good overview of the mixed empirical findings on the relationship between compe-
tition and stability. Keeley (1990) finds that the erosion in the US banks’ market
power, which resulted from deregulation, caused an increase in the bank failure
rates during the 1980’s. Similarly, Beck et al. (2006) provide evidence that more
concentrated banking systems are less vulnerable to systemic risk because more con-
centrated banks tend to diversify their risks more. Schaeck et al. (2009) also come
to the result that a more concentrated banking system is less fragile to systemic
risk. In contrast, Berger et al. (2009) find that, though more competitive banking
systems tend to take more risk, they also compensate the higher risk with higher
equity to asset ratios and are, thus, less fragile to systemic risk. Schaeck and Cihak
(2011) find empirical evidence that a bank’s capital structure is one of the chan-
nels through which competition may have an impact on the stability of the banking
sector. However, there is little empirical evidence that suggests that more stringent
capital regulation actually improves the stability of a particular banking sector as
pointed out by Barth et al. (2005).
Building on the rather mixed theoretical prediction and empirical evidence, re-
cent empirical work focuses on the role that the market and institutional environment
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plays in the determination of the relationship between competition and the stabil-
ity of the banking sector. Beck et al. (2011) seize the theoretical suggestions on
non-monotone relationships among competition and stability, and try to identify the
most prominent factors that determine the amplitude and direction of the relation-
ship. Based on cross-country data, they find that the relation between competition
and stability is likely to be negative the stricter the capital regulation is, the more
restricted banking activities are, and the more homogenous the banking sector is as
a whole. In particular, they find that more binding capital regulation tends to have
an amplifying effect on the competition-stability relationship, regardless of the sign
of the particular relationship.
To the author’s knowledge, only two theoretical papers exist that try to simul-
taneously analyze the effect that competition and capital regulation have on bank
stability: Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) show that the ambiguous effect of competi-
tion on banks’ risk taking translates into ambiguous effects of capital requirement on
the stability of the banking sector. Though their model tries to capture the influence
of correlation among loan defaults, the simplification they use in their model still
implies that either all loans default at the same time or no defaults occur. Banks
themselves can only influence the probability with which these defaults occur. Hence,
there is no positive marginal effect of higher profits from non-defaulting loans, which
could buffer losses from defaulting loans.
Martinez-Miera (2009) analyzes the impact of capital requirement regulation on
the probability of bank failure under different exogenous market structures when
loan defaults are imperfectly correlated. He argues that if the asset risk of the
bank’s loan portfolio is not perfectly correlated, capital requirements have ambiguous
effects on the stability of a bank, which is labeled effect (V). He shows that in
highly concentrated loan markets the increase in price setting power resulting from
9
Table 1: Overview of the Main Literature and the Discussed Effects
 Literature Low Competition: High Competition: Assumptions Basic Effects 
No
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Among others:  
Matutes and Vives (2000),  
Hellmann et al. (2000),  
Allen and Gale (2000) 
Stabilizes Banking Destabilizes Banking Exogenous Competition for Deposits, Bank Risk Shifting Charter Value (I) 
Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) Destabilizes Banking Stabilizes Banking 
Exogenous Competition for 
Loan Assets, Borrower Risk 
Shifting 
Risk Shifting (II) 
Martinez-Miera 
and Repullo 
(2010) 
Perfect 
Correlation Destabilizes Banking Stabilizes Banking Exogenous Competition for Loan Assets, Borrower Risk 
Shifting, Imperfect 
Correlation 
Risk Shifting (II), 
Margin (III), 
Buffer (IV) Imperfect 
Correlation 
U-shaped Relationship:  
Competition-Instability 
Ca
pit
al 
Re
gu
lat
ion
 Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) 
Regulation Destabilizes 
if Competition 
Stabilizes 
Regulation Stabilizes 
if Competition 
Destabilizes 
Exogenous Competition for 
Deposits and Assets, Bank 
controls „correlation“ 
(probability of perfectly 
correlated Default) 
Risk Shifting (II) 
Martinez-Miera (2009) Net Effect of Capital Requirement Depends on Exogenous Competition and Correlation 
Exogenous Competition for 
Loan Assets, Borrower Risk 
Shifting, Imperfect 
Correlation 
Risk Shifting (II), 
Margin (III), 
Buffer (IV) 
This Paper 
Net Effect of Capital Requirement Depends on 
Cost of Recapitalization, Bank Concentration, 
and Correlation 
Endogenous Competition, 
Schliephake and Kirstein 
(2013) 
Risk Shifting (II), 
Margin (III), 
Buffer (IV), 
Cournotization (VI) 
higher capital requirements can reestablish the stability enhancing effect of capital
requirements even with borrower risk shifting, provided that the risk shifting effect is
strong enough. The intuition is that a monopolist who anticipates the risk shifting of
borrowers may find it profitable to internalize the increased marginal costs of higher
capital requirement regulation.
In contrast to Martinez-Miera (2009), this paper does not take the competitive
environment as given but explicitly considers changes in the competitive structure
due to the strategic reaction of banks on the regulation. The Cournotization effect
(VI) of capital requirement regulation reduces the incentives to undercut competitors
in loan interest rates. This leads to increased price setting power, which again rein-
forces the two effects of increased loan interest rates: the margin effect (III), if loan
defaults are not perfectly correlated, and the risk shifting effect (II) by borrowers.
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This paper shows that the net effect of fiercer regulation on banking stability
depends on how much market power is gained by the Cournotization effect. In-
tuitively, the increase in price setting power is higher, the more concentrated the
market structure is, i.e., the less banks compete for loans.
Using a model framework adapted from Martinez-Miera (2009) the analysis sug-
gests that in an economy, where a monopolist finds it optimal to internalize the
increased marginal cost of capital regulation, there exists a critical market concen-
tration for which the Cournot oligopolists internalize the increased costs. In this case
the cost of default decreases due to lower liabilities to depositors, as well as the prob-
ability of default shrinks, because the banks anticipate profit reducing risk shifting
behavior of their customers. The paper therefore extends the analysis of Martinez-
Miera (2009) for endogenous competition and adds an important policy implication:
a regulator that wants to foster bank stability does not only have to consider the
number of competitors but also the cost of recapitalization in the banking sector.
The main finding of this paper is that if low competition has a stability enhancing
effect, higher capital regulation should not be accompanied by a support of recapi-
talization of banks. A summary of the main literature, their crucial assumptions and
differences in results is provided in Table 1.
The next section introduces the basic model assumptions and presents a simplified
and generalized version of the Cournotization effect as discussed in Schliephake and
Kirstein (2013).
3. The Model Setup
Consider a single-period model of n banking firms.The banks compete for risky
loans L in loan interest rates r. Loans default with probability p in which case
the bank receives nothing. In case of success, i.e., with probability 1 − p the bank
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receives the contracted repayment from the borrower. In the basic setting, I assume
that loan defaults are perfectly correlated such that all projects default at the same
time. In the beginning of the period, each bank has access to deposit finance (D)
at a constant cost (rD ≥ 0). The deposits are insured at a flat insurance premium,
normalized to zero without loss of generality.3 Therefore, the supply of deposits to
a bank is independent of the riskiness of the bank’s asset investment.
Each bank is run by a bank owner manager, who can acquire equity ki from
shareholders, which have an alternative and equally risky investment opportunity
with return rK = rD + c. This fixed opportunity cost reflects the higher cost of
equity compared to the insured deposit funding.
The assumption that equity funding is costly is not undisputed in the literature.
In particular, Admati et al. (2010) elaborate the weaknesses of the assumption that
bank equity funding is costly to society. However, in this simple model, the cost of
equity is not seen from a welfare perspective, but it is rather assumed that equity
funding is relatively more costly to the specific bank than deposit funding. This is a
direct consequence of the deposit insurance system. The insured depositors do not
expect a risk premium, while the liable equity investors do. Another interpretation
is that higher opportunity cost compared to deposit funding reflects the additional
benefits that deposits create to the depositors. The role of the bank as a financial
intermediary is, therefore, welfare enhancing. Unnecessarily high capital requirement
regulation would erode the bank’s role as a financial intermediary offering depositing
services, i.e. a equity to asset ratio of 1 would not allow for financial intermediation
in the sense of providing deposit services. Hence, equity is assumed to be costly to
3In alliance with the current regulatory system, this paper takes the existence of the fixed-rate
deposit insurance as given, whereas the insurance can be explicit by an ex ante financed deposit
insurance or implicit by a guaranteed ex-post bail out policy.
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the bank, and pure equity funding in our simple model setup would be inefficient in
the absence of bank Moral Hazard.
A minimum capital requirement is defined as the requirement to refund a specific
proportion of assets (of a specific risk type) with equity βli ≤ ki. In line with the
theoretical and empirical findings, it is assumed that bank managers rather avoid
increasing equity, but adapt their asset portfolios when facing a regulatory equity
shortage.4 The assumption that there are prohibitive costs of recapitalizing im-
mediately changes the sequence of decisions made, and influences the competitive
environment. The Bertrand competition among banks becomes a two stage decision
making process, where in the first stage, the bank has to define the capital structure,
and in the second stage, competition in loan interest rates takes place.
t=1 According to minimum capital requirement regulation, banks choose optimal
ki , i = 1...n, i 6= j with K =
∑n
i ki.
t=2 After observing the opponents k−i, bank i chooses optimal ri(r−i, K)
For simplicity, I assume that equity can only be raised in t = 1, i.e., the cost of
immediate recapitalization is prohibitively high.5 The capital decision is sunk in stage
2. Hence, the marginal cost of equity in stage two is zero. Instead of influencing the
4Anecdotal evidence that equity constrained banks adapt assets rather than liabilities could be
found during the recent financial crisis, where many banks faced difficulties in replacing lost equity
in a timely fashion. Calomiris and Herring (2012) discuss that despite banks being undercapitalized
as a result of the need to write off asset losses in 2008, the financial institutions preferred to wait
instead of immediately raising new equity. They argue that stock prices were so low that the
issuance of significant amounts of equity, in order to cover the large losses incurred, “would have
implied substantial dilution of stockholders – including existing management.” These observations
suggest that bank managers try to avoid an immediate increase in equity in order to satisfy market
demand, and prefer to reduce the demand for loans by increasing the loan rate.
5Schliephake and Kirstein (2013) allow for recapitalization in stage two and show that if recap-
italization is costly enough, the equity raised in the first stage becomes a binding constraint in the
second stage.
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marginal cost of investing in loan assets in the second stage, the regulatory minimum
capital requirement sets an upper bound on the individual bank’s ability to supply
loans li:
li(ri(r−i), r−i) ≤ ki
β
(1)
Let r (·) be the inverse demand function that is decreasing and concave in the loan
quantities supplied, i.e., r(0) > rD, r′(·) < 0 and r′′(·) ≤ 0. The optimal prices
chosen in the second stage, therefore, depend on the amount of equity raised by each
bank in the first stage. Therefore, the capacity constraint for loan supply puts a
lower bound to equilibrium loan interest rates:
ri(r−i, K) ≥ rmin
(
ki
β
)
(2)
For given amount of equity, it would never be profitable to undercut rmin, because
this would imply a demand above the capacity, i.e. a demand that cannot be served
due to the regulatory restrictions; implying lower profits.
3.1. The Optimal Second Stage Behavior
Consider first the trivial case where all banks have raised sufficient equity to
serve the loan market demand at the Bertrand price with externalized downside risk.
Formally, this means that the aggregate equity on the balance sheet of all banks
exceeds
K > βL(rD). (3)
The second stage pricing decision would be the same as in the unregulated case. The
fierce price competition is not constrained by the first stage capital decision. Because
the equity decision is sunk at the second stage, the marginal cost equal the deposit
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funding cost and the non-profit condition would be:
r = rD. (4)
Consider now the case where the raised amount of equity is “sufficiently small”.
The first stage amount of equity is sufficiently small if, firstly, the capacity to provide
loans to borrowers from the first stage capital decision bindingly constrains the price
competitionK < βL(rD). Secondly, sufficiently small assumes that the capacities are
so low that, under any rationing rule, the remaining demand whenever ri < rmin−i , is
below the monopoly loan output βlMi (K) > ki for i, j, where lMi (K) is the monopoly
loan amount in the residual market.
Lemma 1. (From Tirole (1988)) For “sufficiently small” capacities to lend that are
set in the first stage, the second stage loan rate competition yields a unique Nash
Equilibrium that is independent of any rationing rule, namely a loan interest rate
that just clears capacities: r
(
K
β
)
Proof. If the infimum of the loan interest rates set by the competitors equals the
capacity clearing interest rate, undercutting the opponent’s price can never be prof-
itable. Consider contrariwise the case where ri < r(K). Since recapitalization is
assumed not to be possible in stage two, price undercutting would only lead to ex-
cess demand for loans, which cannot be served due to the binding minimum capital
requirement. Undercutting in loan rates is not profitable, because each bank lends
already the maximum capacity to its borrowers.
Furthermore, a price increase is not profitable, since profits are assumed to be
strictly convex in loan quantities and the capacity is assumed to be smaller than
the residual demand monopoly quantity. For any r(K) < ri, bank i receives the
residual demand, after the m other banks served the loan applicants up to their own
capacity. The assumption lMi (K) >
ki
β
implies by definition Π(lMi ) > Π(
kj
β
). The
inverse demand function implies r(LMj (ki, kj)) < r
(
Kj
β
)
. Since the resulting profit
maximizing loan quantity in the residual market is higher than the small capacity, the
respective profit maximizing loan rate must be lower than the constrained optimal
loan rate that clears capacity. Hence, overbidding can never be profitable. Figure 2
illustrates this point.
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Figure 2: The Overbidding at Competitor’s Profit with Sufficiently Low Capacities
.
The underlying assumption that capacities are chosen to be sufficiently small in
the first stage seems to be quite restrictive. One sufficient condition for the choice
of low capacities would be very high cost of equity. However, the seminal work of
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) shows that, for a concave inverse demand function,
and efficient rationing of the residual demand, installing sufficiently low capacities
is the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium of the two stage game, regardless of the
investment cost of capacity, which is the private cost of equity in this model.6 Since
this model focuses on the effects of a change in the competitive structure induced by
capital requirement regulation on the riskiness of banks, it is assumed for simplicity
that borrowers are rationed according to the efficient rationing rule, and accordingly
6Davidson and Deneckere (1986) show that this result is not robust against different rationing
rules. With alternative rationing rules, competitors find it optimal to build up capacities that are
not sufficiently low, but below the demand for selling the product at marginal cost. For capacities
that are not sufficiently small, sub-game perfect strategies only exist in mixed strategies. However,
regardless of the specific rationing rule, the separation of decisions into capacity buildup and price
competition leads to reduced incentives to undercut in prices and, therefore, positive profits.
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that the result of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) can be applied.
3.2. The Optimal First Stage Capacity Choice
Anticipating that it is the optimal behavior in the second stage to clear any ca-
pacity, banks choose the individual amount of equity in the first stage that maximizes
the first stage objective function:
k∗i = argmax
(
ki
β
·
[
(1− p) ·
(
r
(
K
β
)
− rD(1− β)
)
− rKβ
])
(5)
This is the classical Cournot competition objective function, where rK -the cost of
equity - can be interpreted as the marginal cost of investing into loan capacity. A
symmetric equilibrium then consists of a vector ki which simultaneously satisfy the
system of first order conditions for all banks i = 1...n.
For symmetric banks, which have identical characteristics and face the identical
demand and cost functions, the Cournot equilibrium is symmetric.7 In such a sym-
metric equilibrium it must hold that ki = kj = k. Therefore, it must also hold that
K =
∑
ki = nk. The first order condition for a symmetric Cournot equilibrium can
thus be simplified to:
r′(K) · K
n
+
(
(r(K)− (1− β)rD − βrK
(1− p)
)
= 0 (6)
The first term reflects “market power rents” that result from the strategic com-
mitment to Cournot capacities in the first stage. The term captures the effect of
a decreasing demand that is taken into consideration when capacities are built up
in the first stage. The second term reflects each bank’s expected payoff per unit of
loans.
7See Tirole (1988), pp. 220 for a discussion of symmetry, existence and uniqueness of a Cournot
equilibrium.
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The Cournotization effect then describes a situation where, because of sufficiently
high recapitalization costs, the actual Bertrand competition for loans is constrained
by a strategic loan capacity choice. Therefore, the Bertrand competition for loans can
be described by Cournot competition. If the recapitalization costs are low, such that
the capacity constraint is not binding, the existing Bertrand competition can still be
described in the quantity space by Cournot competition with an infinite number of
competitors.
Lemma 2. If there is no Cournotization effect, because recapitalization costs are
low, the unconstrained Bertrand competition can be described in the quantity space
by the Cournot equilibrium with an infinite number of competitors.
Proof. If the number of competitors approaches infinity, then the market power term
vanishes and the sub-game perfect outcome approaches the one stage Bertrand equi-
librium outcome
lim
n→∞
(
r(K) = (1− β)rD + βrK
(1− p)
)
. (7)
When discussing the impact of the Cournotization effect on stability of banks, I
will therefore compare the situation where n → ∞ with a situation where n < ∞.
This also implies that a low number of banks in the oligopolistic market leads to
a relatively high increase of price setting power in the two stage game, compared
to unconstrained Bertrand competition. Therefore, a high market concentration is
likely to be reflected in a capacity constrained loan market competition with higher
marginal profits compared to the Bertrand equilibrium.
Because in equilibrium the capital requirement will be binding, I can substitute
ki
β
= li such that each bank chooses its individual optimal loan amount. The capacity
constrained objective function then reflects the Cournot decision problem in loan
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quantities.8
l∗i = argmax (li [(1− p)(r (L)− rD(1− β))− rKβ]) (8)
Denoting h(L) := (1−p)(r (L)−rD(1−β)) as the extended indirect demand function
I can write the first order condition as the general Cournot equilibrium condition:
h′(L) · L
n
+ (h(L)− rKβ) = 0. Analogous to equation (6) the first term reflects the
gained market power, which approaches zero in the unconstrained Bertrand competi-
tion, i.e., if recapitalization is costless. Lemma 2 implies that such an unconstrained
competition can be described in the quantity space as hypothetical increase of n to
infinity.
In the following section, I will discuss how the increase of capital requirement
regulation β influences this equilibrium condition and the according default risk of a
bank, given there is a Cournotization effect. Moreover, I will compare the results to
the net effects in Bertrand competition and will discuss if a regulator should control
for the Cournotization effect or not.
4. Constrained Competition with Risk Shifting and Perfect Correlation
The previous discussion concentrated on the changes in competitive behavior
of banks when capital requirement regulation is tightened, while the risk taking
behavior of borrowers was assumed to be exogenous. However, not only banks,
but also borrowers are limitedly liable, and thus protected against the downside
risk of investments. Higher loan interest rates reduce the profitability of borrowers
investment projects, which gives incentives to search for higher yields at the cost
8Keeping equity as the decision variable does not change the qualitative results but unnecessarily
complicates the notation in the following, because the capital requirement rate beta influences not
only the marginal equity cost but also acts as a scaling factor for the equity decision. However, this
function as a scaling factor has no impact on the risk choice of the bank and is, therefore, neglected
in the following.
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of a higher risk of the project. The model is, therefore, extended to the optimal
responses of borrowers’ to differing loan rates resulting from the tightening of capital
requirement regulation.
The intuition is that the individual default probabilities of projects is partly
controlled by the borrowers decision to control for risk. This could either reflect a
certain costly effort that borrowers spend to enhance the success of their projects, or
by the unobservable choice of the particular project the borrower invests in. The less
profitable projects become that are financed by bank loans, the less effort borrowers
are willing to spend, and the lower are the success rates of their projects. To model
the borrower risk shifting I follow the model set up of Martinez-Miera and Repullo
(2010).
A continuum of penniless entrepreneurs captured with i, who have access to risky
projects of fixed size, normalized to 1. The entrepreneurs can spend effort on an indi-
vidual alternative (e.g. employment) to obtain a utility level b[0, B]. The reservation
utility is continuously distributed on [0, B] with the cumulative distribution function
G(b). Let G(u) denote the measure of entrepreneurs that can obtain an alternative
utility less than or equal to u.
In case of success, projects yield a risky return α(pj) and zero otherwise. The
component pi is the endogenously chosen probability of default, and reflects the
costly effort an entrepreneur spends on the project to enhance expected output.9
9Boyd et al. (2009) explicitly model the optimal effort choice of entrepreneurs. The projects
yield an output of y˜+ z. The total return component y is random and distributed with the density
function f(y) and the cumulative density F (y) on the closed interval [0, A], which is known by the
bank and the borrowers. The component z is endogenous and reflects the costly effort the borrower
is willing to spend on the project to enhance output. The effort cost is c(z) a strictly increasing,
twice differentiable, convex cost function. For a given contracted loan rate, a borrower defaults
whenever y ≤ y ≡ r− z. Knowing the loan rate offered, the entrepreneur chooses his optimal effort
in order to maximize his expected profit: max
z
´ A
y
(y + z − r)f(y)dy − c(z). Integrating by parts
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As in Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010), I assume that α(0) < α′(0) in order to
get interior solutions. The bank offers a standard debt contract with limited liability
of borrowers: In case of project success with probability (1 − pi), the bank receives
the contracted loan interest r, and in case of default with probability pi, the bank
receives nothing, since the project’s liquidation value is assumed to be zero.
Lemma 3. Because of the limited liability of a standard debt contract the default
risk of a single loan increases in the equilibrium loan interest rate dp
dr
> 0.
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix A.
It is further assumed that entrepreneurs are homogenous in their objective func-
tion, except for the exogenous reservation utilities uj. Hence, all entrepreneurs will
choose the identical optimal default probability pj(r(L)) = p(r(L)), {j |uj ≤ u(r)}
or opt for their outside option and do not borrow from banks. A bank that is lending
to Li(r) borrowers, faces individual loan defaults of p(r(L)) in the portfolio.
If all projects are perfectly correlated, i.e., ρ = 1, and thus default at the same
time, the bank’s portfolio risk of default is also equal to p(r(L)). Under perfect
correlation, there is no margin effect, because all projects either default or not.
Similarly, there is no buffer effect for a leveraged bank. A lower leverage allows the
bank to absorb a higher share of defaults in the portfolio. However, with perfect
correlation the share of defaults is either zero or 1. In section 5 the influence of
imperfect correlation and in particular the impact of the margin and buffer effects
is discussed. As before, the Cournot equilibrium is defined by the optimal choices of
yields the objective function: A + z − r − ´ A
y
F (y)dy − c(z), resulting in the first order condition:
1 − F (r − z) = c′(z). Total differentiation yields zRL(r) = F
′
(r−z)
F ′ (r−z)−c′′(z) < 0. Higher loan rates
imply less optimal effort, which translates into higher risk. Therefore, a riskier project (less costly
effort) yields a higher success return to the borrower, i.e. α(pi) is assumed to be positive, concave
and increasing in pi.
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individual loan quantities:
l∗i = argmax ([(1− p(r(L)))(r (L)− rD(1− β))− rKβ]) (9)
For the sake of notational simplification, the extended indirect demand function is
defined as: h(L, β) := (1 − p(r(L)))(r (L) − rD(1 − β)). Even with linear indirect
demand and indirect risk shifting, the extended indirect demand function is not any
more linear. However, with linear demand and risk shifting functions, h(L) has the
characteristics that guarantee a unique Cournot equilibrium, i.e.: h′(L) < 0 and
h′′(L) < 0.10 To make sure that the reaction functions intersect, I assume that
h(0) > β ·rK . In other words, it is assumed that investing in risky projects is socially
desirable. The first order condition, that defines a symmetric pure strategy Cournot
equilibrium is then defined by:
h′(L, β) · L
n
+ (h(L, β)− rKβ) = 0 (10)
As this paper is concerned with the stability of the banking sector in Bertrand and
two stage capacity constrained competition that yields Cournot results, the question
to be answered is how the probability of default of each bank is effected by changes in
the exogenous parameters. Define q as the probability of default of a single bank. For
the very simplified case of perfect correlation, the probability of default of a bank is
reflected by the probability of default of the borrowers q = p(r(L)). In particular, the
probability of bank default increases whenever the loan interest increases, implying
that a decrease in equilibrium loan supply increases the probability of a bank default.
Lemma 4. A decrease in aggregate equilibrium loan supply of perfectly correlated
10For the existence of a pure strategy Cournot equilibrium with the linear cost function, it is
sufficient that the extended demand function is concave h′(L) = −p′(L)(r (L)− rD(1− β)) + (1−
p(r(L)))r′ (L) < 0 because p′(r) > 0 and r′(L) < 0 and h′′(L) = p′(r(L))r′(L) < 0.
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risky loans increases the probability of default of the investing banks and thus desta-
bilizes the banking sector.
Proof. Using Lemma 3 and the assumption of decreasing loan demand it is straight-
forward that dq
dL
= p′(r(L))r′(L) < 0.
Consider first the direct effect of a change in the competition level due to an
exogenous change in the market concentration. As in the traditional Cournot equi-
librium, a change in the competition that is reflected by an exogenous change of the
number of competitors n has a positive effect on the supply of loans.
Lemma 5. Ceteris paribus, the aggregate loan supply L in equilibrium is lower in
more concentrated markets, i.e.,dL
dn
> 0.
Proof. Applying the implicit function theorem to equation (10) I show that
dL
dn
= − h(L, β)− β · rK
h′′(L)L+ (1 + n)h′(L)
> 0 (11)
The denominator is negative whenever the second order condition of the bank’s
objective function holds, i.e., it is clearly negative for a concave extended demand
function. The numerator is positive, as long as the assumption that h(0) > β · rK
holds.
This is the result of Boyd and De Nicolò (2005). Due to the risk shifting effect,
a reduction in competition that increases loan interest rates destabilizes the banking
sector.
However, this paper is not concerned with the direct effect of competition on the
stability of banks, but instead with the indirect effect that capital requirement has
on the price setting power and its impact on banking stability. In order to analyze
this impact, it is necessary to understand first the direct impact of an increase in
capital requirements on banking stability, and then compare the results for Bertrand
competition and two stage capacity loan interest rate competition. Applying the
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implicit function theorem to equation (10) I obtain:
dL
dβ
= −
∂2Π(L,β)
∂L∂β
∂2Π(L,β)
∂L2
= −
(
∂h(L,β)
∂β
− rK
)
+ ∂
2h(L,β)
∂β∂L
L
n
h′′(L)L+ (1 + n)h′(L)
(12)
The denominator is negative if the second order condition holds, which is in particular
true for linear demand and linear risk shifting functions. Therefore, the sign of the
right hand side of equation (12) is determined by the sign of the numerator. In
particular, if
(
∂h(L,β)
∂β
− rK
)
+ ∂
2h(L,β)
∂β∂L
L
n
< 0, an increase in capital requirements
results in lower aggregate supply of loans in equilibrium, and vice versa. For perfectly
correlated loan defaults, the partial derivative of the extended demand function is
simply:
∂h(L, β)
∂β
= (1− p(r(L)) · rD > 0 (13)
If equity funding is costly (rK ≥ rD) then it must clearly hold that (1−p(r(L)))·rD <
rK because p(r(L)) ∈ [0, 1] because it is a probability.11 Therefore, the first term
in brackets is negative and reflects the decreasing profitability of each unit of loan
when equity funding is more expensive than deposit funding.
Applying Young’s theorem to equation (13) one obtains:
∂2h(L, β)
∂L∂β
= −p′(r(L))) · r′(L) · rD > 0 (14)
The impact of an increase in capital requirement on each bank’s profit is thus
ambiguous:
11Even if the opportunity cost of equity funding would equal rD, the limited liability to depositors
already implies higher expected marginal cost of equity.
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∂2Π(L, β)
∂L∂β
=
(
∂h(L, β)
∂β
− rK
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
∂2h(L, β)
∂L∂β
· L
n︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(15)
Proposition 1. If the cost of recapitalization is sufficiently low, such that there is no
binding capacity constraint on Bertrand competition, an increase in capital require-
ments will unambiguously decrease the stability of banks under perfect correlation.
Proof. Recall from Lemma 2 that unconstrained Bertrand competition translates in
the quantity space into n → ∞ such that equation (15) becomes unambiguously
negative: an increase in β decreases the supply of loans in equilibrium. The decrease
in loan supply increases the equilibrium loan interest rate and through risk shifting
as the only effect this decreases the banks’ probability of default as shown in Lemma
4.
This result is similar to the argumentation of Boyd and De Nicolò (2005). With-
out any price setting power the only effect of the increase in capital requirements and
the resulting higher marginal funding costs is an increase in loan interest rates. The
higher loan interest rate then unambiguously translates into borrower risk shifting
and decreases the bank stability.
Moreover, it becomes clear that the sign of right hand side of equation (15)
depends critically on n.
Lemma 6. A higher market concentration, i.e., a lower n, increases the cross partial
derivative ∂
2Π(L,β)
∂L∂β
.
Proof. Using equations (13), (14) and (15) I obtain:
−
(
rK
rD
− (1− p(r(L)))
)
− p′(r(L)) · r′(L) · L
n
(16)
Differentiation with respect to n yields:
−p′(r(L))) · r′(L) ·
[
dL
dn
+
dL
dn
n
− L
n2
]
≷ 0 (17)
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Because −p′(r(L))) · r′(L) > 0, the sign of the derivative depends on the terms in
brackets. A lower n increases equation (15) whenever
[
dL
dn
+
dL
dn
n
− L
n2
]
< 0. Intu-
itively, this condition means that an increase in the number of competitors increases
the aggregate loan supply more than it reduces the individual loan supply as con-
jectured in Martinez-Miera (2009) based on simulations. Because n, the number of
competitors, is strictly positive, this condition can be reduced to:
dL
dn
<
L
n · (n+ 1) (18)
Recalling Lemma 5, i.e., using equation (11) I obtain:
− h(L, β)− β · rK
h′′(L)L+ (1 + n)h′(L)
<
L
n · (n+ 1) (19)
This can be simplified to:12
h(L, β)− β · rK < − h
′′(L)L2
n · (n+ 1) − h
′(L) · L
n
(20)
Moreover, the first order condition for the Cournot equilibrium that is given in
equation (10) can be rewritten as:13
(h(L, β)− β · rK) = −h′(L, β) · L
n
(21)
Substituting the right hand side in the left side of the inequality yields:
− h
′′(L)L2
n · (n+ 1) > 0 (22)
This condition holds for h′′(L) < 0 as provided in our model.14
12The second order condition requires that −(h′′(L)L+ (1 + n)h′(L)) > 0.
13Further modification would lead to the standard Cournot equilibrium condition -
(h(L,β)−β·rK)
(h(L,β) =
1
n
e - the Lerner Index in equilibrium equals the market share over the point price
elasticity at the equilibrium price.
14In the standard Cournot oligopoly model with linear indirect demand, this term is zero. Im-
plying that, with a linear extended demand function, the market concentration plays no role on
the impact of capital requirement regulation on the stability of banks because an increase in the
number of competitors increases the aggregate output exactly in the same amount as the individual
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Lemma 6 shows that there exists an n for which it is not optimal for the competing
banks to shift the cost of higher capital requirements to their borrowers. Anticipating
the risk shifting reaction to higher loan interest rates, a bank with high price setting
power prefers to keep the loan interest rate constant or even lowers it, when capital
requirements are increased. Denoting LM as the optimal monopoly output and
assuming that the risk shifting effect is high enough, i.e., −p′(r(LM))) · r′(LM)LM >(
rK
rD
− (1− p(r(LM)))
)
, the following proposition can be derived.
Proposition 2. If risk shifting is high, the impact of the capital requirement on
the equilibrium loan interest rate is not monotone but may depend on the number of
competitors:
if n > nˆ → ∂2Π(L,β)
∂L∂β
< 0 → dr
dβ
> 0
if n < nˆ → ∂2Π(L,β)
∂L∂β
> 0 → dr
dβ
< 0
Proof. If risk shifting is high, i.e.
(
−p′r′(LM) · LM > rK
rD
− (1− p(r(LM)))
)
, a mo-
nopolist finds it optimal to increase the loan interest rate, i.e., to reduce the loan
supply, when he faces higher marginal cost from capital requirement regulation
(dr(L)
dβ
< 0). If n → ∞, the cross partial derivative is unambiguously negative such
that the default probability increases with higher capital requirements dr(L)
dβ
> 0.
From Lemma 6, it becomes clear that there must exist a critical number of competi-
tors nˆ for which the cross partial derivative is zero.
If banks gain price setting power through higher capital requirements, the loan
interest rate is not monotonically increasing in capital requirements. If the Cournoti-
zation effect is high compared to risk shifting (due to high market concentration),
a capital requirement increase will increase aggregate lending. The intuition is that
banks consider the risk shifting effect when setting optimal capacities. If they gain
enough price setting power, they can internalize the increased marginal cost and
thereby avoid the risk shifting of their borrowers.
output is reduced.
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Proposition 3. A binding capacity constraint on Bertrand competition, resulting
from increased capital requirements, may stabilize the banking sector if the market is
highly concentrated.
Proof. Recall from Lemma 2 that unconstrained Bertrand competition translates in
n → ∞ such that equation (15) becomes unambiguously negative: an increase in β
decreases the supply of loans in equilibrium. The decrease in loan supply increases
the banks’ probability of default as shown in Lemma 4.
Note, however, that the increase in capital requirements decreases the leverage
of the potentially defaulting banks. Considering that a high proportion of the social
cost of a bank default is driven by the size of outstanding debt, and not only by
the fact of the default, a lower debt level may mean lower cost in case of default.
Therefore, an increase in capital requirements in this setting makes a bank default
ex ante more likely, but may decrease the ex post cost of the default.
5. Generalization to Imperfect Correlation
If not all loan investments default at the same time, the bank can survive a
certain aggregate share of loan defaults in the investment portfolio, due to the equity
it invested, which is the so called buffer effect (IV), and the profit it makes on non-
defaulting loans in the portfolio, which is called the margin effect (II) accordingly to
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) . As illustrated in Figure 1, an individual bank
goes bankrupt whenever the revenue from non-defaulting loans cannot compensate
the liabilities rD to its depositors D = (1 − β)L. Using the introduced variables,
this aggregate share of defaults that a bank can survive is implicitly defined by the
following equation:
(1− x) · r(L)L < rD ·D (23)
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Define xˆ(L) as the critical aggregate loan failure rate that makes the non-defaulting
condition binding:
xˆ(L) =
r(L)− (1− β)rD
r(L)
(24)
The bank’s probability of default is then the probability to observe an aggregate
portfolio default rate above this critical value.
The probability of observing such an aggregate default rate in the portfolio is
analyzed using a one-factor Gaussian copula model of time to default.15 The basic
assumption is that a bank invests in a highly granulated portfolio of assets with
individual probabilities of default p(r(L)). It is assumed that the copula correlation
between each pair of homogenous borrowers is ρ < 1. The single risk factor model
then assumes that the default of each individual loan investment is triggered by the
random project value falling below a critical value. The random project return of a
project can be described as:
Bj =
√
ρ · Z +
√
1− ρ · εj (25)
where Z is a common systematic risk factor that effects all projects and εj is an
idiosyncratic risk factor that is independent among the projects. Assume that both
random variables are independently standard normally distributed. The constant ρ,
hence, measures the correlation between project returns, i.e., defines the proportion
of systematic and idiosyncratic risk that triggers the project value. For each state
of nature, which reflects a certain realization of the systemic factor, I can define a
15The IRB approach in Basel II and III is based on this model that is also known as the Vasicek
model (Vasicek, 2002).
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conditional probability of default:
pj(z) = P [Bj < cj|Z = z] (26)
where cj reflects a certain threshold value, which the project return has to outweigh.
In this paper’s model framework this threshold value is the borrower’s liability to
the bank.
Because the project return is the sum of two independent standard normally
distributed variables the return itself is also Bj ∼ N(0, 1), such that pj(z) = φ(cj) or
cj = φ
−1(pj). The threshold value is the quantile for the default probability that the
borrowers choose when confronted with the standard debt contract. Conditional on
the realization of Z = z, there is only one random variable left, the idiosyncratic risk
that determines the conditional probability of default of a representative project:
qj(z) = P
[√
ρ · z +
√
1− ρ · εj ≤ φ−1(pj) |Z = z
]
(27)
Since εj ∼ N(0, 1), the conditional probability of default in a certain state of nature
is:
qj(z) = φ
(
φ−1(pj)−√ρ · z√
1− ρ
)
(28)
For the derivation of the cumulative distribution of the failure rate the assumption
that the states of nature are also standard normally distributed, z ∼ N(0, 1), is used:
F (x, p) = P
[
φ
(
φ−1(p)−√ρ·z√
1−ρ
)
≤ x
]
= P
[
−z ≤
√
1− ρ · φ−1(x)− φ−1(p)√
ρ
]
= φ
(√
1− ρ · φ−1(x)− φ−1(p)√
ρ
)
(29)
This gives the probability to observe an aggregate failure rate smaller or equal to
x ∈ [0, 1].
A certain bank’s stability can therefore be described as the probability of observ-
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ing an aggregate failure rate, which a bank is able to survive P [x < xˆ]:
F (xˆ(β, r(L)), p(r(L)) = φ
(√
1− ρ · φ−1(xˆ)− φ−1(p)√
ρ
)
(30)
The above equation illustrates that the correlation ρ among individual loan de-
faults determines the existence and strength of the the buffer and margin effects,
which are effects on the critical default rate xˆ. If the correlation is imperfect ρ < 1,
the bank’s stability depends on the individual loan default probabilities p(r(L)) and
the value of the aggregate failure rate the bank can survive xˆ(β, r(L)) weighted with
√
1− ρ. If correlation is perfect, i.e., ρ = 1, the weight becomes zero and bank
stability is defined solely by φ (φ−1(p)) = p the default probability of a single loan is
equal to the default probability of the bank as it was analyzed in the section above.
Bank stability with ρ < 1 directly depends on the capital requirement rate,
because with higher equity a bank can absorb higher losses. This is reflected in the
fact that the critical default rate is increasing in the capital requirement ∂xˆ
∂β
> 0.16
Moreover, the bank’s stability depends on the effect the capital requirement has on
the equilibrium loan interest rate. On the one hand, an increase in the loan interest
rate leads to higher profits per non-defaulting loan. This again increases the bank’s
stability because with higher profits, more defaults can be absorbed. On the other
hand, as discussed above, a higher loan interest rate results in the discussed risk
shifting effect: the limitedly liable borrowers choose higher individual risks, which
increases the bank’s probability of default.
Lemma 7. Under imperfect correlation, an increase of capital requirement affects
the stability of a bank in three ways. Which effect prevails is influenced by the strength
16For notational simplicity I neglect in the following the indirect functional relationships and
where suitable, I write e.g. only F (xˆ, p) when referring to F (xˆ(β, r(L)), p(r(L)).
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of the Cournotization effect.
dF (xˆ, p)
dβ
=
∂F (xˆ)
∂xˆ
· ∂xˆ
∂β︸ ︷︷ ︸
Buffer(+)
+
∂F (xˆ)∂xˆ · ∂xˆ∂r︸ ︷︷ ︸
Margin(+)
+
∂F (p)
∂p
· ∂p
∂r︸ ︷︷ ︸
Risk Shifting(−)
 · drdβ︸︷︷︸ ≷ 0
Cournotization(±)
(31)
Proof. For the formal proof see Appendix B. Intuitively, Buffer effect (IV) is posi-
tive, because F (xˆ, p(r(L))) is a cumulative distribution function such that increasing
xˆ has a positive effect on bank stability ∂F (xˆ,p(r(L)))
∂xˆ
> 0 and ∂xˆ
∂β
= rD
r(L)
is positive
for strictly positive loan and deposit rates. Similarly, the Margin effect (III) is pos-
itive because higher loan interest rates increase the critical default threshold level
∂xˆ
∂r
= (1−β)(rD)
(r(L))2
> 0. The Risk Shifting effect (II) is negative due to the negative
first order stochastic dominance effect of an increased borrower default probability
∂F (xˆ,p(r(L)))
∂p
< 0 and the positive effect of an increased loan rate on the borrowers’
default probabilities.
Depending on the exogenous parameters, three possible scenarios exist that de-
termine the effect that the gained market power has on the impact of an increase in
regulation on stability.
Case 1: |Buffer |>|(Margin+Risk Shifting)· dr
dβ
|, the buffer effect outweighs the
risk shifting and margin effect. In this case, the gained price setting power of banks
does not influence the total effect that is fully driven by the buffer effect. An increase
in capital requirement regulation unambiguously increases the stability of banks re-
gardless of the competitive market structure. This situation reflects the traditional
view on capital regulation and is not analyzed any further.
Case 2: |Buffer |<|(Margin+Risk Shifting)· dr
dβ
| and |Margin|<|Risk Shifting |: the
buffer effect is low and the risk shifting outweighs the margin effect. This is a more
general case of the perfect correlation analysis above: Risk shifting is the dominant
effect and an increase in capital requirements translates into higher risk. If banks
have no price setting power, an increase in capital requirements unambiguously de-
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creases the banks’ stability. The Cournotization effect may enhance stability because
the gain of price setting power allows banks to internalize the increase in the marginal
cost of equity funding. In highly concentrated markets banks are thus reluctant to in-
crease the loan interest because they anticipate risk shifting of borrowers. Analogous
to the discussion of perfect correlation an increase in capital requirements then can
lead to lower loan interest rates if the risk shifting effect is high enough as discussed
above.
Case 3: |Buffer |<|(Margin+Risk Shifting)· dr
dβ
| and |Margin|>|Risk Shifting |:
The buffer effect is small and the margin effect outweighs the risk shifting effect.
In this case, a gain in price setting power that would lead to a decrease in the equi-
librium loan interest rate would destroy the stability enhancing effect of an increase
in equity funding. However, such a situation is not feasible in equilibrium because
whenever the margin effects outweighs the Risk Shifting effect, an increase in capital
requirements always increases the equilibrium loan rate, i.e., reduces the equilibrium
loan supply, regardless of the number of competitors.
The following argumentation shows that the Cournotization can only influence
the net effect of capital requirement regulation on stability in Case 2 but not in
Case 3.
From equation (12) it is clear that an increased capital requirement decreases the
equilibrium loan interest rate, whenever the equilibrium loan supply increases, i.e.,
whenever the cross partial derivative of the objective function with respect to L and
β is positive.
The necessary conditions for the cross partial derivative to be positive is a low
number of competitors n, as well as a positive cross-derivative of the extended de-
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mand function ∂
2h(L,β)
∂L∂β
> 0.17 However, in contrast to the perfect correlation analysis,
the cross partial derivative of the indirect extended demand function is not unam-
biguously positive. The indirect demand function of a limitedly liable bank may now
be written as:
h(L, β) :=
xˆˆ
0
((1− xˆ) · r(L)− rD · (1− β)) dF (x, p(r(L)) (32)
Partial integration yields:
h(L, β) :=
xˆˆ
0
F (x, p(r(L))) · r(L)dx. (33)
∂h(L, β)
∂β
= F (xˆ, p(r(L))) · r(L) · ∂xˆ
∂β
> 0 (34)
Substituting ∂xˆ
∂β
= rD
r(L)
this reduces to:
∂h(L, β)
∂β
= F (xˆ, p(r(L))) · rD > 0. (35)
Applying Young’s theorem, the cross partial is obtained:
∂2h(L, β)
∂L∂β
= rD
∂F (xˆ)∂xˆ · ∂xˆ∂r︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+
∂F (p)
∂p
· ∂p
∂r︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
 · dr(L)dL (36)
The first term in brackets is theMargin effect and the second term is the Risk Shifting
effect, as defined above. With decreasing indirect demand for loans, i.e., dr(L)
dL
< 0,
17As before, the cross partial derivative of the objective function is: ∂
2Π(L,β)
∂L∂β =
(
∂h(L,β)
∂β − rK
)
+
∂2h(L,β)
∂L∂β · Ln . As under perfect correlation, the first term is negative, due to the limited liability of
the banks. However, the sign of the second term is not any more unambiguously positive.
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the equation (36) is positive if |Margin|<|Risk Shifting | and negative otherwise.
Proposition 4. If the Buffer effect is small and the Risk Shifting effect outweighs
the Margin effect (Case 2), an increased price setting power of banks may reestablish
the stabilizing impact of capital regulation.
Proof. If |Margin|<|Risk Shifting |, it follows from equation (36) that ∂
2h(L,β)
∂L∂β
> 0
and thus
∂2Π(L, β)
∂L∂β
=
(
∂h(L, β)
∂β
− rK
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
+
∂2h(L, β)
∂L∂β
· L
n︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
. (37)
As this is equal to equation (15), the Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 from the special
case of perfect correlation also hold as long as the assumptions of Case 2 hold.
However, for Case 3, where it is assumed that the Margin effect outweighs the
Risk Shifting effect, equation (36) becomes negative. With a negative cross partial
derivative of the indirect extended demand function, the cross partial derivative of
the objective function is also negative, regardless of the number of competitors.
Proposition 5. If the Buffer effect is small and the Margin effect outweighs the Risk
Shifting effect (Case 3) an increased capital requirement unambiguously increases
the stability of the banking sector regardless of the market structure.
Proof. If |Margin|>|Risk Shifting |, the right hand side of (36) is unambiguously
negative, such that
∂2Π(L, β)
∂L∂β
=
(
∂h(L, β)
∂β
− rK
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
+
∂2h(L, β)
∂L∂β
· L
n︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
< 0. (38)
Therefore:
dL
dβ
= −
∂2Π(L,β)
∂L∂β
∂2Π(L,β)
∂L2
< 0 (39)
Increased capital requirements result in a reduced equilibrium loan supply such that
dr
dβ
> 0 regardless of the number of competitors. Using Lemma 7 it is straightforward
that dF (xˆ,p)
dβ
> 0 ∀n ∈ Z+
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Table 2: Overview of the Results
The + and − signs indicate the direction of the effect, the frequency indicates
the relative strength of each effect.
If stricter equity regulation allows competing banks to strategically commit on
loan capacities, the gained price setting power has only limited implications on the
stability of the banking sector. In Case 1 and Case 3, a stricter regulation fosters
stability regardless of the competitive mode in the banking sector. However, in Case
2 where stricter regulation harms the stability under perfect competition, the anti-
competitive effect of stricter regulation can outweigh the risk shifting and reestablish
banking stability. Because of the gained price setting power from stricter regulation,
the banks consider the risk shifting effect in their optimal choices if the market
concentration is low. The results are summarized in Table 2.
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6. Conclusion
Higher capital requirements may increase the price setting power of banks that
compete for risky borrowers. If increased capital requirements stabilize the banking
sector under perfect competition this increased price setting power does not have
any impact on stability. However, if under perfect competition higher capital re-
quirements result in a significant increase in the default probabilities of borrowers,
i.e., Risk Shifting is high, the increased price setting power can revers this destabi-
lizing effect. Intuitively, the Cournotization of the market enhances the ability of
banks to internalize the increased costs of equity funding. With many competitors,
the price setting power increase is not enough to offset the higher marginal cost of
capital funding. The impact of the capital requirement with Cournotization is the
same as under Bertrand competition. However, if the increase in price setting power
is high enough, the banks internalize the increased marginal cost and the net effect
of higher capital requirements becomes stability enhancing.
The analysis implies that an increase in capital requirement regulation should be
accompanied by policies that regulate competition and the recapitalizations of banks
if correlation among loans is high and the borrowers’ risk taking is very sensitive
to loan interest changes. The optimal policy mix depends on the structure of the
banking sector and the risk characteristics of the borrowers that banks invest in. If
and only if the risk shifting of borrowers is high, such that Case 2 is likely to describe
the real economy, an increase in capital requirements should be accompanied by a
restriction of competition and by no means with a support of recapitalization. With
the gained price setting power, the banks can consider the price sensitivity of their
borrowers. Therefore, the banks will be reluctant to burden their customers with
the cost of higher capital requirements but will absorb the higher marginal cost
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with their profits from increased price setting power. If reality can be described
by Case 1 or Case 3, the market structure has no impact on the effectiveness of
capital requirement regulation. In this case, the traditional view that a regulator has
to trade off stability and bank market efficiency does not hold. In this case, equity
regulation and efficiency are separable goals such that a regulator can increase capital
requirements and foster competition among banks at the same time.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 3
For any given loan rate, the entrepreneur maximizes his payoff:
max
pj
u(r) = (1− pj)(α(pj)− r)
s.t. u(r) ≥ ui
(A.1)
The first order condition is characterized with:
(1− pj) · α′(pj)− α(pj) + r = 0 (A.2)
Which implicitly defines a unique default choice p∗j(r). The assumption α(0) >
α′(0) secure a unique interior solution for any loan interest rate in the interval
α(0) − α′(0) < r < α(1). Using the envelop theorem, it can be shown that ∂u(r)
∂r
=
−(1 − p∗(r)) < 0. For any optimal effort choice, an increase in the loan rate de-
creases borrowers utility. Let L(r) denote the total loan demand, which exactly
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equals L(r) = G(u(r)). For any given loan rate r, a measure of G(u(r)) obtains an
alternative utility less or equal to u(r) and, therefore, demands a loan. Since G′ > 0,
it is straightforward that the total demand for loans is decreasing in the loan interest
rate. Total differentiation of the first order condition gives
dp
dr
= − 1
(1− p) · α′′(p)− 2α′(p) > 0 (A.3)
An increase in loan interest rates increases the probability of default of the loan.
Appendix B. The Effects of Capital Requirement on the Stability of the
Banking Sector
The probability that a bank does not fail as a measure for the banking sector
stability is:
F (xˆ(β, r(L)), p(r(L)) = φ
(√
1− ρ · φ−1(x)− φ−1(p)√
ρ
)
(B.1)
The direct effect of capital on the bank’s probability of failure is the capital buffer
effect, i.e., higher equity funding increases the failure threshold:
∂F (xˆ)
∂xˆ
· ∂xˆ
∂β︸ ︷︷ ︸
Buffer
=
(√
1− ρ√
ρ
)
φ
(
φ−1(p)−√1− ρ · φ−1(xˆ)√
ρ
)(
dφ−1(xˆ)
dxˆ
)
rD
r(L)
0 (B.2)
The indirect effect of capital requirements: through higher cost and the Cournotiza-
tion effect, less loans are supplied, but at a higher loan interest rate. This leads to
the risk shifting effect. When banks charge higher loan interest rates, the borrowers
react with investing in riskier loans.
∂F (p)
∂p
· ∂p
∂r︸ ︷︷ ︸
Risk Shifting
=
(
− 1√
ρ
)
φ
(
φ−1(p)−√1− ρ · φ−1(xˆ)√
ρ
)(
dφ−1(p)
dp
)
< 0 (B.3)
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When all projects do not default at the same time, higher loan rates also imply higher
margins of non-defaulting loans which enhances bank stability.
∂F (xˆ)
∂xˆ
· ∂xˆ
∂r︸ ︷︷ ︸
Margin
=
(√
1− ρ√
ρ
)
φ
(
φ−1(p)−√1− ρ · φ−1(xˆ)√
ρ
)(
dφ−1(xˆ)
dxˆ
)
(1− β)rD
r(L)2
> 0
(B.4)
The total impact can be summarized as:
dF (xˆ,p)
dβ
=
(√
1− ρ√
ρ
)
φ
(
φ−1(p)−√1− ρ · φ−1(xˆ)√
ρ
)(
dφ−1(xˆ)
dxˆ
)
rD
r(L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Buffer (+)
−
(
1√
ρ
)
φ
(
φ−1(p)−√1− ρ · φ−1(xˆ)√
ρ
)(
dφ−1(p)
dp
)
· p′(r)︸ ︷︷ ︸ ·
Risk Shifting(−)
dr
dβ
+
(√
1− ρ√
ρ
)
φ
(
φ−1(p)−√1− ρ · φ−1(xˆ)√
ρ
)(
dφ−1(xˆ)
dxˆ
)
(1− β)(rD)
(r(L))2︸ ︷︷ ︸ ·
Margin(+)
dr
dβ
(B.5)
It is easy to see that the correlation between bank failures determines which effect
prevails. For imperfect correlation, the result is generally ambiguous and depends
on which effect prevails. The more the individual project failures are correlated (the
higher the systematic risk), the more likely it is that the bank destabilizing risk
shifting effect outweighs the stabilizing margin effect and the buffer effect. With
perfect correlation, the margin effect and the buffer effect disappear, and the only
effect of an increased loan interest rate is the borrower risk shifting.
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a b s t r a c t
We develop a simple model of banking regulation with two policy instruments: minimum capital
requirements and the supervision of domestic banks. The regulator faces a trade-off: high capital require-
ments cause a drop in the banks’ profitability, whereas strict supervision reduces the scope of interme-
diation and is costly for taxpayers. We show that a mix of both instruments minimises the costs of
preventing the collapse of financial intermediation. Once we allow for cross-border banking, the optimal
policy is not feasible. If domestic supervisory effort is not observable, our model predicts a race to the
bottom in capital requirement regulation. Therefore, countries are better off by harmonising regulation
on an international standard.
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1. Introduction
As demonstrated by the recent financial crisis, asymmetric
information between depositors and banks may cause a break-
down of financial markets. Empirical studies suggest that the prob-
ability of such a confidence crisis, i.e., the stability of the banking
sector, responds to two factors: changes in the minimum capital
requirement regulation (Barth et al., 2006; Laeven and Levine,
2009) and changes in domestic supervision (Buch and DeLong,
2008). However, supranational reforms focus on the design of cap-
ital regulation, whereas the specific standards of supervision re-
main left in the hands of national authorities.1
This paper disentangles the trade-off between higher capital
requirements and more supervision by explicitly considering both
policy instruments to secure the stability of a domestic banking
sector. Due to the coexistence of moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion, we show that the regulator needs both instruments to ensure
financial intermediation. Intuitively, both problems result from
asymmetric information regarding the actual riskiness of banks.
Capital regulation solves an individual bank’s moral hazard, reduc-
ing the cost of a market breakdown, whereas supervision reduces
the adverse selection problem and the probability of a collapse.
Therefore, a regulator minimises the expected cost of a collapse
via a neo-classical production function with both input factors.
However, the cost burden of intervention differs: the cost of
increasing capital is borne by the banks, and the cost of supervising
and improving the banking sector is borne by the regulator and
thus by taxpayers.2
We distinguish between household income and bank profits to
include financial market frictions into our model. In a frictionless
world where households have unrestricted access to perfect finan-
cial markets there is no role for banks, capital regulation, and
supervision. Because we are interested in the interplay of both
instruments, we exclude the direct access of households to the
financial sector. Interestingly, this highly stylised model yields a
rich set of results when we allow for a certain degree of biased
preferences of the regulator.
0378-4266/$ - see front matter ! 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.04.012
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.:+49 17990 74 214.
E-mail addresses: florian.buck@lmu.de (F. Buck), eva.schliephake@ovgu.de (E.
Schliephake).
1 Even after two substantial revision processes, the main focus of the Basel Accords
remains the regulation of capital and liquidity standards. Although the regulatory
framework encourages convergence towards common supervisory standards, the
rather general implementation guidelines are by far less detailed and matured than
the regulation of capital requirements, which leaves national authorities room to
incorporate supervisory practices that are best-suited to their own national systems.
As a result, there exist considerable variations in supervisory standards in jurisdic-
tions that are adopting the Basel framework. Regulation differs, for example, with
respect to definitions of the requested reporting items, time-tables, or technical
details.
2 This assumption is consistent with recent empirical findings, such as those by
Masciandaro et al. (2007), who analyse the financial governance of banking
supervision in a sample of 90 countries. The authors conclude that full public
financing is the most common budgetary arrangement. However, some supervisory
systems are financed by both taxpayers and supervised institutions, e.g. Germany
where the banking sector pays half of the costs.
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First, we examine the optimal regulation of a banking sector in a
closed economy that consists of banks, which differ with respect to
their ability to control the risk of their investment projects. If
depositors cannot observe the actual ability of each bank, they will
deposit less money in banks compared to fully informed depositors.
To reduce the inefficiency stemming from asymmetric information,
the regulator selects an optimal combination of a minimum capital
requirement level, which incentivises banks to control their risk,
and supervisory effort, which influences the quality of the banking
sector (i.e., the proportion of banks that are able to control their ris-
ky investments). The regulator’s optimal choice depends on both
the cost of supervisory effort in influencing the quality of the aver-
age bank and the weight she places on the rent or the size of the
domestic banking sector. This political economic approach repre-
sents a rather broad view of regulation compared to the prudential
framework found in most of the existing literature.
Second, we show that with institutional competition among
regulators, the optimal combination of policy instruments crucially
depends on the moving costs and observability of differences in na-
tional regulation in the banking sector. If depositors are able to
fully observe country-specific regulatory regimes and to differenti-
ate via adjusted interest rates, jurisdictions evolve into a ‘‘club’’
supplying a regulatory framework for banks. In such a situation,
the regulatory costs of preventing the breakdown of financial mar-
kets increase with the mobility of banks. Moreover, if depositors
cannot distinguish between different national regulatory regimes,
incentives to underbid the other country’s capital ratios appear,
resulting in an even higher probability of a collapse. This finding
implies that competition among regulators causes a rent-shifting
between banks and taxpayers compared to the optimal policy
mix in autarky, which always reduces domestic welfare.
Our results are related to the small but growing theoretical lit-
erature on the political economy of regulatory competition in
banking. In a globalised world, regulators must consider that banks
seek to go abroad, and thus must address externalities created by
mobile banks. Empirical studies document increased foreign bank
entry in many economies. Barth et al. (2006) show in a sample of
91 countries that on average 45% of banking assets were owned
by banks that are more than 50% foreign owned. A recent study
by Ongena et al. (2013) provides an analysis of spillover effects
of national capital requirement regulation and supervision on the
lending behaviour of cross-border banks. The authors find empiri-
cal evidence that stricter regulation and supervision reduces risk-
taking among banks in the home country but increases risk-taking
in lending in foreign countries. Their findings suggest that national
capital regulation and supervision may have important spillover
effects. Instead of enhancing bank stability, stricter capital regula-
tion and supervision may simply reallocate the risk-taking behav-
iour to other countries.
Kilinc and Neyapti (2012) develop a general dynamic equilib-
rium model to analyse the joint welfare implications of stricter
capital regulation and supervision. In their model banking regula-
tion and supervision have the same impact on the economy: they
reduce transaction costs and thus increase the efficiency of finan-
cial intermediation. Because more efficient financial intermedia-
tion facilitates economic growth, the authors show that an
increase in regulation and supervision unambiguously increases
welfare. Our paper makes a similar argument; however, we are
interested in the particular adverse effects of each policy instru-
ment on the efficiency and size of the banking sector. With a partial
equilibrium analysis we derive the optimal input mix of both
instruments to establish financial intermediation at minimum cost.
In other words, we address the Coasian question of an optimal
selection of regulatory policies in the banking sector – but we
incorporate market frictions such as restricted access to markets
and asymmetric information, which standard general equilibrium
models not consider. Analysing the regulator’s incentives to use
each specific instrument then allows us to discuss the welfare
implications of an international harmonisation of capital require-
ment regulation among heterogeneous countries.
For this purpose Dell’Arricia and Marquez (2006) develop in
their seminal paper a two-country model with structural
spillovers between two national banking systems. Without a
supranational regulator, externalities induce nations to select
sub-optimally low standards of minimum capital requirements.
Trading off the benefits and costs of centralisation Dell’Arricia
and Marquez show that nations with relatively homogenous
banking systems have a stronger incentive to form a regulatory
union. However, they do not allow for supervisory interventions.
Complementary to their findings, Acharya (2003) discusses the
desirability of uniform capital requirements among countries
with divergent closure policies. He illustrates that ex post policies
may have an incremental effect on the optimality of ex ante reg-
ulation. Therefore, the regulator has to consider these policies
when designing prudential ex ante policies. He concludes that,
with heterogeneous closure policies, level playing fields can result
in a welfare-declining race to the bottom.
The main findings of Morrison and White (2009), however, sug-
gest the opposite phenomenon. In their model, a less competent
jurisdiction suffers from international financial integration, as good
banks flee to the better jurisdiction, which is able to cherry-pick
the best banks applying for licenses. Therefore, less competent
jurisdictions benefit from the international harmonisation of regu-
lation, although international capital requirements alone cannot
prevent the exit of sound banks. One may conclude that the catch-
ing-up of the weakest regulator over the best-regulated economy
takes place when capital is mobile. Therefore, in their view, level
playing fields are desirable for weaker regulators.
Our model incorporates both of these ideas and analyses if com-
petition among regulators leads to a race to the bottom in capital
ratios or to an outcome where the more efficient regulator expects
higher volumes of deposits. In contrast to Acharya (2003), who
concentrates on the interlinkage of capital requirement and closure
policies, our baseline model focuses on the link between optimal
harmonised capital requirements and ex ante supervisory efforts
that will change the pool quality, and thereby affect the stability
of the banking sector within a jurisdiction. Moreover, we combine
our results with the political-economic literature showing the dis-
tributional effects of regulatory competition between taxpayers
and the banking sector which create incentives for lobbying activ-
ity. Finally, our analysis of cost-efficient regulatory intervention
provides a rationale for the international harmonisation of mini-
mum capital standards à la Basel when banks shop for their regu-
lator. We show that the equilibrium outcome of regulatory
competition is welfare-inferior compared to a world with closed
economies. Consequently, there are two driving forces for the
international harmonisation of capital requirements: (1) indepen-
dently of the information structure, harmonised capital regulation
counters a regulatory race that increases the overall cost of inter-
vention and (2) the network benefits of harmonisation make opti-
mal regulation cheaper for national supervisors.
This paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we introduce our
basic model setup in a closed economy showing the conditions un-
der which an unregulated banking sector may be characterised as a
lemons market where no financial intermediation is possible. To
prevent such a domestic market breakdown the regulator can
now use capital standards and supervision. In Section 3, we allow
for the free movement of banks and introduce regulatory competi-
tion to analyse the changes in the optimal policy mix. Section 4 dis-
cusses our main findings and Section 5 concludes.
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2. Optimal regulation in closed economies
2.1. Lemons equilibrium in an unregulated banking sector
We develop our arguments in a partial equilibrium model with
three types of risk-neutral agents: regulators, banks anddepositors.3
Consider a continuum of banks normalised to 1. Banks simply
collect funds from depositors and equity investors to finance risky
projects. Unmonitored projects return R in the case of success with
probability pL and zero in case the of failure with probability
(1 ! pL). Suppose that a fraction h 2 [0,1) of banks has access to a
monitoring technology, which allows them to increase the proba-
bility of project success to pH = pL + Mp > pL at a cost m. We call
these banks efficient. The remaining banks in the national banking
sector (1 ! h) are said to be goofy.
We assume that equity funding has high opportunity cost and is
thus scarce, i.e., the opportunity cost of equity q is greater than the
efficient investment, q > R " pH.4 Therefore, banks never invest equi-
ty in an unregulated world, but prefer to be financed by deposits.
A large pool of depositors, each endowed with 1, may either in-
vest in a risk-less storage technology yielding a certain return of
cP 1 or lend it to a bank without any form of depositor insurance.
Therefore, banks may raise deposits as long as the offered expected
return on deposits exceeds the depositors’ outside option rDP c.
Let R " pH > c > R " pL such that non-monitored projects have a nega-
tive expected value. This relationship implies that a depositor is
unwilling to deposit with a bank that does not monitor. However,
due to a single banks’ opaqueness, we suppose that her type is pri-
vate information and cannot be credibly communicated to deposi-
tors. Therefore, the decision to deposit depends on the average
quality of banks in the economy provided that efficient banks have
enough ‘‘skin in the game’’ in the form of equity to monitor their
projects. Our unobservability assumption reflects information
asymmetries between depositors and banks and is in line with tra-
ditional banking models as well as recent empirical findings.5 The
opacity of the banking sector implies that depositors cannot distin-
guish between banks based on their individual balance sheets. In par-
ticular, a single bank is not able to signal its quality by any choice
variable such as additional equity, profits or the leverage ratio.
Depositors may only observe theminimum capital requirement stan-
dard implemented by the national regulator.6 Because inside equity
funding is costly and cannot be used by banks to signal their quality
due to balance sheet opaqueness, any bank will intuitively minimise
costly equity capital such that capital requirements are always bind-
ing. Note that binding minimum capital requirement regulation also
implies that there is no competition among banks for deposits.7
In the spirit of this literature we model the breakdown of finan-
cial intermediation as a confidence crisis where depositors are
unwilling to give their money to a bank which they select at ran-
dom. We may now construct two conditions for the existence of
financial intermediation, i.e., depositing: first, monitoring must
be incentive-compatible for efficient banks. The fraction h of banks
will choose to monitor projects only if the return from monitoring
exceeds the return from not doing so, i.e., (R ! rD)(pL + Mp) !mP
(R ! rD)pL. Therefore, banks must receive a sufficiently high rent to
be incentivised to monitor. In other words, the monitoring incen-
tive compatibility constraint for efficient banks provides an upper
bound on the deposit rate:
rD 6 rMICD :¼ R!
m
Mp : ð1Þ
This upper bound on the refinancing cost is increasing in the va-
lue added of monitoring @r
MIC
D
@Mp > 0 and decreasing in the cost of mon-
itoring @r
MIC
D
@m < 0. Any deposit rate rD > r
MIC
D will destroy the efficient
bank’s incentives to monitor, and will result in a homogenous
banking sector where the probability that the project succeeds
equals pL. If rD 6 rMICD , depositors anticipate that the fraction h of
banks engage in monitoring. Knowing the overall fraction of banks
with monitoring technology allows for the deduction of an ex-
pected unconditional probability of project success of (pL + hMp).
Note that the monitoring incentive constraint also excludes the
possibility that efficient banks signal their quality through higher
deposit rates. Any bank that would offer a deposit rate rD 6 rMICD
cannot credibly commit to monitor and cannot signal its efficiency
due to higher deposit rates in equilibrium.8
Anticipating this average probability, depositors are willing to
deposit their endowments at the bank if the expected return from
depositing exceeds their outside option rD " (pL + hMp)P c. The par-
ticipation constraint from depositors thus gives the second condi-
tion for depositing, which defines a lower bound on the deposit
rate. Depositors require at least a deposit rate that is equal to, or
greater than
rPCDD :¼
c
pL
iff rD > rMICD ;
c
pLþhMp iff rD 6 r
MIC
D :
8>><>>: ð2Þ
Because of the perfectly elastic supply of deposits, i.e., no com-
petition among banks for deposits, the depositor’s rent declines,
resulting in a binding participation constraint denoted by
rD½h( :¼ cpLþhMp if h efficient banks monitor.
However, financial intermediation is only possible in an opaque
banking sector when the depositors require an interest rate that
deposit rate that is required by depositors does not violate the
bank’s monitoring condition. If the natural fraction of efficient
banks is high enough, financial intermediation may exist without
any regulatory intervention. However, throughout this paper, we
will assume that the ‘‘natural’’ proportion of banks that have access
3 The basic set-up follows Holmström and Tirole (1997) and Morrison and White
(2009) with perfect correlation of risk for each type of bank. Alternatively, we may
assume that depositors are fully insured, but the deposit insurance risk premium to
be paid by the banks depends on the average risk in the banking sector. We will
discuss this case in Section 2.5.
4 The assumption that bankers prefer to economise on equity is a regular
assumption and is commonly justified by the scarcity of bankers’ wealth, e.g.
Morrison and White (2011), by the existence of agency problems, e.g. Holmström and
Tirole (1997), or simply by the special tax treatment or an underpriced safety net, e.g.
Admati et al. (2011).
5 Morgan (2002) supports empirically the assumption of significant opacity in the
banking sector by comparing the frequency of disagreements among bond-rating
agencies regarding the values of firms across sectors of activity. The disagreements
are higher for financial institutions than for other economic sectors. In addition,
Flannery et al. (2013) find significant bank balance sheet opacity during times of
financial crisis. They also find evidence that capital and policy actions increase
transparency and are substitutes.
6 This assumption is in line with the empirical observations of Jordan et al. (2000)
who show that market prices react to supervisory announcements supporting the
claim that investors do not have full information.
7 Following Acharya (2003) and Morrison and White (2011) we remain with the
assumption that competition for deposits is absent.
8 The efficient banks would be able to credibly signal their type by offering a higher
deposit rate only if they make higher profits than goofy banks. To see that such a case
is not feasible, note that no bank is able to attract depositors by offering an interest
rate that is higher than the monitoring incentive constraint rMICD , because depositors
would foresee that efficient banks lack the incentive to monitor. They would require a
deposit rate rD ¼ cpL > R, which is strictly higher than the return a bank makes from
investing the deposits. Therefore, the maximum interest rate that unregulated banks
can credibly offer is rMICD (or with binding capital regulation r
MICk
D ). By definition, this
deposit rate is the rate that equals the profit of monitoring efficient and goofy banks.
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to a monitoring technology is too small so that unregulated depos-
iting is not feasible without any regulation.9
Definition 1 (Lemons Equilibrium). If h < h^ :¼ cMpR!m ! pLMp, financial
intermediation is on average less productive than investments in
the storage technology and the banking market disappears.
Proof. If h < h^, it follows that cpLþhMp > R! mMp. Depositors correctly
foresee that no banks are monitoring. From (2), it follows that
depositors require rD ¼ cpL to participate. However, for c > R " pL,
no bank would be able to pay such a deposit rate without experi-
encing losses, i.e., the required return for the depositor’s participa-
tion constraint to hold will violate the participation constraint of
the non-monitoring banks. Although lending to efficient banks is
socially valuable, depositors are unwilling to deposit, leading the
banking market to break down; a lemons equilibrium à la Akerlof
emerges. h
In a lemons equilibrium, even banks with efficient monitoring
technology would not be able to raise funds and no investments
would be made, even though monitored projects could create va-
lue. As a result, the financial market is unable to channel funds
effectively to firms that have the most productive investment
opportunities.
In the following sections we argue that the market inefficiency
caused by asymmetric information may be alleviated by two alter-
native policy instruments: capital standards and supervision.
2.2. The effects of capital standards
The introduction of a minimum capital requirement changes
the individual incentive constraints of banks. The first effect of
capital concerns the monitoring condition of efficient banks.
To see this, note that if a bank refunds each investment by a
fraction of capital k, the incentive to monitor changes to
(R ! rD(1 ! k))(pL + Mp) !mP (R ! rD(1 ! k))pL. It follows that the
incentive constraint becomes
rD 6 rMICkD :¼
R! mMp
ð1! kÞ > r
MIC
D : ð3Þ
This tells us that a capitalised bank, which refunds a proportion
of its investments with equity, is able to pay higher deposit rates
without violating its incentive constraint. Because @r
MICk
D
@k > 0, the
incentive constraint (MIC) is upward sloping in a deposit rate-cap-
ital ratio space. Efficient banks wish to provide monitoring services
only when the deposit rate is sufficiently low to compensate them
for monitoring activities. A minimum capital requirement reduces
the rent an efficient bank requires to be willing to monitor. There-
fore, with more ‘‘ skin in the game’’, efficient banks may accept
higher deposit rates, while still credibly offering the assurance to
monitor their projects ex post. Fig. 1 illustrates how the monitoring
incentive constraint MIC is increasing in k. Without any regulation,
depositing does not occur, as all depositors prefer to invest in the
storage technology instead of lending money to banks. The equity
funding rate k⁄ gives the minimum capital requirement rate that
establishes financial intermediation by solving the moral hazard
problem of efficient banks for a given required return of depositors
rD[h].
However, because equity funding is costly, a higher capital
requirement rate diminishes the rents of both bank types. There-
fore, it also influences each bank type’s incentive to participate,
i.e., the break-even point which limits the range of feasible capital
standards.
The participation constraint of a monitoring bank is given by the
non-negative profits condition: (R ! rD(1 ! k))pH !m ! qkP 0.
Solving for a maximum deposit interest rate, we obtain:
rD½h( 6 rPCED :¼
R! mþq"kpH
ð1! kÞ : ð4Þ
Because we assume that q > pH " R, the minimum capital
requirement must be small enough to sustain the continued oper-
ation of efficient banks: k < k^e½rD( :¼ pHðR!rD ½h(Þ!mq!pH "rD ½h( .
Goofy banks, on the contrary, will make non-negative profits
whenever (R ! rD(1 ! k))pL ! qk > 0, which is the case for every de-
posit rate
rD½h( 6 rPCGD :¼
R! qkpL
ð1! kÞ ; ð5Þ
implying a break-even capital standard that is equal to
k^g ½rD( :¼ pLðR!rD ½h(Þq!pL "rD ½h( . Let k^½rD( denote the capital standard that solves
MIC = PCG = PCD. With a sufficiently high cost of capital q > pL "mDp ,
we may derive the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. For a sufficiently high proportion of efficient banks,
rD½h( < rD½k^(, there exists a continuum of minimum capital require-
ment rates k 2 ½k); k^e( that solves the moral hazard problem.
Otherwise, capital requirements alone cannot guarantee financial
intermediation, k 2 [;].
Proof. With q > pL "mDp , it must hold that 0 < k^ < 1. Therefore, there
exists a maximum interest rate rD½k^( that simultaneously makes
the MIC (3) and the PCs of each bank type (4) and (5) binding.
Any capital requirement above k^e would further decrease the
required interest rate for monitoring incentives but violates (3).
Fig. 1. The intermediation region for a high pool quality: The figure plots the
constraints on deposit rates as functions of the capital regulation, i.e., the
participation constraint of depositors, PCD, the participation constraint of efficient
and goofy banks, PCE and PCG, and the monitoring incentive constraint of efficient
banks, MIC. A market for financial intermediation is possible if the imposed capital
regulation is set within the feasible range k 2 ½k); k^e(, where k⁄ denotes the
minimum capital standard necessary for monitoring investments at a given deposit
rate rD, and k^e represents the capital standard where intermediation allows zero
profits for efficient banks.
9 The condition of non-negative profits: (R ! rD)pH ! mP 0 gives the participation
constraint of a monitoring bank and hence rD 6 rPCED :¼ R! mpH . Note that the lower
bound on the deposit rate of the efficient bank’s participation is always above theMIC,
as pH > Dp and the MIC will be violated first. By contrast, goofy banks will make non-
negative profits whenever (R ! rD)pH > 0, which is the case for any deposit rate
rD 6 rPCGD :¼ R.
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Therefore, there exists no capital requirement that guarantees that
efficient banks monitor and are willing to participate. h
Lemma 1 tells us that observable and binding minimum capi-
tal requirements can only overcome a lemons equilibrium in the
market if the fraction of efficient banks is sufficiently high. Then,
by decreasing the moral hazard incentives in an opaque banking
sector, efficient banks credibly commit to monitor. However, cap-
ital regulation cannot solve the adverse selection problem by
crowding out goofy banks. On the one hand, it is true that for
any k > k^, monitoring banks are more profitable than goofy
banks, rPCED > rPCGD . Consequently, setting a sufficiently high capital
requirement k^e P k > k^g will induce the exit of goofy banks first.
On the other hand, depositors correctly anticipate that only effi-
cient banks participate and monitor: The expected success of pro-
jects increases to pH and the required return on deposit falls to
rD ¼ cpH. However, with lower deposit funding costs, goofy banks
find it profitable to participate in banking – and re-enter the mar-
ket. Therefore, crowding out goofy banks by setting a sufficiently
high capital requirement cannot be an equilibrium unless the
capital requirement is set such that k^e cpLþhMp
h i
> k > k^g cpH
h i
. From
these observations we can define the depositors’ participation
constraint as follows:
rPCDD :¼
c
pL
k < k)
c
pLþhMp k^g P kP k
)
c
pH
k > k^g :
8>><>>: ð6Þ
The depositors’ willingness to invest does not depend linearly
on the capital requirement, because a bank’s probability of success
is affected not by the capital structure of the bank, but only by the
monitoring incentives of banks and the incentives to enter the
market.10 Intuitively, depositors require a ‘‘goofy’’ risk premium
for the average success probability in the banking sector.
Recall Fig. 1 where the PCs of depositors, efficient and goofy
banks, as well as the monitoring incentive constraint are plotted.
A capital standard k⁄, as the intersection point of the MIC- and
the PCD-curve labels the lowest capital ratio that must be imple-
mented to guarantee the existence of a national banking sector.
Capital requirements that exceed this threshold may solve the
moral hazard problem induced by asymmetric information, but a
prohibitive high requirement k^e will violate the bank’s participa-
tion constraint of non-negative profits. It follows that effective reg-
ulation is only possible within the feasible set k ¼ fk); k^eg. Such a
policy is welfare-superior compared to an unregulated economy:
The expected output of the regulated banking sector is strictly
higher. Because the transfer between the bank and the depositor
is welfare-neutral, the level of the deposit rate is negligible from
a regulator’s point of view.
Definition 2 (Welfare). A policy is welfare-superior if the expected
output of the banking sector exceeds the cost of implementation.
One interesting corollary of the model setup is that we observe
an implicit cross-subsidy for goofy banks. Efficient banks must pay
higher refinancing costs in an opaque banking sector compared to
a transparent one; by contrast, goofy banks face lower refinancing
costs. In other words, goofy banks free-ride on the monitoring
activity of their efficient competitors. This positive externality
may be interpreted as a cross-subsidy equal to
1
pLþhMp ! 1pLþMp > 0
h i
. It is straightforward that this externality has
consequences for the reluctance of capital standards: if banks max-
imise profits, Pi = pi " (R ! rD(1 ! k)) ! q " k !m, we show that
PE >PG for any k ¼ fk); k^eg.
However, Fig. 2 illustrates the second case of Lemma 1 where
the natural fraction of efficient banks is too low, and the feasible
set of capital requirement regulation is empty k = {;}. Here, capital
regulation alone cannot solve the lemons market; i.e., regulation
cannot implement a situation where efficient banks will monitor
and participate. In this case, non-relevant capital standards yield
the same outcome and welfare as in an unregulated banking sector.
Intuitively, depositors’ confidence in the banking sector is so low
that only a prohibitively high capital standard k⁄ satisfies the mon-
itoring condition of efficient banks and the market breaks down.
From here on, we assume the ‘‘natural fraction’’ of efficient
banks to be zero. As a consequence, the regulator must interfere
and improve the quality of the banking sector. She must make
use of a second policy tool. We call this tool supervisory effort.
2.3. The effects of supervision
We now introduce the alternative policy instrument used to en-
sure financial intermediation and foster depositors’ confidence in
the banking sector, which simultaneously influences the composi-
tion of efficient and goofy banks. The regulator has the possibility
of spending resources on supervisory officers, watchdog institu-
tions, and specialised equipment to prevent goofy banks from
obtaining a licence. Therefore, the regulator may control the pool
quality of the national banking sector in a direct way via screening
and auditing domestic banks, via on- and offsite examinations, or
via disclosure requirements in order to select out goofy banks.
In terms of our model, the fraction of efficient banks in our
economy and thereby the absolute number of goofy banks G, is
the output of the regulator’s investment in a supervisory technol-
Fig. 2. The intermediation region for a low pool quality: The dashed monitoring
incentive constraint, MIC, and the dotted participation constraints of each bank
type, PCE and PCG, intersect below the depositors’ participation constraint, PCD.
Because the capital standard k⁄ that solves the efficient banks’ moral hazard
problem is prohibitively high, no bank is willing to remain in the market. For any
capital requirement policy the intermediation region is empty.
10 The fact that higher equity funding does not directly influence the bank’s success
probability, is a result of the simplicity of our model where defaulting investment
projects have perfect correlation. One major argument in favour of higher capital
requirements is that equity provides a buffer against unexpected losses. Such a
condition could be implemented in our model by a shock to risky investment returns,
where a proportion of the projects do not succeed. When a bank has funded its
investments with more equity, it will be able to absorb larger shocks; in other words,
the actual return on investment covers at least the deposit liabilities. However, this
additional stability enhancing buffer effect does not change our results, but would
increase the complexity of our model. Therefore we neglect the effect of imperfect
correlation in our model.
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ogy. In other words, for a given size of the banking sector, we
endogenise h ¼ EEþG reflecting the supervisory effort e of the na-
tional regulator with h(e) = f[e], h(0) = 0 where f is a production
function for the pool quality in our economy. Given f, a higher level
of effort spent on running supervisory agencies and institutions to
evaluate the soundness of national banks, facilitates the discovery
of offenses and the identification of goofy banks.11
However, supervision is costly. According to Goodhart et al.
(1998) the cost of banking supervision may be divided into three
classes: the institutional cost of operating supervisory agencies,
the costs of compliance and structural costs which include ways
in which supervision affects markets such as the possible impair-
ment of competition. All of these costs become excessively burden-
some with the regulator’s investment in supervision.
Therefore, let the cost of supervision be continuously increas-
ing in effort, convex, and twice differentiable c[0] = 0, c[emax] =1,
c0[0] = 0, c0[e] > 0, c00[e] > 0. Intuitively, a regulator has a certain
capacity (manpower or time) that allows her to screen only a lim-
ited number of banks. It is straightforward that she may enhance
the pool quality of the banking sector, if she supervises with great
intensity. Although doing so would be easy and cheap for one
bank, an increase in the number of supervised banks may in-
crease the institutional cost. For too many banks, it might not
even be at all possible ‘‘to keep an eye’’ on each bank. In addition,
the excess burden of supervisory activities (structural costs) in-
creases with the number of banks supervised. To keep our model
simple and traceable, we parametrise h as a linear increasing
function of effort such that e = h where the cost function is equal
to c½e( ¼ c2 " h2. We assume that the source of financing of banking
supervision comes directly (budget assigned by government) or
indirectly (seigniorage) from taxpayers via lump-sum taxes that
do not change the investment choice of households.12 Accord-
ingly, a better screening ability of the regulator, reflected in a lower
marginal cost of supervision c, implies less for taxpayers and fewer
goofy banks in the banking sector for a given cost level. It follows
that a regulator that faces high supervisory effort costs, may allow
more goofy banks. She shows this behaviour not because her basic
motivation differs but because her benefits and costs differ from a
regulator that faces less effort cost. It follows that the efficiency of
a supervisor’s technology determines the ex-ante composition
within the national banking sector.
The introduction of our supervisory technology does not affect
the MIC of efficient banks, but does change the composition of
the banking sector, and thus the PCD of depositors. The intuition
is simple: depositors will encounter investment in supervision by
adapting their beliefs of the overall market quality and thus the
required deposit rate, given that efficient banks have an incentive
to monitor. All banks benefit from the more effective screening
provided by the regulator because of lower deposit rates. As a
consequence, the profits of the remaining banks are greater in
jurisdictions with better supervision ability, i.e., lower supervi-
sory costs, c[h]. The highest rent per bank may be achieved only
when efficient banks are left in the banking sector, such that
h = 1 (though this would imply prohibitively high effort cost).
However, even in this case the outside option of the depositor
may exceed the value added from monitoring. Then the benefi-
cial effect from supervision, i.e., cheaper refinancing, erodes and
the banking market freezes regardless of the level of supervisory
effort.
Lemma 2. If c > pH R! mMp
! "
, supervision alone cannot solve the
moral hazard problem.
Proof. Consider the highest quality a banking sector may have,
h = 1, where there are only efficient banks in the sector. The deposit
rate required by depositors is cpH , provided that the MIC is not vio-
lated. However, with cpH > R! mMp, this is not the case. Depositors
foresee that efficient banks have no incentive to monitor and thus
require cpL > R. Without any additional capital requirement, the
market breaks down. h
Indeed, this finding implies that the expected value of the
depositors’ alternative investment is more profitable than the ex-
pected return of efficient bank investments, which may be an ex-
treme case because banking is not at all desirable. However, even
if supervision alone may solve the moral hazard problem h = 1, it
might not be optimal, due to increasing supervision costs. If a
country does not have the supervisory capabilities or simply the
ability to raise taxes to oversee banks the regulator may be forced
to take different actions. Moreover, an improved pool quality of the
banking sector will cause the size of the sector to shrink. Keep in
mind that an investment in supervision may be interpreted as a
contractionary policy that limits the scope of financial intermedia-
tion by selecting out goofy banks.
After having introduced the two parameters of our model that
govern the banking sector (directly to increase the number of effi-
cient banks via supervision or indirectly via incentivising monitor-
ing of efficient banks with capital standards), we now analyse the
optimal policy mix.
2.4. The optimal policy mix
The concern of the regulator is to prevent the breakdown of
financial intermediation at the lowest cost. To reach this goal,
she must balance the cost and benefits of both policy instruments
which are driven by the characteristics of the domestic economy.
However, we allow for the possibility that the regulator has a cer-
tain preference for both instruments; in other words, she weighs
the rent of domestic efficient banks and the rent of the taxpayers.13
If one policy instrument will produce more output with the same in-
puts, this information will become a factor in choosing among super-
vision and capital standards. Therefore, the regulator’s objective
function may be expressed as
max U
h;k
¼ / "PE½h; k( þ ð1! /Þ " PD½h; k( ! c
2
" h2
! "
;
constrained by the conditions for the monitoring of efficient banks
(3), for the banks’ participation (4) and (5) and for the depositors’
participation (6). The terms PE[h,k] and PD[h,k] denote the rents
of efficient banks and depositors respectively and the parameter
/ 2 [0,1] captures the weight that the regulator places on the rent
of efficient banks. Because we assume perfect competition on the
deposit market, the profit of depositors is zero PD[h,k] = 0. Inserting
the profit function of efficient banks, we may rewrite the utility
maximisation problem, which is in fact a cost minimisation
problem:
max
h;k
U ¼ / " fpH " ðR! rD½h( " ð1! kÞÞ !m! q " kg! ð1! /Þ "
c
2
" h2 ð7Þ
11 According to Barth et al. (2006) 80% of all countries impose basic requirements to
screen entrants to better ensure that they are ‘‘fit and proper’’.
12 See Masciandaro et al. (2007) for an in-depth analysis of the financing sources of
banking supervision for 90 countries. The authors show that public financing is the
most common budgetary arrangement for central banks as supervisors.
13 We thus assume that the regulator cares only for the taxpayers’ money and the
expected value of financial intermediation. Because goofy banks are inefficient and
reduce the value of the banking sector, their profits are ignored. Given a country’s
taste and economic structure, this condition implies that the regulator chooses
efficient capital standards and bank supervisory actions in a Coasian manner.
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s:t:
rD½h( ¼ cpL þ hMp
;
kP 1! ðR!
m
DpÞ
rD
;
k 6 pHðR! rDÞ !mq! pHrD
0 6 k 6 1; 0 6 h 6 1;
where rD[h] labels the deposit refinancing cost. The regulator now
maximises welfare U and decides how to ensure financial interme-
diation with the most cost-efficient usage of her two tools capital
standards k and supervisory effort h. Partial derivation yields:
@U
@k
¼ / " fpH " rD½h( ! qgh0jqi
pH
pL
c
# $
;
@U
@h
¼ !/pH
@rD½h(
@h
ð1! kÞ ! ð1! /Þ " c " h:
The first derivative with respect to k is always negative for
q > pHpL c: capital is comparatively costly for any feasible level of
the deposit rate.
The regulator chooses the lowest feasible capital requirement
and theMIC (3) becomes binding for any / > 0. Substituting (3) into
@U
@h yields
@U
@h
¼ /pH
R " Dp!m
pL þ hMp
% &
! ð1! /Þ " c " h:
Indeed, the chosen policy affects the rents of the two interest
groups, the banking industry and the taxpayers, who are assumed
to have opposite interests regarding the policy. Tighter capital
standards in an opaque banking sector reduce the profitability
of banks, for example, by restricting investment policy, stifling
innovation, or preventing the expansion of investment activities.
This limiting may be regarded as the banking sector’s direct reg-
ulatory burden consisting of opportunity costs for the banking
sector or, alternatively, as the forgone benefits from financial
intermediation to depositors. Therefore, banks have an incentive
to minimise the capital standard and lobby for supervisory effort,
thereby implicitly shifting the cost burden of regulatory interven-
tion to taxpayers. On the other hand, taxpayers have the interest
to maintain financial intermediation via setting high capital
requirements, as banks would ultimately bear the cost burden
and cannot externalise it to society. Intuitively, the composition
of both policy tools determines rent shifting between taxpayers
and banks. Given the conflicts about the policy mix, resolution
occurs in the political realm, based on distributional and
economic efficiency criteria. The organisation of political systems
may thus also play a prominent role in determining national
banking regulation.
2.4.1. Jacksonian regulation (/ = 0)
Consider first the case where the profitability of efficient banks
receives no weight in the regulator’s welfare function. The term
Jacksonian regulation goes back to US President Andrew Jackson
(1767–1845) who fundamentally opposed government-granted
monopolies to banks (‘‘The bank is trying to kill me, but I will kill
it!’’).
Because @U@k ¼ 0, @U@e < 0, we know that the MIC determines the
necessary supervisory effort. If the participation constraint never
becomes binding before the monitoring incentive constraint, i.e.,
q < pL "mDp the regulator will simply set k = 1 and save any effort on
supervision with h = 0. However, with k = 1, the bank would lose
its function as a financial intermediary. Therefore, this trivial solu-
tion appears to be rather unconvincing. If equity capital is costly,
i.e., q > pL "mDp , the regulator must spend a minimum supervisory
effort to secure the existence of financial intermediation, i.e., the
MIC and the PCE become binding. The regulator sets a capital
requirement k^ ¼ pLDp " mq and exerts just enough supervisory effort
to satisfy PCD =MIC = PCE. In particular, the regulator exerts effort
to increase the average bank quality just up to the amount where
the required deposit rate equals the break-even deposit rate:
h ¼ c"ð1!k^ÞMpR!m ! pLMp.
2.4.2. Captured regulation (0 > /P 1)
We now consider the more relevant case where the regulator
also considers the profits of efficient banks.14 A possible capture
of the regulator by the banking industry is supported by a rich liter-
ature of empirical studies; e.g., Colburn and Hudgins (1996) provide
evidence that the voting behaviour of the House of Representatives
in the 1980s was influenced by the interests of the thrift industry.
More recently, Igan et al. (2011) find that financial institutions that
successfully lobby on mortgage lending and laxity in securitisation
issues adopt riskier investment strategies.
If the profitability of banks influences the regulator’s decision,
then there arises a trade-off between spending more costly effort
on supervision and allowing banks to yield higher profits. Intui-
tively, a policy-maker that places more weight on efficient bank
margins will vote for lower capital ratios, and vice versa. Such a
regulator would balance the weighted marginal cost of supervision
with the weighted marginal cost of higher capital requirements for
the banks.
The optimal mix of a captured regulator depends on her mar-
ginal rates of substitution to the corresponding relative prices,
i.e., costs. Using (7) we may generally characterise her decision
with the following proposition.
Proposition 1. For / 2 0; ciRDp!mþci
h i
, there exists a unique optimal
pair of k⁄ and h⁄ 2 [0,1] that maximises regulator’s utility.
Proof. If (4) and (5) are non-binding, and effort costs are suffi-
ciently high, i.e., if c > /ð1!/Þ ðR " Dp!mÞ, there exists a unique inte-
rior solution. For a given level of effort cost, the first-order
condition implicitly defines the optimal supervisory level h⁄ and
capital standard k[h⁄]. The detailed analysis may be found in
Appendix A. h
The intuition for Proposition 1 comes from the fact that bank
supervision reduces the number of goofy banks in the market,
and thus the required interest rate in the domestic deposit market.
The bank’s incentive to monitor projects increases, and capital
requirements may be reduced; optimal regulatory capital stan-
dards decrease with the number of efficient banks in an economy.
A higher fraction of efficient banks leads to a lower capital standard
required to maintain depositing in a banking sector:
dk)
dh ¼ ! 1c ðR " Dp!mÞ < 0 (see Fig. 3). A regulator balances the
weighted profitability of efficient banks with the marginal costs
of supervision and select an optimal level of enforcement e⁄ that
translates into a specific h. Therefore, if k½h)( < k^½h)(, then the regu-
lator chooses an optimal supervisory effort that trades off the high-
er marginal effort cost with the lower marginal cost of capital
requirements consistent with financial intermediation.
14 A special case of the analysis, / = 0.5, will yield the social welfare function, where
the regulator selects supervision and capital regulation in an economically efficient
manner based on wealth maximisation but not Pareto optimality, see Acemoglu et al.
(2005). This view is often called the ‘‘Coasian theorem of banking regulation’’ and may
be reinterpreted as a condition where the banking sector ‘‘regulates’’ itself by credibly
agreeing on minimum capital ratios and bears the cost for spending effort on peer
monitoring.
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2.4.3. The feasible policy set
The appeal of capital requirements for supervision that will be
optimally set by a captured regulator depends on the economic
state. Within a feasible set of effective regulation, our model pre-
dicts how the regulator adjusts to certain features and shocks in
the domestic economy.
Fig. 3 illustrates the decision problem of the regulator by plot-
ting the optimal capital standard and supervisory effort in a k⁄–
h-diagram. Whereas the downward sloping curve graphs the MIC
function, the upward sloping lines capture the participation con-
straints of the banks, and the vertical line captures the participa-
tion constraint of depositors. The figure shows that there is a
well-defined window for possible combinations of a capital stan-
dard and supervision that ensures financial intermediation
ðk^ > k > kminÞ.
From Lemma 2, we know that for a prohibitively high outside
option of depositors/monitoring costs, the effort spent on supervi-
sion alone cannot solve the moral hazard problem. Therefore, the
regulator must still set a capital requirement k = kmin to ensure that
efficient banks monitor and financial intermediation actually oc-
curs. On the other hand, Lemma 1 tells us that capital requirement
regulation alone cannot also solve the adverse selection problem if
the required capital requirement is above the capital requirement
that ensures that banks break even, i.e., k½h( > k^. Therefore, the reg-
ulator must spend a minimum supervisory effort such that finan-
cial intermediation occurs in equilibrium. There is a natural limit
for possible combinations of feasible capital standards and super-
visory investments.
Specifically, for an interior solution, the point of intersection be-
tween the optimal supervisory effort and the MIC is the regulator’s
optimum. The first-best capital ratio that maximises the regulator’s
utility within the feasible policy set depends on her supervisory
efficiency and on the parameters of the domestic banking industry.
The following table shortly summarises the comparative statics.
h c q m Mp
k⁄ ! + ! + !
First, it is worth noting that a jurisdiction that spends higher ef-
fort on supervisory enforcement may allow banks to operate with
lower capital requirements. However, it is optimal to have stricter
capital regulation when the regulator is less efficient in controlling
the quality of the banking sector, whereby a regulator’s ability to
supervise efficiently is reflected by the marginal costs of supervi-
sion. Therefore, lower cost efficiency in supervisory effort leads
to higher optimal capital requirements.
Lemma 3. Within the feasible policy set, capital standards and
supervision are substitutes.
Second, when the economy is in good condition (the cost of
equity q is sufficiently low), it is optimal to require banks to hold
capital sufficient to contain moral hazard, i.e., to set higher capital
standards, whereas in bad economic states (where equity costs are
sufficiently high), it becomes optimal to decrease capital standards.
Essentially, such a countercyclical policy of capital standards in-
creases the regulator’s welfare by lowering the impact of equity
shocks on banks.
Lemma 4. Within the feasible policy set, capital standards are set
counter-cyclically.
The intuition is straightforward. Whereas the benefits from
monitoring are independent of the state of the world, the cost of
inducing monitoring is higher in bad states, when capital is costly.
Analogously, a higher monitoring cost decreases the profit of effi-
cient banks which lowers the optimal effort level, thereby increas-
ing the optimal capital requirement. Moreover, both the MIC and
the participation constraint of efficient banks become more likely
to be binding. For higher levels of value added by monitoring, there
is a greater probability that the MIC holds. In terms of our model,
higher profits justify lower capital requirements.
To summarise the main findings in this section, our model sug-
gests that there are two ways to ensure financial intermediation.
The first is the introduction of minimum capital requirements that
reduce banks’ margins. The second is to exert effort on sophisti-
cated supervision to improve the efficiency of the average bank
in the market, which reduces the size of the banking sector. We ob-
tain a lower bound for the cost of banking regulation based on the
minimal rents necessary to implement both cost-efficiency and the
existence of the intermediation. Our analysis shows that the cost
minimisation problem of the regulator requires two actions: mak-
ing monitoring profitable via capital standards (this ensures the
existence of the pie we call a banking sector that is to be divided
among depositors and banks) and ensuring that no participation
constraint is violated (minimising the costs, and thereby maximis-
ing the size of the pie). We show that for any domestic regulator,
the optimal combination of both instruments that maximises
domestic utility under the constraint that financial intermediation
occurs, depends on her marginal rates of substitution to the corre-
sponding relative costs where the first term is related to the weight
the regulator places on the rent of each interest group. Therefore,
the regulator implicitly creates rents by selecting a policy mix of
capital regulation and supervisory effort that deviates from the
weighting of a benevolent social planner (i.e., / = 0.5).
2.5. Deposit insurance
The assumption in our baseline model that uninsured deposi-
tors discipline the banking system by requiring a deposit rate vary-
ing with the average quality of a domestic bank is arguably strong.
Certainly, the banking system of modern societies is characterised
by widespread deposit insurance systems and a resulting lack of
market-disciplining reactions of depositors. Notably, during the
2007–2009 financial crisis these deposit insurance systems were
even broadened.15 However, our qualitative results remain un-
changed if we introduce a risk-adjusted deposit insurance scheme fi-
nanced by banks. Such a self-financed scheme is common in most
Fig. 3. The feasible regulatory set: The figure plots the monitoring incentive
constraint MIC and the participation constraints of each bank type as well of
depositors, PCE, PCG, and PCD, as functions of the supervisory effort h. The optimal
regulatory policy consists of both minimum capital requirements k⁄[h⁄] and a
supervisory effort h⁄ considering the corresponding constraints. The feasible set of
solutions is depicted as a bold line.
15 During the financial crisis, many jurisdictions provided full depositor guarantees.
However, the range and implementation of these guarantees differed from pure
political commitments such as the assurance of the German chancellor Angela Merkel
that ‘‘no German depositor would lose any money’’, to legislative guarantees as in
Denmark, which provide a 100% guarantee on savings.
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industrialised countries. Consider a deposit insurance company that
has the same information as the depositors in our basic setup, i.e.,
she cannot observe the riskiness of a single bank but knows the risk
level of the banking sector as a whole. In this case, banks must pay a
risk premium e[pL,Dp,h] that decreases with the banking sector
quality h and with the success probabilities of bank assets pL and
Dp. If the deposit insurance company must pay the outstanding lia-
bilities rD for all failing banks, the risk premium exactly reflects the
average riskiness of the banking sector. In other words, the resulting
premium captures the expected cost of bailing out the failed bank’s
depositors rD " (1 ! (pL + hMpL)). However, only solvent banks are
able to contribute to the deposit insurance fund, i.e., e[pL,Dp,h] "
(pL + hMpL). Substituting the expected cost equal to the expected
average payments into the deposit insurance fund, yields the fair risk
premium for each bank e½pL;Dp; h( ¼ rD "ð1!ðpLþhMpLÞÞðpLþhMpLÞ .
Due to the deposit insurance, depositors do not face any risk:
they recoup their money regardless of whether the bank fails.
Retaining our assumption of perfect competition among deposi-
tors, the equilibrium deposit rate equals the depositors’ outside op-
tion c and no longer responds to changes in regulation or
supervision. In other words, in an economy with full risk-adjusted
deposit insurance, the depositors lose their bank disciplining role
and require only the fixed deposit rate rD = c. The active role to dis-
cipline banks based on average riskiness is delegated to the deposit
insurance company. Nonetheless, our qualitative results remain ro-
bust, as the banks’ funding cost now consists of the required de-
posit rate plus the deposit risk premium paid to the deposit
insurance. In particular, the banks face aggregate costs of deposit
funding (rD + e[pL,Dp,h]) that are exactly equal to the PCD of our
model:
rD þ e½pL;Dp; h( ¼ rD þ
rD " ð1! ðpL þ hMpLÞÞ
ðpL þ hMpLÞ
¼ c
pL þ hMpL
:
Consequently, all constraints for financial intermediation are
unaffected by the introduction of deposit insurance. A risk-ad-
justed deposit insurance that is financed ex post by the banking
sector yields the same qualitative results.16
In the following section, we now investigate the role of institu-
tional competition among regulators on the optimal bundle of pol-
icy tools.
3. Optimal regulation with international spillovers
The essence of international competition is that the integration
of national markets changes the allocation of banks and, conse-
quently, the economic environment for optimal national policies.
The institutional framework determines the factors of production
for banks. Therefore, the following section analyses a regulator’s
optimal reply to the globalisation of banking markets, explicitly
considering international spillovers. We discuss the conditions un-
der which competition will work properly to improve financial sta-
bility. In other words, we address the question: when does the
invisible hand of regulatory competition fail such that there is a
need for collective action, i.e., the harmonisation of banking regu-
lation à la Basel?
We argue that the effect of regulatory competition crucially de-
pends on the information structure of national regulation in the
banking sector. If depositors are able to fully monitor country-spe-
cific regulatory regimes and are able to differentiate via adjusted
interest rates, jurisdictions evolve into a ‘‘club’’ supplying a regula-
tory framework for banks. Accordingly we argue that a regulatory
product such as banking regulation is characterised for depositors
by immobility, rivalry in use and the possibility of exclusion of
outsiders.
3.1. Two heterogenous countries
To discuss the impact of regulatory competition, consider two
countries i 2 [A,B] with / 2 0; ciRDp!mþci
h i
that are linked through
bank mobility. With the home country principle in regulating for-
eign banks and two symmetric banking sectors, we allow banks to
finance projects abroad. However, we assume that the regulator in
each country differs with respect to her supervisory efficiency.
More specifically, consider country A with effort cost cA and coun-
try B with effort cost cB, where cA < cB without loss of generality.
Ceteris paribus, the ex-ante level of effort, and the resulting share
of monitoring banks is h)A > h
)
B, and the respective optimal national
capital ratios set by the domestic regulator are k)A h
)
A
' (
< k)B h
)
B
' (
.
Note that even though country B has a higher observable capital
requirement, the quality of the banking sector is lower, resulting
in a lower average rate of success. As argued above, a less cost effi-
cient supervisor will compensate for a lower quality of the banking
sector with higher capital requirements. In other words, a higher-
quality banking sector entails lower capital requirements to disci-
pline banks.
Facing the possibility of moving, banks compare their expected
profits from remaining in their home country and moving to the
foreign jurisdiction. When moving implies switching cost m, a bank
of type i 2 [E,G], that is settled in country B will move whenever
Pi(A) ! m >Pi(B).
3.2. The club-view: Observable supervision in competing jurisdictions
In this subsection, we assume complete information for all mar-
ket participants regarding the quality and costs of banking super-
vision. Consequently, depositors adjust the deposit rates to the
average bank quality of the national banking sector and there are
additional incentives for banks to move abroad. Facing lower cap-
ital requirements in the foreign country, banks that are able to
move to another jurisdiction have an incentive to choose the juris-
diction that allows for the highest profits. A potential entrant now
chooses his regulatory environment by trading-off the benefits and
costs of foreign certification.
Because efficient banks are able to generate higher marginal
profits than goofy banks, their rent from moving to the more effi-
cient country is greater compared to the rent for goofy banks.17
Facing, lower capital requirements and more favourable deposit
refunding rates, banks in country B have an incentive to either
move to country A or at least to refund in country A. Intuitively,
the first decision may be regarded as opening a subsidiary, and
the second may be regarded as opening a branch. Subsidiaries
are separate entities from their parent banks, and are subject to
the regulation of the host country, whereas branches are subject
to the regulation of their parental bank.18
16 Morrison and White (2011) discuss that an ex ante payment may introduce
further room for moral hazard. In their framework taxing bankers to pay for the
deposit insurance is welfare-neutral, as in our discussion above. A higher deposit
insurance reduces the deposit interest rate for banks and increases their return from
investing. If banks are taxed, they pay less to the depositors but contribute to the
insurance company with their equity capital making moral hazard more likely. Thus,
Morrison and White (2011) show that deposit insurance financed by general taxation
may be welfare-enhancing and that the optimal level of deposit insurance varies
inversely with the quality of the banking sector.
17 The sufficient condition for DPE > DPG is Dp " R ! m > 0: marginal profits should
exceed the monitoring cost.
18 Cerutti et al. (2007) find that regulatory variables have non-marginal effects on
the form of foreign bank entry. They conclude that governments may design
regulations to favour one structure over another.
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On the one hand, deposit rates in country A are lower than in
country B, so banks have an incentive to move from B to A. On
the other hand, opening a subsidiary in a foreign country involves
higher switching costs compared to opening a branch. Let us de-
note the cost for moving from one country to the other (founding
a subsidiary) as mM and the cost of staying in the home country
but raising funds abroad as mR. We assume that mM > mR; i.e., the cost
of moving into the foreign country and being regulated under this
jurisdiction involves higher switching costs than simply raising
funds abroad and remaining regulated in the home country.
Depending on the specific level of switching costs, different scenar-
ios arise. Fig. 4 summarises the results.19
Consider first the case I where overall switching costs are very
low mR < mGR and mM < mGM; i.e., it is profitable for both efficient
and goofy banks to move from country B to country A. In this case,
the banking sector in country B disappears, whereas the banking
sector in country A consists of two pools. However, the overall
quality of the banking sector in country A is lower than before. If
depositors recognise this decrease in banking pool quality, they
will require a higher deposit rate compared to autarky. For a given
capital requirement in country A, a higher deposit rate will result in
lower monitoring incentives of efficient banks. To preserve the
financial sector, the regulator in country A must either increase
capital requirements or expend higher effort on supervision. With
convex effort costs, the marginal increase in supervision becomes
more costly. Therefore, compared to autarky, the regulator in coun-
try A will increase the capital requirement compared to the effort
of supervision. Accordingly, case I implies a deviation from the
optimum in autarky, resulting in a lower overall pool quality and
a higher cost of intervention.
In situation II, where mR < mGR and mGM < mM < mEM , only efficient
banks have an incentive to move to the more efficient jurisdiction,
whereas goofy banks remain in country B trying to borrow from
depositors in country A. The effects in this case are similar to those
in case I: financial intermediation in jurisdiction B breaks down,
depositors in country A demand higher deposit rates, and the reg-
ulator in country A must adapt the optimal policy mix.
We now consider the case III of sufficiently high switching costs,
i.e., mGR < mR < mER and mGM < mM < mEM . Only efficient banks in country
B find it profitable to move to and borrow from jurisdiction A. In
this case, the pool size and quality of country A increase to
EA + EB + GA, whereas country B obtains GA. Depositors observe this
change in each jurisdiction and allow lower interest rates in coun-
try A due to the enhanced pool quality, whereas financial interme-
diation in country B collapses due to the lack of trust in the quality
of the banking sector. Because countries optimally set their capital
requirement at the minimum, such that the MIC holds, country B
cannot further increase its capital requirement rate to compensate
for the risk of depositors. The only possible reaction is to increase
effort in supervision which brings additional costs for taxpayers in
jurisdiction B.
In case IV, no bank has an incentive to move, but both bank
types try to borrow in country A. Whereas the pool quality in coun-
try A worsens, the financial sector expands. The resulting deposit
rate decreases the monitoring incentives of efficient banks in A,
whereas efficient banks in B continue to face the high capital
requirements and engage in monitoring. Therefore, in this case, a
relatively small (compared to case I) tightening of capital require-
ments is the optimal regulatory response.
Case V describes a situation where only efficient banks try to
borrow in the more efficient jurisdiction. In this case, the more effi-
cient jurisdiction exclusively benefits from an increase in pool
quality and size. The case VI describes autarky.
Therefore, if depositors anticipate the migration of banks and
adjust their country-specific interest rate, we derive the following
result regarding national rents in the non-cooperative equilibrium
for a one-shot game:
Proposition 2. For a given regulatory policy [k⁄,h⁄] in autarky, the
more efficient a supervisor is, the higher the expected volume of
deposits. The overall cost of efficient regulatory intervention increases
with the mobility of banks.
Interestingly, in our framework, bank mobility leads to a col-
lapse of financial intermediation. Sufficiently low switching costs
yield the standard result, where the banking sector in the less effi-
cient country B always breaks down. However, even in the absence
of systemic spillovers on the competing economy A, the movement
of banks implies negative externalities on the regulatory policy in A
and changes the redistribution.
To observe how the outcome of regulatory competition affects
the rents of the two interest groups, we must only analyse how
the optimal policy mix changes. Compared to autarky, the optimal
minimum capital ratio in country A that prevents a banking crisis is
increasing with the mobility of banks. Intuitively, a lower mM im-
proves financial intermediation in A, but lowers the pool quality
as long as mR < mGR , increasing the minimum capital regulation re-
quired to secure financial intermediation. Therefore, the rent of
the banking sector will shrink as a result of low switching costs,
whereas the rent of taxpayers remains constant. Therefore, with
lower switching costs, club competition tends to decrease domes-
tic welfare in both jurisdictions. However, financial intermediation
concentrates in the country with higher supervisory efficiency.20
3.3. International deposit rates: Unobservable supervision in
competing jurisdictions
We now turn to the alternative extreme case, where asymmet-
ric information makes it difficult for depositors to distinguish the
characteristics of regulatory systems. The reason may be that it is
difficult for them to interpret national banking laws in foreign lan-
guages which may act in accordance with unwritten cultural habits
Fig. 4. The jurisdiction choice of mobile banks with perfect observability: The figure
illustrates the choice of jurisdiction for foreign lending and moving abroad for each
type of bank, where mM denotes the switching costs to found a subsidiary and mR the
costs to raise funds abroad. Low switching costs (Regions I and II) allow both bank
types to move and/or borrow abroad. High switching costs (Regions III and V) allow
only efficient banks’ mobility, whereas very high costs (Region VI) isolate the
jurisdictions from each other.
19 The derivation of the switching cost thresholds may be found in Appendix B.
20 This effect is similar to the effect analysed in Huddart et al. (1999). When agents
hold private information on their specific type, enabling them to choose their
preferred jurisdiction makes them reveal their type (here if switching costs are high
only good banks are able to move). Therefore the good agents prefer to move to the
more efficient market.
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and which may differ in the degree of strictness with which they
implement the rules. Depositors may be expected to have an infor-
mation deficit, and thus may demand a fixed interest rate indepen-
dently from the bank’s localisation.21
Because individual jurisdictions are not distinguishable and
depositors lend their endowments with any bank without knowing
the characteristics of its home jurisdiction, we assume the interna-
tional deposit rate to be rD h)A
' (
< rD < rD h)B
' (
. Fig. 5 illustrates this
situation. When banks may only borrow from a pooled deposit
market but are regulated with k)A h
)
A
' (
< k)B h
)
B
' (
, the incentive in both
countries are distorted. In country B, banks benefit from the lower
overall lending rate. However, in country A, a higher deposit rate
will prevent the efficient banks from monitoring; i.e., k)A h
)
A
' (
is
too low to satisfy the monitoring incentive constraint.
Due to the lower capital requirement rate in country A, both
types of banks migrate to A. However, because both jurisdictions
face the same international deposit rate there is no incentive for
borrowing in the more efficient jurisdiction. Therefore, only the
scenarios of low and high switching costs are relevant.
If switching costs are sufficiently low, both bank types switch to
the jurisdiction with lower capital requirements. The size of the
financial sector in A increases. However, with low capital require-
ments but relatively high deposit rates, efficient banks have no
incentive to monitor in A.
The situation is similar to the case of high switching costs,
where only efficient banks have an incentive to move to country
A. By doing so, these banks face a capital requirement that is too
low to incentivise them to monitor. To prevent a collapse, the reg-
ulator should in fact increase capital requirements. However, the
crux of pooled deposit rates is that the regulator does not benefit
from an increase in capital requirements because depositors do
not punish non-monitoring efficient banks.
Proposition 3. With unobservable supervision, each jurisdiction has
an incentive to decrease domestic capital standards down to kmin.
Proof. Country B observes an outflow of her banks. If switching
costs are low, the entire banking sector disappears. Otherwise,
goofy banks remain in country B. However, with an international
deposit rate, the smaller banking sector in country B does not break
down due to the low pool quality. A regulator caring for the exis-
tence of a domestic banking sector will decrease the capital ratio
to prevent the outflow of domestic banks. It is straightforward that
it is optimal to slightly decrease the capital ratio offered by the
other jurisdiction. h
With pooled deposit rates, the undersupply of capital regulation
appears to be the non-cooperative equilibrium in the one-shot
game. This result may be translated into a supervisory cost level
necessary to ensure depositing even with kmin. Therefore, the prof-
itability of banks will increase as a result of the race to the bottom
and the regulatory cost burden is shifted to the taxpayers.22
Again, with cross-border banking, both countries will lose in
welfare terms compared to the case of autarky such that interna-
tional harmonisation of capital requirements is desirable for both
countries. Therefore, our static model suggests a prisoner’s dilem-
ma. However, now the jurisdiction with the lowest supervisory
costs is the relative winner of the regulatory race that otherwise
will occur.
3.4. Policy implications
We pose in this section the question whether regulatory com-
petition may avoid the existence of a lemons equilibrium at lower
costs by mitigating the efficient banks’ moral hazard problem. We
see that, with open economies, the political equilibrium is no long-
er the only result of an analysis of the marginal rates of substitu-
tion between the costs of supervision and capital requirements.
Instead, it reflects the strategic interaction with other jurisdictions
in regulatory competition where observable capital ratios become
a strategic weapon in the battle for attracting banks. The intuition
is that banks seek the most lenient of all possible regulators. In this
respect, systems competition becomes counterproductive depend-
ing on the opacity of international financial markets. Optimal stra-
tegic choices of domestic regulators are rooted in the degree of the
observability of differences in country-specific regimes for deposi-
tors. If the observability is sufficiently low, domestic capital ratios
cannot send any price signals to investors and cannot reward effi-
cient banks in better regulated economies with cheaper refinanc-
ing. The optimal cost-minimising policy is no longer feasible.
We gain similar effects if we allow for heterogeneity with re-
spect to the weighting of the rent of the banking sector between
both jurisdictions, i.e., in the capturing of a regulator. Suppose both
countries are identical with regard to supervisory efficiency
(cA[hi] = cB[hi]). Let k⁄ be an interior equilibrium in the case of autar-
ky. For this equilibrium, it holds that k)A < k
)
B if /A > /B. Intuitively,
country B values capital regulation more highly than country A
does, but B’s costs with regard to its equity cost and opportunity
cost, in terms of supervision, remain the same. As we have shown
above, a higher preference for capital requirements is a stigma in
regulatory competition, resulting in a welfare loss if we allow for
bank mobility. An obvious implication of this re-interpretation of
different regulatory bliss points in capital ratios is that institutional
competition will decrease stability when the differential of the reg-
ulator’s weighting for domestic banks in autarky is sufficiently
high between the competing jurisdictions. A larger differential
Fig. 5. International deposit rates. If depositors cannot observe the supervisory
effort of each country, international refinancing implies the same deposit rate rD for
the banks in each jurisdiction A and B. The low-cost country A faces higher
refinancing costs, whereas jurisdiction B benefits from lower interest rates. Here, B
has incentives to lower the capital requirement rate kB, whereas A’s capital
requirements fail to satisfy the monitoring incentive constraint of efficient banks.
21 In other words, in this subsection, regulation is assumed to be a lemon good, and
depositors are only able to observe the average supervisory effort and capital
regulation of national regulators. The assumption of regulatory policy being a lemon
good is not new in the economic literature. Sinn (1997) argues that governments only
intervene in private markets if the invisible hand fails (selection principle).
Accordingly, he shows that a reintroduction of a market through the backdoor of
systems competition does not work.
22 However, due to the pooling of deposit rates, regulators may now have an
incentive to shirk in identifying goofy banks, as supervisory effort creates a positive
externality on the other countries’ refinancing conditions. If this free-riding effect is
severe, we have an unstable lobal economy, where depositors overestimate the
average expected repayment. When depositors update their beliefs, the global
banking system faces a collapse.
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[/A ! /B], renders it more likely that competition among regulators
plays a role in destabilising the financial sector or, put differently,
that the laxity in capital standards by only one captured banking
regulator makes regulatory harmonisation more likely to be
needed to prevent a collapse.
It is plausible that both jurisdictions have an incentive to coop-
erate to ensure the lowest combination of capital ratios and super-
visory effort that is necessary to maintain global banking.
Therefore, regulators demand collective action to govern the global
banking sector. This provides an impetus for coordinating capital
ratios and striving for an international standard regarding banking
capital adequacy, to which we will turn to in the next subsection.23
3.5. Incentives for policy coordination
With a loss in utility due to decreasing switching costs for mo-
bile banks, national regulators face a collective action problem and
have an incentive to cooperate independently whether there is a
club competition or there are international deposit rates. The
reduction in regulators’ utility is due to the uncoordinated behav-
iour of competing jurisdictions. If all regulators could agree on the
same level of capital standards, there would be no utility-reducing
bank flight. Therefore, our model explains a strong demand for har-
monising activity of self-interested regulators. Such international
coordination may be interpreted as an act of collusion among pol-
icy-makers. By removing utility-reducing institutional competi-
tion, regulators would be able to reduce the cost of financial
stability.
The following proposition provides the necessary and sufficient
condition for a level of harmonised capital standards kH and super-
vision cost cH that simultaneously ensure the existence of financial
intermediation in both countries.
Proposition 4. Harmonised capital standards cH are self-enforceable
if and only if:
* cH 2 ð0; ~c(, where ~c ¼ c½h0( þ U½k0( ! U½kH(;
* kH 2 [kA[h],kB[h]] where kA[h] and kB[h] are the solution of the
following programs:
kA½h( ¼ argmaxUA such that UA½kH; cH½hH(( ! UA½k0; c½h0((P 0;
kB½h( ¼ argmaxUB such that UB½kH; cH½hH(( ! UB½k0; c½h0((P 0:
We say that both jurisdictions will agree on a common capital
standard if the supervision costs for the supranational capital ade-
quacy lie within the interval cH 2 (0,c[h0] + U[k0] ! U[kH]] making
harmonisation profitable compared to the non-cooperative equi-
librium utility Ui[k0,c[h0]]. It follows that, for any cH 2 ð0;~c(, there
exists a subset of self-enforceable agreements of size (kA ! kB). In
other words, we say that a policy cartel may be welfare-superior
even if the supervision cost cH will increase for all participating
jurisdictions that harmonise their capital requirements.
Interestingly, recent contributions to the literature argue that
there are network benefits of harmonisation for national regulators
that decrease the supervision cost. The intuition for this argument
is based on mechanisms of reputation building and is prominently
discussed by Tarullo (2008). First, international harmonisation in
the sense of Basel provides reassurance to all members that the
banking system of all other member countries is sufficiently capi-
talised, and is stable and sound with a low probability of triggering
an international financial crisis. Second, Tarullo mentions that
international harmonisation fosters the implementability and effi-
ciency of supervision of internationally active banks. Finally, there
are direct benefits for internationally active banks themselves, fac-
ing one harmonised capital requirement instead of different regu-
lations in each country where they are active.24
Therefore, if network benefits reduce the cost of supervision
such that cH[e] 6 c[e] " e 2 [0,emax], it is easy to see that the inter-
national convergence of capital adequacy is desirable even with
heterogeneous countries. Therefore, the provided welfare-theo-
retic argument for international agreements is enforced in the
presence of network benefits in the spirit of Tarullo (2008). With
institutional competition, national regulators are better off by har-
monising their capital requirements.
However, it is worth mentioning that the one-sided harmonisa-
tion of capital requirements without the explicit contracting of
minimum supervision has its dark side. Our model suggests that
supervision serves a crucial role in ensuring financial intermedia-
tion. We show that any harmonised capital requirement regulation
above the first-best regulation in autarky will lead to supervisory
effort below the first best. The reason is that according to Proposi-
tion 1, the optimal response of a certain regulator to an exogenous
increase of capital standards is to spend less resources on supervi-
sion. Therefore, under such circumstances, the incentives of the
regulator in jurisdiction A to invest in supervision erodes. Paradox-
ically, a more efficient producer of bank quality exerts less super-
visory effort. Vice versa, the regulator in B faces lower
harmonised minimum capital standards and should increase re-
sources into supervision – if this is observable and contractible in
the policy cartel. Otherwise, she may also have an incentive to de-
crease effort in screening out goofy banks and to free-ride. As dem-
onstrated above in Lemma 1, financial intermediation may then
break down independently of the harmonised level of capital stan-
dards if the resulting pool quality of banks in the policy cartel falls
below a critical threshold.
4. Discussion
4.1. Empirical evidence
The key message of our paper is the two-way interaction be-
tween capital standards and supervision. According to our model,
the fraction of goofy banks in the domestic banking sector depends
on the regulator’s willingness to supervise. The reason for intro-
ducing sophisticated supervision is to address the adverse selec-
tion problem in the banking sector. By sorting out goofy banks,
the supervisor increases the average quality of banks in the sector,
which decreases the interest rate that depositors demand for lend-
ing their money. This selection process also reduces the size of the
national banking sector. This argument is in line with recent
empirical findings as well as the origins of bank supervision in
the US.25 According to Mitchener and Jaremski (2012), the rise of
23 Indeed, some authors argue that the genesis of the Basel Accords may support the
idea of such a destructive regulatory race (see Kapstein, 1992). In the 1980s, it was a
common opinion that raising the capital requirements for US banks negatively affects
their international competitiveness unless foreign banks were forced to recapitalise in
a similar fashion. In light of the Mexican crisis in 1982, this idea provided the impetus
for US authorities to push for an international agreement on capital ratios.
24 Following Schüler and Heinemann (2005) who find clear evidence for the
existence of economies of scale in the banking supervision of financial markets in
Europe, one may incorporate this cost-saving effect of regulatory unions in our model
by a downward shift of the cost function in supervision.
25 Heider et al. (2009) demonstrate that liquidity crises occur when the adverse
selection problem between banks becomes acute. The authors show that the
(interbank) market breaks down when the quality of the individual bank is unknown,
such that efficient banks prefer to hoard liquidity rather than lending in the interbank
market. In the light of the 2007–2009 crisis, Flannery et al. (2013) argue that market
collapses are encouraged by cyclical increases in asset opacity and that the regulator
must take steps to ensure that transparency via supervision persists even as equity
values fall.
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formal supervisory institutions in the US responded to state banks’
closures and banking panics by the time the Federal Reserve System
was founded. Their results suggest that the amount of supervision is
positively correlated with the size of the banking sector, i.e., the
number of banks. However, the authors argue that ‘‘states imple-
mented their optimal or desired level of supervision and changed
it based on environmental factors rather than slowing ramping up
expenditures in some linear way’’. Moreover, Dincer and Neyapti
(2008) show empirically that the combination of past financial crises
and prevailing levels of financial market development are a precon-
dition that positively affects the quality of the regulatory and super-
visory frameworks adopted in a country.
Our result that the optimal effort in ex-ante supervision inver-
sely depends the level of capital requirements, is supported by sev-
eral cross-country studies based on the Worldbank dataset of 107
countries. Barth et al. (2006) find that the stringency of capital
requirements is negatively associated with the share of denied
bank applications. This finding is in line with our story that a coun-
try that alleviates the adverse selection problem may allow banks
to operate with lower equity capital. Furthermore, in response to
the 2008 financial crisis, many countries made capital regulation
more stringent, whereas domestic bank entry requirements mostly
remained unchanged. Barth et al. (2012) develop an index that
proxies the hurdles that entrants must overcome to obtain a bank
license. This index does not show a significant change in crisis
countries.
We also discuss the consequences of differences in individual
optimal policy mixes in an integrated financial world where banks
actively shop for regulators. We distinguish between the two cases
of a fully observable policy mix and the case of internationally
pooled deposit rates, where depositors cannot observe the individ-
ual characteristics of countries. In the first case, international
financial integration increases the financial sector of a country that
is more efficient in supervision at a higher cost of intervention,
whereas the relatively inefficient country’s banking sector shrinks.
In an opaque world, where the national supervisory effort is not
observable, we find that the moral hazard problem of banks cannot
be solved. Moreover, regulators may have an incentive to reduce
capital requirements to free-ride on the international deposit rate.
The result is an unstable global banking sector, where depositors
believe that the banking sector is safer than it actually is. If depos-
itors update their beliefs, financial intermediation collapses. These
negative spillovers are more serious, when differences between
countries are more pronounced. This relationship is in line with
the findings of Houston et al. (2012), who provide empirical evi-
dence that supports the lemon result. Banks transfer funds to
financial markets with less regulation. Their study indicates that
bank flows are positively related to the stringency of capital regu-
lation imposed on banks in their source country, and negatively re-
lated to regulations in the recipient country. However, these effects
are stronger if the recipient country is a developed country with
strong property and creditor rights, a finding that is also in line
with our model prediction.
4.2. Dynamic aspects
The static partial equilibrium focus of our model allows us to
gain a deeper understanding of the relations and mechanism be-
tween the different policy instruments analysed. The optimal de-
sign of regulatory interventions consists of both capital standards
as well as the regulation of the domestic pool quality via
supervision.
Our qualitative results remain robust in a dynamic setting. To
see this, consider a dynamic setting with free entry and exit. In
such a setting, the regulator may decide whether to renew licenses
at the beginning of each legislative period. Then, in any legislative
period, the regulator selects her optimal mix of capital standards
and supervision, i.e., entry regulation depending on the specific cir-
cumstances of the economy in each period.
Furthermore, in a repeated game, the solution to the negative
effects of free bank movement is an agreement on international
capital requirement standards that prevents a regulatory race with
other jurisdictions. In an infinitely repeated version of the regula-
tory game, cooperation could emerge as an evolutionarily stable
equilibrium due to the threat of future punishments through a
deregulation race. Provided that regulators are sufficiently patient
and not myopic, cooperation among jurisdictions would also be a
possible Nash equilibrium but many other strategy profiles are
possible equilibria as well. Because the multiplicity of equilibria
is endemic in repeated games, there exists no guarantee that coop-
eration emerges naturally. Moreover, cooperating in every period
would be a best response only against another cooperating juris-
diction. Therefore, a sub-game perfect equilibrium requires both
jurisdictions to cooperate and to expect the others to cooperate
as well. An international agreement on both policy instruments
may facilitate such mutual expectations, thereby selecting the
cooperation equilibrium from the multiple equilibria of a dynamic
game. Considering that governors tend to be impatient and face a
finite legislative period, the cooperation equilibrium is even less
likely as a stable equilibrium because a necessary condition for
cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma is that the same
agents interact with each other for infinite rounds. International
harmonisation, therefore, may play an important role in establish-
ing a cooperative equilibrium, even in repeated games.
5. Conclusion
We build a simple framework to jointly discuss the stability and
welfare implications of capital standards and supervisory enforce-
ment in the context of international regulatory competition. In our
model, banking regulators seek to prevent a market breakdown.
Direct forms of regulation (supervision) enhance the ability of
the average bank to control risk whereby indirect regulation via
capital requirements establishes incentives that elicit socially de-
sired monitoring activity by banks. Therefore, both regulatory
instruments reduce the banking sector’s vulnerability to a collapse.
However, each instrument imposes a cost on different interest
groups. The opportunity cost of capital regulation is borne by the
banking sector, whereas the cost of supervision is borne by the tax-
payer. We show that in closed economies, there exists a unique
optimal policy mix that outweighs the cost and benefits of each
instrument. Specifically, we demonstrate how countercyclical cap-
ital standards within a feasible set may be an optimal response to
economic fluctuations and reflect the depositors’ loss of confidence
in the banking sector’s quality.
The regulator’s objective function trades off the cost of capital
regulation for the banking sector with the losses from taxation
due to the enhancement of transparency via supervision. We dem-
onstrate that the regulator minimises the costs when she chooses
the optimal policy mix. However, political economy considerations
like the ability to collect tax revenues may create additional con-
straints, but do not change our fundamental results.
We also argue that supranational agreements, which impose
international uniformity in minimum capital requirements, as in
the Basel Accords, may provide the incentive to the most efficient
supervisors to exert less effort in supervision, thereby, missing an
important input factor of financial stability. The inefficiency arises
from the unobservability and non-contractibility of supervisory
standards. If countries are not homogeneous with respect to their
supervisory efficiency or degree of capturing, any international
capital requirement standard that neglects supervisory efforts
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leaves room for free-riding, and thus may even destabilise the glo-
bal financial sector. Therefore, our model suggests that the imple-
mentation of binding minimum supervisory standards is essential
for international financial stability. In this context, our findings
show that the regulator’s choice between international capital
standards and domestic supervision is strategically rich and a
promising area for future research. In particular, it would be inter-
esting to analyse the strategic interaction of both instruments in a
broader framework with inter-temporal feedback effects.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
The regulator may stabilise the opaque banking sector via a pro-
duction function with two input factors. Both instruments – capital
standards k and supervision h – reduce market inefficiencies that
goofy banks cause. The regulator considers only the rent of efficient
banks as goofy banks strictly reduce welfare. The regulator thereby
places a weighting factor / on the profit of efficient banks and
maximises her utility subject to the monitoring incentive-con-
straint of the efficient banks, the participation constraint of effi-
cient banks, and the participation-constraint of depositors.
Assume that h is a linear increasing function of effort; thus, ef-
fort can be simplified to e = h, c½h( ¼ c2 " h2. The maximisation prob-
lem of the regulator can be written as
max U
e;k
¼ / " ðpHðR! rD½h(ð1! kÞÞ !m! q " kÞ ! ð1! /Þ "
c
2
" h2
s.t.
rD½h( ¼ cpL þ hMp
;
kP 1!
R! mDp
! "
rD
;
k 6 pHðR! rDÞ !mq! pH " rD
0 6 k 6 1; 0 6 h 6 1:
The first optimality condition with respect to the capital stan-
dard is
@U
@k
¼ / " pH " rD½h( ! qf g < 0jq >
pH
pL
c
# $
;
The first term captures the marginal benefit of an increase in
capital standards resulting from the decreasing cost of deposits
(decreasing refinancing rate and decreasing amount of deposits),
whereas the second term q is simply the marginal cost of capital.
Because equity funding is costly, the marginal benefit of lower de-
posit costs never outweighs the marginal cost. Therefore, the sec-
ond constraint is binding – the regulator tries to reduce costly
capital requirements to a minimum and simply requires banks to
refund their investments with a minimum requirement that en-
sures that the monitoring incentive constraint holds.
The optimality condition with respect to supervisory effort is
@U
@h
¼ !/pH
@rD½h(
@h
ð1! kÞ ! ð1! /Þ " c " h:
¼ / pHDp " cð1! kÞðpL þ hMpÞ2
 !
! ð1! /Þ " c " h
¼ / pHDp " rD½h( " ð1! kÞðpL þ hMpÞ
% &
! ð1! /Þ " c " h:
The first two terms capture the benefits of increased enforce-
ment: the former reflects the induced increase in efficient banks’
rent (marginal increase of the number of efficient banks in the pool
of the domestic banking sector multiplied with their expected
profit); the latter describes the cost-savings of refinancing as a con-
sequence of a higher fraction of efficient banks. Therefore, more
supervisory effort – a higher pool quality – will always improve
the profitability of efficient banks. Comparing the increase in mar-
ginal profits (weighted with /) with the marginal costs of supervi-
sion, the regulator selects an optimal level of enforcement. If the
regulator does not consider the profits at all (/ = 0), the optimal ef-
fort spent is zero.
If the participation constraint of banks is non-binding, there ex-
ists a unique interior solution for the optimal level of supervisory
effort if effort costs are sufficiently high. Using the binding moni-
toring constraint 1! k ¼ ðR!
m
DpÞ
rD ½h( , gives:
@U
@h
¼ /pH
R " Dp!m
pL þ hMp
% &
! ð1! /Þ " c " h:
We define A1½h( ¼ /pH R"Dp!mpLþhMp
! "
and A2[h] = (1 ! /) " c " h. With-
out any efficient banks, A1½0( ¼ / pHpL ðR " Dp!mÞ > 0 ¼ A2½0(. Note
that A[1] is continuously decreasing @A1@h < 0, while A2 is continu-
ously increasing @A2@h > 0 in h. Therefore, if A1[1] = /
(R " Dp !m) < (1 ! /) " c = A2[1], there is a unique value h⁄ 2 (0,1)
that fulfils the first order condition.
In particular, if (1 ! /) " c > /(R " Dp !m). For a given level of ef-
fort cost, the first order condition then implicitly defines a unique
optimal supervisory level:
h) ¼ 1
2
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ð1! /Þ2 " p2L ! / " 4"pH "DpðR"Dp!mÞc
q
ð1! /Þ " Dp !
pL
Dp
0@ 1A:
This implies a capital requirement level
k½h)( ¼ 1! 1c ðpL þ h
)MpÞ R! m
Dp
% &
:
Taking the partial derivative of the regulator’s optimal supervi-
sory effort w.r.t. k, yields
@2U
@k@h
¼ !/ pHDpcðpL þ hMpÞ2
 !
< 0:
It follows that capital standards and supervision behave as sub-
stitutes for the regulator.
Appendix B. Switching costs
Consider the case where country A is able to supervise her banks
at lower marginal costs than country B. Therefore, hA > hB, kA[hA] <
kB[hB], and if the characteristics of both jurisdictions are observable
by depositors, banks in country Amay refund their investments at a
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more favourable rate than in country BrD[hA] < rD[hB]. For simplicity,
we denote the deposit rate in each country as rD[hi] = ri.
We first analyse the critical switching costs for efficient banks
from country B moving to country A. The efficient bank will move
to A whenever PE(A) ! # >PE(B). More specifically
pHððR! rAÞð1! kAÞÞ !m! q " kA ! mM
> pHððR! rBÞð1! kBÞÞ !m! q " kB:
This can be summarised as follows:
mM < mEM :¼ pHððR! rAÞð1! kAÞ ! ðR! rBÞð1! kBÞÞ þ q " ðkB ! kAÞ:
To be willing to move abroad, the switching costs for an effi-
cient bank should not outweigh the additional revenue per deposit
and the saving in capital investment. Therefore, the critical switch-
ing cost equals the gain in profitability from moving in the foreign
jurisdiction. In the same way, we may derive the moving condition
for goofy banks:
mM < mGM :¼ pLððR! rAÞð1! kAÞ ! ðR! rBÞð1! kBÞÞ þ q " ðkB ! kAÞ:
Because efficient banks are more productive than goofy banks,
the critical cost is greater for efficient banks than for goofy banks:
mEM ! mGM ¼ Dp " ððR! rAÞð1! kAÞ ! ðR! rBÞð1! kBÞÞ:
Now, consider the case in which a bank does not move to the
foreign jurisdiction, but opens branches and borrows at the lower
deposit rate. An efficient bank has the incentive to do so as long as
the earned profit outweighs the costs connected with opening up a
branch:
pHððR! rAÞð1! kBÞÞ !m! q " kB ! mR
> pHððR! rBÞð1! kBÞÞ !m! q " kB:
This case results in the following condition:
mR < mER :¼ pHðrB ! rAÞð1! kBÞ:
and similarly for the goofy bank:
mR < mGR :¼ pLðrB ! rAÞð1! kBÞ:
Again, the efficient bank is more productive and outweighs
higher switching costs: mER ! mGR ¼ Dp " ðrB ! rAÞð1! kBÞ. Yet, the gain
in profitability from moving compared to opening a branch is
greater for each type:
mEM ! mER ¼ ðpHðR! rAÞ þ qÞðkB ! kAÞ;
and similarly:
mGM ! mGR ¼ ðpLðR! rAÞ þ qÞðkB ! kAÞ:
Fig. 4 illustrates the six cases.
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Microprudential capital requirements are designed to reduce the excessive
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risky assets they invest more funds into safe assets. This paper analyzes a
government that simultaneously regulates the banking sector and borrows
from it. I argue that a government may have the incentive to use capital
requirements to alleviate its budget burden. The risk weights for risky assets
may be placed relatively too high compared to the risk weight on government
bonds. This could have a negative impact on welfare. The supply of loans
for the risky sector shrinks, which may have a negative impact on long term
growth. Moreover, the government may be tempted to increase its debt level
due to better funding conditions, which increases the risk of a future sovereign
debt crisis. A short term focused government may be tempted to neglect the
risk and, thereby, may introduce systemic risk in the banking sector.
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1. Introduction
The recent financial crisis and the resulting economic crises have illus-
trated the vulnerability of the banking sector and its negative externalities
on real sector development. One main cause of the vulnerability of the bank-
ing sector is that banks are partly shielded against the downside risk of their
investments by explicit insurance of their deposit liabilities and implicit in-
surance in the form of government support. The main instrument that is
used to prevent banks from taking excessive risk is risk sensitive capital re-
quirement regulation. Optimal regulation reduces the risk shifting of banks
and can implement the optimal risk allocation. However, a government may
face an inherent conflict of interest when setting the risk weights for bank
assets. On the one hand, governments regulate banks to limit their expo-
sure to risk and the related negative externalities of such risk. On the other
hand, banks are also a source of financing government debt as pointed out
by Calomiris and Haber (2011).
This paper analyzes the inherent conflict of interest and the possible im-
plications for optimal capital requirement regulation and discusses possible
welfare implications. Based on a simple model, it is shown that a govern-
ment which simultaneously regulates the banks and borrows from them, may
have the incentive to overregulate risky investments compared to safe invest-
ments if those safe investments are government bonds. The interesting point
made here is that the government can influence its budget indirectly via risk
weighted capital regulation and, thus, may circumvent the monetary policy
monopoly of the central bank. This calls into question whether or not gov-
ernments should be entitled with setting the optimal risk weights for capital
2
requirement regulation.
If government bonds are indeed safe, the overregulation of risky assets
may not decrease overall welfare. However, if the risk of government default
increases due to its indebtedness, a limitedly liable government can have the
incentive to neglect this risk partially, participating in risk shifting on its own.
This might result in increased systemic risk and a vulnerable government,
with detrimental effects on welfare.
The idea that the financial sector is a potential source of easy resources
for a government to finance its debt has been already discussed by McKinnon
(1973). He defines financial repression as a set of policies, laws, regulation,
taxes, distortions, qualitative and quantitative restrictions, and controls that
are imposed by governments, which do not allow financial intermediaries to
be active at their full technological potential. This point abstracts from the
optimal degree of regulation in banking that is justified by the existence
of moral hazard and other market failures. Financial repression considers
any policy that goes beyond the regulation that deals with the negative
externalities of financial markets. Roubini and Sala-i Martin (1992) conclude
that regulation in the form of financial repression tends to reduce financial
intermediation from its optimal level, and thereby has negative effects on the
long term growth of the economy.
However, to the author’s knowledge, the government’s incentives for a
biased setting of risk weights in capital requirements has not yet been dis-
cussed, and it is the goal of this paper to close this gap.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, strengthening capital requirement
regulation became the major concern of regulators. The goal of recent reg-
3
ulatory reforms, such as the third Basel Accord, is to increase the quantity
and the quality of the equity base, which banks use to refund their invest-
ments. However, the discussion of the risk weights for bank assets has been
of limited concern.
The impact of banking capital regulation on the portfolio composition
of banks is well studied. The Basel I accord was criticized for applying too
broad risk weights among assets. By searching for yield, the banks have the
incentive to reshuﬄe their portfolios to the highest risk assets with accord-
ingly higher returns within one risk class. The Basel II and III changes and
enhancements aim to reduce this regulatory arbitrage. The broad risk classes
for capital requirements were amended according to external ratings under
the standard approach. As in Basel II, the Basel III agreement sets a zero
risk weight to AAA-AA- rated governments while loan assets require a sig-
nificantly higher risk weight. Moreover, the new Basel accord expects large
and sophisticated banks to implement the IRB approach, which requires an
individual assessment of government risk. However, the recommendations of
the Basel agreements are not binding for national government regulators. In
fact, when the European Union implemented the Basel II approach in the
form of the Capital Requirement Directive1, a zero risk weight for sovereign
bonds of the European Union members, regardless of their risk rating, was
sustained under the standardized approach.2
1Basel II was implemented into European law by DIRECTIVE 2006/48/EC, Article
89(1)(d), which was amended by the Directive 2009/111/EC. The zero risk weight excep-
tion for Member States is still valid.
2“Exposures to Member States’ central governments and central banks denominated
and funded in the domestic currency of that central government and central bank shall be
assigned a risk weight of 0 %.” (Directive 2006/48/EC, Annex VI, Part1(4))
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Moreover, the European directive allows for the IRB approach the perma-
nent partial use rules, according to which, the IRB approach can be applied
to corporate exposures, whereas the risk weight applied to the member state
government exposures remains zero.3
The comparatively low risk weight for government bonds can certainly be
justified with very low observed government defaults. However, the recent
government debt crisis and the continuous deterioration of government risk
ratings casts doubts on this certainty. This reluctancy to implement the risk
sensitive amendments made by the Basel II approach may serve as anecdotal
evidence of the tendency to privilege government bonds. This biased regula-
tion had a detrimental effect in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Jablecki
(2012, p.6) summarizes this effect as follows “[...] by imposing a zero risk
weight on all EU sovereign exposures - irrespective of the governments’ fiscal
conditions’ - the CRD [Capital Requirement Directive] encouraged banks to
load up on debt issued by the most risky euro-area governments, reducing the
yields that these governments would have had to pay creditors otherwise”.
Brunnermeier et al. (2011) present a detailed discussion on how the over-
investment of banks in government debt has created a “vicious circle” in
which a doubt on the government’s safety creates a crisis in those banks’
safety which have invested heavily in government bonds. The stressed banks
in turn need to be supported by the government, which increases government
debt further eroding the government’s solvency.
Both effects have been supported with empirical evidence. Reinhart and
3The EU-wide Stress Test Aggregate Report of the European Banking Authority (2011)
revealed that only 36 out of 90 banks applied the IRB approach to sovereign debt.
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Rogoff (2011) find empirical evidence that a systemic banking crisis increases
the probability of a subsequent government debt crisis. Borensztein and
Panizza (2009) find support that the occurrence of a sovereign debt crisis
increases the probability of a banking crisis.
Observing this diabolic loop in the current sovereign debt crisis, the ques-
tion arises: Why does a regulator have the incentive to indirectly subsidize
government debt with unbalanced relative risk weights for capital require-
ment regulation?
Livshits and Schoors (2009) present a simple model and some empirical
evidence of a Russian data set that a government may not have the right
incentive to include sovereign risk in prudential regulation as this could lower
the cost of financing the debt and may postpone the sovereign default.
In contrast, this paper argues that a regulator may have an incentive to
increase the relative risk weight for risky assets beyond the optimal point if
the government does is not prone to default risk.
The goal of a financial regulator without any fiscal interest is modeled as
in Tirole (1994), according to which the regulator represents the interest of
the depositors and intervenes in the case of a banker’s insolvency by guar-
anteeing outstanding debt to depositors in exchange for control rights of the
bank. This view leads to a narrow goal of the regulator, who is not concerned
with maximizing social welfare but is, instead, interested in minimizing the
negative externality of banks’ excessive risk taking.
Moreover, in contrast to the narrow goal of the regulator, this paper
also allows the government regulator to pursue the additional goal of current
budget maximization. This is a very simplified approach to a government’s
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objective, but it is commonly used in public choice theory.4 Introducing
a more sophisticated objective function of the government, would however,
not change the basic results as long as the government has an incentive
to increase its debt above the level that would result from microprudential
regulation. By setting excessively high risk weights on risky assets, such as
loans to entrepreneurs, banks’ funds are channeled into safe assets, such as
government bonds. Assuming that equity funding is costly to the banker a
higher risk weight on assets increases the marginal costs and thereby channels
more funds into less weighted assets. Hence, for a given market size and funds
available, higher risk weights for risky assets create higher demand for low
risk assets.
The paper proceeds as follows: in chapter two, a simple model of banker’s
risk shifting is introduced and it is shown how an optimal capital requirement
for risky assets can reduce or eliminate this risk shifting. By extending the
objective function of the regulator for short term consumption, the regulator
with fiscal interests is introduced and his regulatory choice is compared with
the optimal regulation. In chapter 3, the welfare implications are briefly
discussed. Chapter 4 concludes.
4The argument goes back to Niskanen (1971) who introduces a model in which politi-
cians’ preferences are directly linked to an increase in their bureau’s budget. The budget
maximizer as one extreme and also the mixed incentives of a government are commonly
used in the analysis of public choice e.g. Haucap and Kirstein (2003) discuss four types
of a government: a welfare maximizer, a Leviathan that is only interested in budget max-
imization, an industry friendly government and a green government in order to analyze
the optimal pricing of pollution permits. The two latter types of governments have mixed
incentives of the two extremes. I follow their approach by discussing the extreme case of
a not fiscally interested and a fully interested government, a Leviathan, and any mixed
incentives in between the two cases.
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2. The Model
Consider an economy with two dates t = 1, 2. Agents make their decisions
at t = 1 and returns are realized at t = 2. The economy is populated with four
different types of agents: bankers, households, borrowers, and a government
regulator.
2.1. The Bankers
There is a continuum of bank owner-managers5 , normalized to one, which
are risk neutral and receive an endowment W = 1 in t = 0.
I assume that bank owner-managers, which I call from here on simply
bankers, have the unique skill to profitably provide loans L to borrowers.
The assumption that only bankers are able to profitably provide loans to
borrowers reflects the incomplete market paradigm for financial markets. In
particular, I assume that the loan market is segmented such that risky bor-
rowers cannot borrow directly from households. This market friction consti-
tutes one of the raison d’eˆtre for banks.6 Due to their unique skills to screen
and monitor borrowers, banks facilitate access to funding to profitable in-
vestment projects that could not be carried out otherwise because borrowers
lack access to financial markets.7 However, to keep the model simple, the
5The bank owner-manager may also reflect a consortium of a mass of shareholders and
a delegated manager if the manager’s interests are aligned with the shareholders and there
is no conflict of interest among shareholders.
6Freixas and Rochet (2008) offer a comprehensive overview on the incomplete market
paradigm for financial markets. They argue that banks play an important role in im-
proving the efficient allocation of capital by: 1) Offering liquidity and payment services,
2) transforming assets, 3) managing risks, and 4) processing information and monitoring
borrowers (Freixas and Rochet, 2008, p.2).
7This is a simplification, since established firms with a good reputation and collateral
obviously have access to direct financial market funding. A vast literature deals with the
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costly monitoring and screening effort by banks that is necessary for loans
to be profitable is not explicitly modeled.
In order to invest in loan assets, banks can attract insured deposits from
households at a risk insensitive deposit rate rD. Moreover, I assume that
there is a deposit insurance risk premium, that is fixed and normalized to
zero. For brevity, I define RD = 1+rD to be the gross repayment on deposits.
Since depositors are insured, the deposit repayment is not contingent on the
riskiness of a bankers investment, and deposits take the form of a simple debt
contract. Combined with the deposit insurance, the simple debt contract
structure creates incentives for excessive risk taking, since banks are at least
partly shielded from the downside risk of their risky investments.8
Bank owners are assumed to maximize their consumption over the two
periods. In order to introduce a private cost of equity capital to the banker
I assume that in contrast to households the owners are impatient, i.e. they
discount their consumption at t = 2 with a discount factor 1/ρ where I
assume that ρ > RS, with RS = 1 + rS the gross repayment on safe assets,
i.e., government bonds. The factor ρ, thereby may be interpreted as ρ = 1+i
with i being the individual discount rate. The assumption ρ > RS thus
implies that i ≥ rS, the banker’s individual discount rate is higher than the
reasons for the coexistence of market and bank debt. For a good overview, see Freixas
and Rochet (2008). Most prominent is the discussion of the role of banks as delegated
monitors that screen borrowers as discussed by Broecker (1990), prevent Moral Hazard
as most prominently discussed by Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997), and are able to punish
borrowers as discussed e.g. by Diamond (1984). For simplicity, this paper neglects the
coexistence of market and bank debt and only focuses on firms that lack access to financial
markets.
8As Merton (1974) pointed out, deposit insurance creates an option value that banks
can exploit by risk shifting.
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safe interest rate on government bonds.9 The assumption reflects the idea
of the CAP-Model that the return on an assets increases with the riskiness
compared to the market risk. However, while the CAPM is based on the
assumption of risk-averse investors, this simple model includes a premium
on equity based on impatience in consumption. Therefore, the risk-neutral
banker behaves as if he was risk-averse and the investment of equity in the
risky bank is privately costly to the banker but not to the society. Moreover,
as shown later, debt financing is partly subsidized by a deposit insurance, and
thus inside equity funding is comparably more costly to the banker, because
depositors do not require to be compensated for the risk of default of the
bank.
To keep the model simple, I assume that banks have a constrained capac-
ity to invest. In particular, I assume that a bank’s optimal balance sheet size
is fixed and normalized to unity.10 Denote with x the proportion a banker
invests into safe assets and with 1− x the proportion of investment in risky
9A government could also be allowed to go bankrupt. In this case, also the deposits
become risky, since in case of government default, depositors receive nothing. However,
deposits remain the least risky investment with the same risk of default as the ”safe”
investment which is the government bond as they are both repaid as long as the government
is solvent.
10Consider otherwise, that banks can also choose the optimal balance sheet size. Since
we will consider decreasing returns to investments in risky assets, the balance sheet size
itself is a function of the banker’s optimal investment decision. To see this, consider assume
that the management of a bank yields a convex cost function of the bank’s balance sheet
size S, i.e., C(S) = S
2
θ2 . A single banker chooses the proportion of investments in safe
assets x and the balance sheet size. With decreasing returns to the investment in risky
loans, the return of investments is a function of x. Denote the utility of the banker as
U = p(R(x))S−C(S), then the optimal balance sheet size is determined by S = θp(R(x)).
This would considerably complicate the analysis without changing the main implications
that are sought to be analyzed. Since this paper does not aim at discussing the optimal
size of banks, the balance sheet size is, therefore, assumed to be exogenous.
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loan assets.
2.2. The Households
Furthermore, consider a continuum of households, normalized to one,
also with an endowment of W = 1 at the beginning of t = 1. Households are
assumed to be risk-neutral and maximize their consumption at date t = 2.11
The assumption that households cannot consume in t = 1 is a simple way
to create the need to safe money. Due to a lack of monitoring and screening
skills, households can not directly invest their endowment in risky assets.
In order to be able to consume in t = 2 households, thus, either invest
their endowments in government bonds or as insured deposits. Because all
banks together may, at the maximum, borrow an aggregate amount of 1 from
households in the form of deposits, and the depositors aggregate endowment
is W = 1, the depositors have no market power and will be willing to deposit
their endowment at the bank as long as RD ≥ RS since both assets have
the same risk, i.e., are safe assets in the basic setting. However, as discussed
later, the government overtakes the outstanding debt of a banker in case of
banker’s insolvency and therefore insures the deposits. As a result, even if
the government is not safe, deposits have the same risk level as government
bonds. Assuming that the households will provide the maximum endowment
possible to banks if RD = RS, it becomes clear, that banks will have to pay
R := RD = RS to the depositors in order to raise deposits.
12
11This assumption abstracts from the usual liquidity insurance problem of depositors.
However, with a known proportion of impatient and patient households, the result would
remain unchanged.
12The assumption of households preference for deposits is an epsilon argument, i.e., if
they are indifferent, banks only need to pay an  more than government bonds. However,
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2.3. The Borrowers
There is a continuum of penniless borrowers that receive loans L from
the banker, which they invest into a project that returns B with a posi-
tive probability p, and zero otherwise. I assume that the projects to which
borrowers have access are profitable, i.e., I assume that p · B > ρ. Intu-
itively, the expected gross return from risky projects is assumed to be higher
than the private opportunity cost of bankers to invest in those returns. The
investment in risky projects is therefore socially desirable.
The returns of investment projects are assumed to be perfectly uncor-
related. Due to a lack of collateral and transparency, borrowers can not
get direct funding from households but need to apply for loans from spe-
cialized banks. The bank loan is a simple debt contract that limits the
liability of the borrower, therefore, the banker receives the repayment on
the loan RL only in case of success.
13 The profit from an investment in
the borrower’s risky project is the expected net return minus a cost func-
tion that is convex in the loan amount, i.e., the investment in the risky
project. In particular, I assume the explicit form of the cost function to
be d
2
L2. Therefore, I can write the expected profit of a risky project as
ΠF = p
(
(B −RL)L− d2 · L2
)
+ (1 − p) (−d
2
L2
)
. The loan repayment is de-
creasing in aggregated investment, i.e., the indirect loan demand is assumed
to be a decreasing function of overall investment. To understand the intu-
ition, consider a representative penniless borrower, who faces the following
the preference can also be motivated by liquidity and service arguments such as access to
ATM and electronic payment systems.
13Again, RL = 1 + rL is for brevity the gross repayment which consists of the loan
interest rate rL plus one.
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utility function:
UF (L) = max{ΠF ; 0} · (1− τ) (1)
In case of success, the borrower makes a profit of which he has to pay a
tax τ to the government. In order to maximize its utility, the representative
borrower demands a loan amount L∗ = argmax UF (L). Because he is limited
liable, the utility of a penniless borrower can only be non-negative, a strictly
positive demand for loans exists for small loan repayments. In particular, the
first partial derivative with respect to L is either negative, such that L∗ = 0
or the optimal loan demand derived from the first order condition is given by
L∗ = B−RL
d
. The optimal loan demand is decreasing in the loan repayment.
Considering that each banker invests a total amount of 1 into assets, such
that x is the amount the banker invests in government bonds, and L = 1−x
is the share that is invested into risky loans. Therefore, the indirect demand
function for bank loans can be written as
RL = B − d(1− x) (2)
Here, B can be interpreted as the reservation price, the maximum loan in-
terest payment borrowers are able to pay. In particular, strategic interaction
among banks is neglected because it would not change the general result of
this model.
2.4. The Government Regulator
In regulating the bankers, the government regulator that has no fiscal in-
terest has the goal of reducing the excessive risk taking of banks via adequate
risk weighted capital requirements. The regulator aims at internalizing the
negative externalities of the deposit insurance without aiming at maximizing
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overall welfare. The idea is, that when the banker does not bear the full cost
of funding its investment due to the deposit insurance on deposit funding, he
will invest too much of his funds into risky loans. In particular, the unreg-
ulated limitedly liable banker will invest more in risky loans than he would
if he was fully liable for his outstanding debt. In particular, the investment
in safe assets of a fully liable bank x∗ is greater than the investment of a
limitedly liable bank x∗ > xˆ. As in the real world, the regulator can not
directly regulate the asset portfolio composition of a banker’s investment,
which would be the first best solution. This could be justified by a lack of
information on the specific asset characteristics, that is only known by the
banker.
However, the regulator can indirectly influence the portfolio composition
by setting regulating the liability side of the bank’s balance sheet. In order
to do so, the regulator forces the bankers to refund a share of their risky
investments with privately costly equity, i.e., he puts a relative risk weighted
capital requirement ∆ on risky loan assets. The relative risk weight ∆ makes
investments into risky loans relatively more costly to the banker than invest-
ments in safe government bonds, and therefore decreases the investment in
risky assets and increases the investments in safe assets. In other words, the
banker’s investment in safe assets xˆ(∆) is an increasing function of the rela-
tive risk weight ∆∗. In this way, the regulator can force the banker to invest
exactly the same amount of funds into risky assets as the banker would invest
when he was fully liable, i.e., first best investment amount. In order to force
banks to internalize the cost of their risk shifting, the regulator implements
the risk weighted capital requirement for risky assets that disciplines banks
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to behave as if they were fully liable such that xˆ(∆∗) = x∗
However, as discussed above, the government regulator also borrows from
the banks, which can influence his optimal decisions. Therefore, it is assumed
that the government has no endowments in t = 1 but receives tax income
τ · UF in t = 2 from successful borrowers.
In order to be able to repay current debt and provide public goods as
well as bailing out the liabilities of defaulted banks, the government issues
government bonds as safe assets in t = 1 with the promise of a fixed gross
repayment of RS in t = 2. In order to guarantee interior solutions, I assume
that p · (B − d) < RS. This assumption implies that due to the increasing
cost of conducting risky projects, i.e., the decreasing returns from risky in-
vestments, the gross return from risky investments if all funds are channeled
into it is lower than the return on safe investments. In other words, it is
socially not optimal to invest all funds into the risky projects of borrowers.
Moreover, this implies that p · (B − d) < ρ: it is not optimal to invest the
aggregate banker’s endowment into risky assets. Together with the earlier
assumption of profitable initial investments p · B > ρ the assumption above
secures that it is neither optimal to invest all funds in safe nor risky assets,
but in a portfolio of both assets.
The government’s objective when borrowing is to maximize its budget,
which is reflected as the objective to maximize current consumption. De-
pending on the focus of the government regulator, the goal of budget max-
imization enters the regulator’s objective function with weighting factor φ
measuring the fiscal interest of a government regulator. In the basic model,
it is assumed that government bonds are indeed safe, i.e. that the govern-
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ment regulator receives an endowment in t = 2 that enables him to pay back
the bond obligations.
2.5. Decisions and Timing
The timing is as follows: the households and bankers receive their initial
endowments and the regulator decides on the optimal relative risk weight for
risky assets compared to safe assets ∆ as a minimum capital requirement
regulation. After the agents received their endowments, the bankers collect
funds from depositors, decide to invest inside equity, invest deposits and
equity into assets, and consume the residual in t = 1. In t = 2, the bankers
receive the returns from their successful asset investments. If they are solvent,
they repay their debt to depositors and consume any profits. If insolvent, the
bank is closed and the banker’s outstanding debt is cleared by the deposit
insurance, which is covered the government in this model. Because the banker
consumes the part of his endowment, which he does not invest as equity, he
is penniless in t = 2 and, thus, also limitedly liable. In case of bank default,
the banker receives a payoff of zero, while equity that was invested in t = 1
is sunk.
Figure 1: The Timeline of the Decisions Taken
-s s st=0 t=1 t=2
Regulator sets
risk weight ∆.
Agents receive
initial endowments.
Knowing ∆,
banks choose
equity K, invest
safe xˆ(∆)and risky
(1− xˆ(∆)) assets.
Returns are realized.
Banks are closed if insolvent.
Governments are replaced
if insolvent.
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3. The Banker’s Investment Decision
3.1. The First Best Investment
As a benchmark, I first discuss the optimal investment choice of bankers
in the absence of externalities and without regulation. Therefore, consider
a world, where a banker is fully liable. After receiving his endowment in
t = 1, the representative banker has to decide how much to invest of its
own endowment as inside equity investment K. The banker borrows the
residual 1−K as deposits from households at the promised repayment RD.
He then invests the deposits and own equity in a portfolio of a share x of safe
government bonds with repayment RS and in a share (1 − x) of loan asset
with repayment RL(x). In the benchmark, the banker is fully liable to repay
the deposit liability even if his asset investments default.
The banker then chooses K, and respectively D = 1 −K and the asset
portfolio composition x to maximize his expected intertemporal consump-
tion. As he is impatient he discounts the expected future consumption in
time t = 2.
E(U fl(K, x)) = c1 +
1
ρ
· E(c2) (3)
s.t.
c1 = W −K
E(c2) = p (xRS + (1− x)RL(x)− (1−K)RD) + (1− p) (RSx− (1−K)RD)
Because of the full liability, the consumption of the banker can be negative
in t = 2. In particular, it will be negative when the bank invests no own
equity as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If the risky loan investment defaults, the banker’s consumption
c2 is negative when he proportion of equity investment is smaller than the
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investment in risky assets.
Proof. With probability (1 − p), the loan asset investment defaults and the
banker receives (RSx− (1−K)RD). As discussed above, the deposit rate
is driven down to R = RD = RS, which implies R(x − 1 − K) such that
consumption becomes negative whenever 1− x > K.
This follows from the zero profit of the safe investment, which does not
create a buffer against losses. The partial derivative of the expected future
consumption with respect to equity investment K is:
∂E(U fl)
∂K
= −1 + 1
ρ
·RD (4)
As discussed above, the deposit rate is driven down to R = RD = RS. Under
the assumption that ρ > RS the right hand side of equation (4) is negative,
such that even a fully liable banker chooses to leverage his portfolio with
deposits as much as possible.
Lemma 2. A fully liable banker invests no inside equity but all deposits into
a portfolio with (1− x∗) = B−
R
p
2d
risky loan assets and x∗ government bonds.
Proof. Because ∂E(U
fl)
∂K
< 0 the banker optimally chooses to invest no inside
equity. With K = 0 the partial derivative of the expected consumption
function with respect to x becomes:
∂E(U fl)
∂x
= p(R−RL(x) + (1− x)R′L(x)) + (1− p)R != 0.
Solving the first order condition for the optimal investment into risky loan
assets 1− x∗ yields (1− x∗) = B−
R
p
2d
Intuitively, the optimal portfolio decision equalizes the marginal profit
of the safe investment, which is zero, with the marginal profits of the risky
investment.
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I now introduce the economic problem that the banker is only limitedly
liable, i.e., after he consumed his initial endowment, he cannot made liable
if the asset returns from his investment portfolio fall short of his liabilities to
depositors. In other words, from now on, I exclude the possibility of negative
consumption.
3.2. The Banker’s Investment Decision without Regulation
If the banker is limitedly liable, his future consumption can be at min-
imum zero. He therefore wants to maximize the following expected utility
function.
E(U ltd(K, x)) = c1 +
1
ρ
· E(c2) (5)
s.t.
c1 = W −K
E(c2) = max{p (xRS + (1− x)RL(x)− (1−K)RD)
+(1− p) (RSx− (1−K)RD) ; 0}
Lemma 3. The unregulated banker prefers to consume all his endowments
in t = 1 and borrow D = 1 from insured depositors.
Proof. The right hand side of first order partial derivative with respect to
inside equity investments is negative in each case, i.e., ∂E(U
ltd)
∂K
= −1 < 0
if E(c2) = 0 and
∂E(U ltd)
∂K
= −1 + 1
ρ
· RD < 0, otherwise. Therefore, the
unregulated bank will always prefer to consume all its endowments in t =
1.
With K = 0, the profit from bank investment is never positive, if the
loan investment fails. Therefore, the first order condition with respect to the
optimal portfolio choice variable x becomes
∂E(U ltd)
∂x
=
1
ρ
· p [R−RL(x) + (1− x)R′L(x)] != 0 (6)
19
The marginal benefit from investing in the loan asset should equal the marginal
benefit from investing in the safe asset, which is zero. Using the linear indi-
rect demand function, the optimal investment of an unregulated bank into
risky assets is
(1− xˆ) = B −R
2d
(7)
Lemma 4. A Limitedly liable banker takes excessive risk in the form of
higher loan asset investments compared to optimal investment with full lia-
bility.
Proof. Consider from Lemma 2 the optimal investment of a fully liable bank:
(1− x∗) = 1
2
B−R
p
d
. For any positive default probability of risky assets p < 1,
it holds that R
p
> R such that (1 − x∗) < (1 − xˆ) or x∗ > xˆ a fully liable
banker invests more funds into safe assets and less into risky assets.
3.3. The Banker’s Investment Decision with Regulation
A risk weighted capital requirement in this model is reflected by a relative
risk weight for risky loans compared to safe loans: K ≥ (1 − x) · ∆. The
relative risk weight ∆ ∈ [0, 1] is a stark simplification of the granulated
capital requirements of the Basel II and III accords but covers in essence the
main mechanisms of the influence of risk weights on the portfolio choice of
bankers.
A more realistic approach to Basel II would be a capital requirement
K ≥ (wS · x + wL(1 − x))δ, where δ is the unweighted percentage, i.e, 8 %
of assets under Basel II, wS is the risk weight for safe assets and wL is the
risk weight for risky assets. A zero risk weight for safe assets immediately
results in wL · δ, which corresponds to the ∆ in the simplified approach.
With a nonzero risk weight for safe assets the requirement can be written as
K ≥ (wS · δ+ (wL−wS)δ(1−x)). In this case, the optimal portfolio decision
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of the banker will not only be influenced by the overall size of the capital
requirement but also by the relative risk weight, i.e., the decision is influenced
by (wL − wS)δ. This relative risk weight is also captured by the simplified
∆ above. If the ∆ corresponds to the relative risk weight (wL − wS)δ it is
noteworthy that ∆ can be increased by a higher risk weight for risky assets
as well as by a lower risk weight for safe assets, respectively. This implies
that a correct risk weight for risky loan assets but a comparatively too low
risk weight for the safer asset, such as government bonds, is also reflected in
a higher ∆.
The inside equity investment of the banker must at least equal a per-
centage ∆ of its risky loan investment. As discussed above, a banker prefers
consumption over investing inside equity, hence, the minimum equity re-
quirement that the regulator sets will be a binding constraint to the bankers
optimal investment decision K = (1− x) ·∆. Inserting the binding require-
ment into equation (5) yields the regulated banker’s objective function.
E(U reg(x)) = c1 +
1
ρ
· E(c2) (8)
s.t.
c1 = W − (1− x) ·∆
E(c2) = max{p (xRS + (1− x)RL(x)− (1− (1− x) ·∆)RD)
+(1− p) (RSx− (1−K)RD) ; 0}
Lemma 5. For a relative risk weighted capital requirement ∆ < 1, the regu-
lated banker does not make positive profits when his assets default.
Proof. Recall from Lemma 1 that a banker defaults when his assets default
whenever (1 − x) > K. Substitution of the binding relative risk weighted
21
capital requirement K = (1 − x) · ∆ gives (1 − x) > (1 − x) · ∆, such that
the banker defaults whenever ∆ < 1.
In the case of ∆ = 1, the banker is forced to refund 100% of his assets
with equity, such that he cannot default. However, this extreme regulation
implies that the banker looses his role as a financial intermediary and is
therefore excluded from the analysis.14
Lemma 5 shows that a regulated limited liable banker, i.e., a banker
that is regulated with ∆ < 1 expects future consumption to be E(c2) =
p (xRS + (1− x)RL(x)− (1− (1− x) ·∆)RD) because with probability 1−p
the bank makes negative profits such that the banker receives zero. This leads
to the first order condition for the optimal portfolio choice variable x of
∂E(U reg)
∂x
= ∆ +
1
ρ
· p [(1−∆)R−RL(x) + (1− x)R′L(x)] != 0 (9)
Solving for the optimal portfolio investment gives the optimal investment
in risky assets as a function of the regulation ∆:
(1− xˆ(∆)) = B −
∆ρ
p
− (1−∆)R
2d
(10)
It is straightforward to show that the investment choice of the representative
bank into safe assets is increasing in the risk weight for risky assets: Note,
14Corresponding to the discussion above, ∆ reflects the difference of risky and safe risk
weights times the general capital requirement, i.e, (wL − wS)δ. The risk weight wL for a
corporate may be above 100% , e.g. claims on corporations are assigned with a risk weight
of up to 150% under the Standard Approach when the corporation rated below BB−.
However, even with a zero risk weight wS = 0 the difference (wL − wS) is multiplied by
the general capital requirement δ, i.e., 8% under Basel II and up to 13 % under Basel
III such that even under the higher requirements of Basel III it is feasible to assume that
∆ < 1.
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that if the banker is not allowed to receive funds from depositors but has to
refund his investment with equity only, i.e., ∆ = 1, the optimal investment
of the regulated banker would be lower than the first best investment, due
to the high opportunity cost of equity investment. In the other extreme
case, when ∆ = 0 the banker’s investment choice equals equation (7), the
unregulated case.
Moreover, the partial derivative of the optimal safe investment choice
with respect to the capital requirement regulation is positive:
∂xˆ(∆)
∂∆
=
1
2
ρ− pR
pd
> 0 (11)
A higher risk weight for loan assets reduces investment in risky assets and
increases investment in government bonds.
3.4. The Optimal Risk Weight of a Regulator without Fiscal Interest
Under the assumption that the regulator cannot regulate the asset side
of the bank but only the liability side, the first best outcome cannot be
implemented.15 However, the regulator can force the bankers to internalize
the cost of their excessive risk taking with the help of minimum capital
requirement. The regulator thereby takes the investment decision xˆ(∆) of
bankers as given. To force the banker to internalize the full cost of his
investment decision the regulator sets a ∆∗ such that the regulated banker
15Actually, regulation under the Basel accords concentrates on liabilities of the bank
rather than the regulation of assets: The main reason for this focus is the asymmetric
information on the asset characteristics. As banks are specialized in evaluating the risk
and return characteristics of their assets it is difficult, if not impossible, for a regulator
to determine the optimal asset portfolio composition. However, anticipating that the
incentives of bankers are disturbed by their limited liability, the regulator can correct
these incentives by requiring the banker to invest sufficient equity funds.
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implements xˆ(∆∗) = x∗. Formally, he sets ∆∗ = argmax{E(U fl(x(∆))} such
that the ∆∗ chosen fulfill the first order condition of the fully liable banker
with reaction function xˆ(∆).
Proposition 1. The regulator without fiscal interest sets an optimal capital
requirement risk weight for loan assets that balances the banker’s benefit from
limited liability with the private opportunity costs of investing equity
∆∗ =
R · (1− p)
ρ− pR .
Proof. The first order condition is
p(R−B + 2d(1− x(∆)) + (1− p)R != 0.
Using equation (10) and solving for ∆ yields the ∆∗ for which it is true that
1− xˆ(∆∗) = 1− x∗, i.e.:
(1− xˆ(∆∗)) = B −
∆ρ
p
− (1−∆)R
2d
=
pB − pR−∆(ρ− pR)
2dp
Inserting ∆∗ = R·(1−p)
ρ−pR and using Lemma 2 yields:
pB − pR−R(1− p)
2dp
=
B − R
p
2d
= (1− x∗)
It is worth noting that the optimal capital requirement risk weight, and
hence the demand for safe assets, is increasing in the risk less government
bond rate R.
3.5. A Regulator with Fiscal Interests
This section analyzes how a regulator sets the capital requirement when
he also has fiscal interests. In other words, I assume that the regulator gains
some utility from forcing banks to integrate the negative externality of their
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investment. However, the regulator also gains utility from maximizing his
current budget and, thus, wants banks and households to invest in govern-
ment bonds. I focus on a short term oriented regulator that only values
current consumption in t = 1. In particular, I assume that, besides regu-
lating the banking sector, the government regulator wants to maximize his
budget in t = 1.16
Requiring banks to refund their investments with inside equity in this
model has two effects on: Firstly, the bank internalizes the risk and, therefore,
invests less in loan assets compared to the unregulated decision. Secondly, the
inside equity crowds out deposit investments of households. Since households
have access to the sovereign debt market, those households that can not
deposit their savings at a bank invest their savings in government bonds.
A regulator with fiscal interests then wants to maximize the weighted
sum of utility he gets from setting ∆∗ and the utility from his current budget
xˆ(∆) + (1 − xˆ(∆))∆. The current budget consists of two terms, where the
first term is the direct investment in government bonds from banks as a
function of capital regulation and the second term the increased investment
from households that cannot deposit their savings at banks due to the capital
requirement. Both terms are increasing in the capital requirement, though
the second term at a decreasing rate, since banks invest less in risky loans
to minimize their private cost of capital requirements. Denote with Γ(∆, φ)
16The weight that a government regulator puts on budget maximization can also be
interpreted as a measure for the necessity to raise new debt in order to server outstanding
debt. This is not explicitly modeled in this simple static model, but the intuition would be,
that a government with high outstanding debt from earlier periods would have a greater
interest to maximize its budget than a government that has low outstanding debt.
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the utility of a regulator with fiscal interest, where the government regulator
weights the goal of current budget maximization with φ and the achievement
on his goal of optimal regulation with (1− φ).
∆ˆ(φ) = argmax{(1− φ)E(U fl(x(∆)) + φ [xˆ+ (1− xˆ) ·∆]} (12)
If φ = 0, the regulator has no fiscal interest and sets the optimal capital
requirement, i.e., ∆ˆ(0) = ∆∗. However, if φ > 0, the government regulator
sets a capital requirement strictly greater than the optimal regulation.
Proposition 2. A regulator with fiscal interests sets a higher relative risk
weighted capital requirement on risky loan assets than a regulator without
fiscal interests.
Proof. The first order condition can be solved for Delta:
∆ =
p (1− φ) (1− p)R2 + (((2− ρ)φ+ ρ)− ρ (1− φ))R− φ (ρ+ pB)
(ρ− pR) (p (1− φ)R + (ρ− 2)φ− ρ)
The second partial derivative with respect to ∆ is negative:
−1
2
(1− φ) (ρ− pR)2
pd
− φ (ρ− pR)
pd
< 0
The partial derivative of the optimal regulation with respect to φ is positive:
∂∆
∂φ
=
pB −R + ρ−R
((1− φ) ρ− p (1− φ)R + 2φ)2 > 0
Here the basic assumptions are used, i.e. that pB > ρ and ρ ≥ R. The higher
φ, i.e., the more interested the regulator is in current budget maximization,
the higher he sets the relative risk weighted capital requirement for risky loan
assets.
To get an intuition, consider the case where φ = 1, the case of a Leviathan
regulator that is only interested in maximizing his budget in t = 1. In this
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case, the first order condition can be summarized to the following condition:
∆ = min
[
1
2
(
1 +
p(B −R)
ρ− pR
)
, 1
]
= 1
For the basic assumptions pB > ρ and ρ > R, the first term is strictly greater
than one, such that a Leviathan regulator would always choose the corner
solution and sets the relative risk weighted capital requirement for risky loans
equal to one.
In contrast, a regulator without fiscal interest sets a capital requirement
strictly smaller than one, i.e. ∆∗ < 1 for ρ > R.
Moreover, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2, the capital requirement
set by the regulator is strictly increasing in his fiscal interest φ, when the
expected return from loan investment outweighs the banker’s private cost of
capital. The more a regulator is fiscally interested, i.e, the more he values
current budget maximization (higher φ), the higher he sets the relative risk
weight for loan assets, deviating from the optimal risk weight, i.e.: ∂∆(φ,R)
∂φ
>
0. Thereby, the regulator channels funds from bankers and households to
investments in government bonds.
Figure 2 illustrates three different types of the government regulator. The
thin black line, labeled (a), depicts the regulator’s utility without any fiscal
interest. He will set the risk weight for risky loan assets as described in
Proposition 1. The thin grey line, labeled (b), illustrates the case of a partly
fiscally interested regulator. The maximum of his utility function is reached
at a higher relative risk weight for risky loan assets. The bold black line,
labeled (c), depicts the utility of a regulator that is only concerned with
fiscal interests, i.e., that only derives utility from current consumption. Such
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Figure 2: The Regulator’s Utility as a function of ∆ and φ
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a Leviathan optimally chooses a corner solution where he sets the risk weight
as high as possible, which would be equal to full inside equity funding in our
model framework. The dashed grey line depicts all feasible utility maximizing
∆(φ) for φ ∈ [0, 1]. A higher regulator’s interest results in a higher overall
utility level because in this simple setting the budget maximization adds
utility to the utility gained from optimal regulation.
Basically, the regulator can implement any bank investment portfolio
decision in the interval [xˆ(0), xˆ(1)]by setting a certain ∆. In other words, the
risk weight decision directly influences how much the banking sector invests
in safe assets xˆ. It is easy to verify that x(∆(0)) < x(∆(φ)) for ∆(φ) > ∆(0),
because x is linearly increasing in ∆. The benevolent regulator channels less
funds into government bonds than the regulator with fiscal interests.
4. Welfare Considerations
The goal of optimal regulation to internalize the cost of risk shifting to
the bank’s optimal portfolio choice does not necessarily coincide with the
welfare maximizing regulation of the banking sector. In particular, with
no additional social cost of bank default, the regulation of banks in this
simple model would be welfare decreasing. To see this, consider the welfare
generated in terms of consumption.
In t = 1, the endowment of households is invested in banks and gov-
ernment bonds depending on the regulation. Banks consume W − K and
the government consumes K. The net welfare effect is zero, since higher
regulation just shifts consumption from banks to the government regulator.
In t = 2, the productive return from the risky projects ΠF (1 − xˆ(∆))
is generated and split between the banks and the firms in terms of the loan
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interest rate. The residual profit of borrowers is shared between the successful
entrepreneurs and the government according to the tax rate. Households
receive and consume R, either from successful banks or the government in
case of bank default. The government pays back its obligations to banks
and households. Hence, the net welfare Y generated is the net profit from
successful entrepreneurs Y = (1− x(∆)) · p(B − d
2
(1− x(∆))).
Without any social cost of bank default, the net impact of investment
in government bonds is a reduction in welfare. In particular, the capital
regulation that maximizes the net profit from successful entrepreneurs is:
∆Y = argmax(1− xˆ(∆)) · p(B − d
2
(1− xˆ(∆))) = −p(B +R)
ρ− pR < 0 (13)
Therefore, any capital regulation ∆ > 0 reduces welfare, because it reduces
investment into the productive but risky sector. However, as the recent finan-
cial crisis has illustrated, bank failures are costly because of the contagion to
other solvent banks, the disappearance of know how and private information
on borrowers, as well as the disturbance of trust, financing, and payment
flows. I assume that these costs are linear to the bank failure, though as
the last crisis has shown, the costs could very well be convex, i.e. the more
banks fail the higher are the marginal costs to society. Introducing these
social costs s proportional to the banks that default, the welfare function
can be written as
Y = (1− x(∆)) · p(B − d
2
(1− x(∆))− s(1− p) · (1− x(∆)) (14)
Proposition 3. With moderate social cost of bank default, a fiscally inter-
ested capital regulation harms social welfare.
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The detailed proof can be found in the Appendix A. The intuition
is that, with moderate social cost associated with bank default, i.e. s ∈[
0, 1
2
(
B+R
1−p +R
)]
, setting a capital regulation ∆(φ) > ∆∗ strictly reduces
welfare. However, if the social costs are very high, i.e. s > 1
2
(
B+R
1−p +R
)
welfare can be increased by fiscally interested regulation. However, a regu-
lator with high fiscal interest may not consider the constraint of government
solvency and, therefore, may risk the detrimental welfare consequences of a
sovereign default.
5. Discussion
The paper argues that a government regulator, who simultaneously reg-
ulates the banking sector and borrows from it, may have the incentive to
increase risk weights for risky loan assets beyond the optimal level in order
to ease its own debt financing. In particular, the government regulator may
have an incentive to overregulate risky assets compared to safe assets. This
incentive to overregulate is particularly interesting, since the most prominent
international guidelines for prudential capital regulation, the Basel accords,
only provide standards for minimum capital requirements but not for maxi-
mum requirements. Therefore, the Basel agreements leave room to overreg-
ulate classes of assets compared to less risky assets. By overregulating the
risky assets, the government regulator can indirectly increase the demand
for government bonds, thereby undermining the separation of monetary and
fiscal policy.
Likewise, biased risk weighted capital regulation may be implemented in
the form of underregulated safe assets compared to risky assets. If risky as-
sets receive a fair risk weight that indeed reflects the fundamental risk of the
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asset, the government with fiscal interest may have an incentive to relatively
underregulated the government bond compared to the risky asset. Anecdotal
evidence may be found in the implementation of the Basel II agreement into
European law. Deviating from the recommendations of Basel II, the Cap-
ital Requirement Directive imposed a zero-risk weight on all EU sovereign
bonds. Arguably this lowest possible risk weight encouraged European banks
to invest massively in these EU bonds because irrespective of the individual
sovereign risk, the bank could invest without any additional equity require-
ment. In times of low interest rates but rare equity, the cheap borrowed
capital was, therefore, channeled into EU government bonds.
In each of the two theoretical cases, biased capital ratios increase the
demand for government bonds. This eases government spending and thus
circumvents the monetary policy monopoly of an independent institution as
the central bank. In other words, through risk weighted capital regulations,
governments can indirectly influence their refunding conditions. Moreover,
reduced cost of government debt may increase government spending. The in-
crease in current government debt may jeopardize the government’s solvency
of tomorrow. However, if the yield on government bonds does not (fully) re-
flect the riskiness of the government regulator, this higher risk is not (fully)
taken into account by the regulator with fiscal interests. This result points
to an additional problem in the Eurozone, where government bond yields
did not fully reflect the individual risk of each Eurozone member state. Be-
sides the direct incentive to increase government debt due to cheap financing,
the government regulator has the incentive to introduce biased regulation,
thereby forcing banks to increase their investments in government bonds.
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This could lead to an additional problem. Due to the excessive investment
in government bonds, all banks are more correlated. If the government bonds
can default, the systemic risk in the banking sector increases. If the financial
distress of the regulator results in a systemic crisis of the banking sector,
the feedback effect on the government through the safety net can drive the
government and its banking sector into an insolvency circle.
The policy implications of the presented analysis are threefold: In the
aftermath of the financial crisis, the reformers in the Basel Committee focused
on the size and quality of the regulatory equity. In addition, anticyclical
equity buffers are introduced. However, the calibration of the risk weights
barely changed and the standards of implementation and supervision are no
component of the reforms. This focus on the fine-tuning of the risk weighted
capital regulation overlooks incentive problems regarding the national and
supranational implementation of the Basel Accords. The problem of upwards
biased capital adequacy regulation may be encountered by a simple maximum
leverage ratio as discussed in the Basel III reform.
Moreover, the analysis suggests the equity regulation should be delegated
to an independent authority because it has the power to indirectly influence
monetary policy. For example, the delegation of regulatory policy, especially
the imposition of risk weights, to an independent institution like the cen-
tral bank could avoid the inherent conflict of interest. Finally, the analysis
suggests that higher indebted governments have a higher incentive to bias
capital regulation. In the process of international harmonization of banking
regulation, the harmonization of maximum government debt levels may also
alleviate the adverse incentives of governments to bias the regulation.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. In t = 1, banks consume
W −K
Households invest
−W
The government consumes
x+K
and borrowers receive
1− x
The net welfare is
W −K −W + x+K + 1− x = 1.
In t = 2, banks consume
p(xR + (1− x)RL − (1−K)R)
Households receive p(1 − K)R from successful banks and (1 − p)(1 − K)R
from the government, taking over the liabilities from defaulting banks
p(1−K)R + (1− p)(1−K)R +KR = R
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The government receives tax income and pays pxr to banks or depositors in
case of default, pays (1− p)(1−K)R−KR
τ · p(1− x)(B −RL − d
2
(1− x))− pxR− (1− p)(1−K)R
and borrowers receive
(1− τ) · p(1− x)(B −RL − d
2
(1− x))
The intertemporal net welfareis
Y := 1 + p(1− xˆ(∆))(B − d
2
(1− xˆ(∆))).
Using equation (10) the net welfare can be expressed in terms of the capital
requirement:
1 +
(
1
2
B (p(B −R)−∆(ρ− pR))
pd
− 1
8
(p(B −R)−∆(ρ− pR))2
dp2
)
p
The first order condition with respect to ∆ is
−1
4
(p(B −R)−∆(ρ− pR)) (ρ− pR)
dp2
p
!
=
1
2
B (ρ− pR)
pd
Solving for delta gives:
∆W = −pB + pR
ρ− pR < 0
Introducing the social cost of bank default, the social welfare function be-
comes
Y s := 1 + p(1− x)(B − d
2
(1− x))− s(1− p)(1− x)
Solving the first order condition for ∆ gives:
∆W (s) =
2(1− p)s− p (B +R)
ρ− pR
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The welfare optimal ∆W (s) is between 0 and 1 for s ∈
[
B+R
2(1−p) ,
(ρ−pR)+(B+R)
2(1−p)
]
.
For s = (ρ−pR)+R(1−p)
2(1−p) , the welfare optimal ∆ equals the benevolent regulator’s
choice. Therefore, for s ≤ (ρ−pR)+R(1−p)
2(1−p) , the welfare is decreasing if the
regulator has fiscal interests and sets a risk weighted capital regulation that
is higher than the regulation that internalizes the risk shifting of limitedly
liable banks.
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